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This is a study about leadership failure, state collapse and external intervention in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1960 to 2010. It is based on research that I undertook, records that 
I kept and field work interviews conducted while serving as a United Nations Electoral Affairs 
Officer (2004-2006) and Political Affairs Officer (2006-2010) in the DRC. It is further based on a 
field mission in the DRC in 2012. The study covers the period from independence in 1960 through 
the Mobutu years to the Joseph Kabila presidency up to 2010. I use the framework of historical 
legitimacy, political economy and subaltern realism to explain conflict and instability in the Congo 
since independence. I posit that governance and leadership failure and external intervention are 
interrelated but that leadership failure is a more crucial explanation of state failure and collapse 
than external intervention. Moreover, while political economy analysis and realism are powerful 
investigative tools, the state’s lack of historical legitimacy best explains crises and instability in 
DRC since independence. Decentralization within a unitary system, functionalist regional 
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12. CONAKAT - Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga – Association of 
Katangan Tribal Associations 
 
13. CSK - Comite Special du Katanga – Special Committee of Katanga 
 
14. FARDC – Forces Armée de la République Democratique du Congo (The Congolese 
army) 
 
15. FLNC - Front du Liberation Nationale du Congo – Congolese National Liberation Front 
 
16. Garde Republicaine – Republican Guard 
 




18. MIBA - Miniere de Bakwanga- the Bakwnga diamond mining authority. 
 
19. MONUC/MONUSCO – Mission d’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation 
du Congo – UN Stabilisation Mission in Congo. Previously known by the name 
MONUC, the Mission d’organisation des Nations Unies au Congo or UN Mission in 
Congo 
 
20. MLC - Mouvement de Libération Congolais –Congolese Liberation Movement 
 
21. MNC Mouvement National Congolais- Congolese National Movement 
 
22. MPR - Mouvement Populaire pour la Revolution – Popular Movement for the Révolution 
 
23. GUN – Gouvernement d’Unité Nationale – National Unity Government 
 
24. PRP - Parti de la Révolution Populaire – People’s Revolutionary Party 
 
25. PSA - Parti de Solidarité Africaine – African Solidarity Party 
 
26. RCD - Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie – Congolese Rally for Democracy 
 
27. UDPS - Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social - Union for Democracy and 
Social Progress 
 
28. UMHK - Union Miniere du Haut Katanga – Katanga Mining Union  
 
29. UN - Union pour la Nation – Union for the Nation 
 
30. FDLR – Front Democratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda – Democratic Front for the 
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Introduction to the Study 
 
(i) Introduction 
Political scientists study power in relation to other concepts such as democracy, the state, class, 
ideology, conflict, war and peace. These concepts have preoccupied the minds of political 
philosophers since antiquity. It is not different in 21st century Africa, where the study of conflict 
and the African state dominates academic discourse. This dissertation is underpinned by the 
paradox of the state in Africa. First, the State is the centre of power and the main distributor of 
resources and privileges. Second, the State in Africa is without historical foundations and therefore 
fragile in its overwhelming power. This paradox sets the context of this dissertation about the 
DRC1, conflict-ridden since independence which explains the inability to build institutions that 
would guarantee a legal-rational order. Powerful but fragile, having no historical legitimacy, the 
State’s authority in the DRC has always been challenged. Coping with this crisis of legitimacy has 
sapped its capacity and depleted its resources during the period of the half century covered by this 
dissertation. 
 
The 1960s were a period of profound change and hope as many African countries became 
politically independent. It was a time of triumphant African nationalism and inspiring debates by 
various political actors of the time over the future political and ideological direction of the 
continent. Thirty years later, after many  secession crises, irredentist conflicts, military coups, civil 
                                                 
1 The name of the country has undergone many changes. During different periods, it was called the Congo Free State 
or Belgian King Leopold’s Congo (1885-1908), the Belgian Congo ( 1908-1960), the Republic of Congo (1960 to 
1973), Zaire (1973 to 1997) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (from 1997 to date).  To better highlight the 
context of historical events, the different names are used interchangeably in this dissertation although The Congo 
stands out as the most used. 
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wars, political assassinations, ethno-electoral crises and instances of State collapse, the continent 
again celebrated, in 1989-1990, what was considered as another new dawn, one for democracy, 
following the collapse of the Berlin Wall ending the Cold War. Changes of revolutionary 
proportions occurred in the form of popular regime change or promising sovereign national 
conferences in Mali, Benin, Niger, Zaire Chad, Republic of Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia and 
Zambia. More than a decade into this new century, the quest for Pax-Africana remains elusive as 
the strong but weak State paradox continues to define the majority of African countries.  
 
Weber conceptualizes the State as the institution that possesses the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of force. This legitimate force is to maintain social order and the delivery of goods like security, 
and social and economic progress2.  Regardless of ideology, the objective of States is usually the 
same. Although the Westphalian State principles, central to the world order, account for relative 
stability across many regions, the situation in Africa has been different. Inherent in this problem 
is the lack of historical legitimacy which is a key framework in this dissertation. When a State 
lacks historical legitimacy, it lacks social capital; that is to say, it lacks the institutions, 
relationships, attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to 
economic and social development. The study shows that the lack of historical legitimacy crucially 
explains the reason for the absence of cohesion and stability in the Congo since independence in 
1960. Due to this lacking, leaders embark on policies and actions that inevitably weaken the 
economy which results in state collapse.  
                                                 
2 The Marxist world view which sees the State as an instrument of bourgeois economic interest is not considered as 
appropriate here. The original declaration of the birth of states does not indicate an existence for the sole purpose of 
exploitation. Marxist historical materialism, dialectics and political economy are however relevant tools to 




The State in Africa may be described as an alien institution. Unlike European states that evolved 
over centuries and matured through earth-shaking historic turning points from the eras of powerful 
kings and kingdoms, peaceful or violent constitutional evolutions, the Enlightenment, the 
Industrial Revolution and continental upheavals between the 18th and 20th centuries, the average 
African State in its current form is barely more than two generations old.  I argue that the nation-
state has not yet arrived in Africa and the State’s alien nature is a factor for instability. 
Corroborating Engelbert’s (2000) findings3, I argue that neopatrimonialism is another name for 
the politics of survival in conditions of contested legitimacy; secession and rebellion are at times 
expressions of ethnic competietion and antagonism; and one-party dictatorship was the other name 
for the imposition of the State on reluctant citizens.4 In this dissertation, I used relevant examples 
to demonstrate that historical legitimacy is crucial in African politics and the lack of it is a factor 
that facilitates instability. 
 
In my second approach, through the political economy analysis of conflict, I discuss instability in 
the context of the struggle for power and resources in the State. I posit that where the State has 
hardly any legitimacy, historical or contemporary, politics becomes violent owing to the lack of 
consensus on state and institution building. The state’s overwhelming power as a ‘bula matari’5 
                                                 
3 Engelbert’s thesis on the African state’s lack of legitimacy holds that the weakness of most African states is a 
function of heterogeneity which causes the adoption of policies that are inimical to growth and weakens the quality 
of institutions. Engelbert’s arguments will be frequently discussed in this thesis. 
4 In the DRC, the state is referred to as Bula Matari, meaning breaker of rocks. The Belgian colonial authority had a 
difficult time fighting off resistance to kings and tribes that refused to accept it. 
5 ‘Breaker of Rocks’ in the Kikongo language. During Henry Morton Stanley’s exploration cum conquest of the 
territory for King Leopold II in the 18 century, he had used dynamite to break up rocks and open up passages to the 
awe of the local population inhabiting areas his party passed through. They referred to him as Bula Matari, the 
breaker of rocks. Ever since, the expression has come to represent the overwhelming power of the state.  The 
overwhelming power of the ‘white man’ demonstrated by the dynamite and other destructive capacity convinced the 
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makes it the alpha and the omega of the polity, the sole distributor of privilege and resources. This 
makes politics violent. To quote Clapham’s expression, the struggle for power usually takes 
“pathological dimensions” (Clapham, 1985, p.45) and a power-security approach dynamique 
characterizes relations among the components of the divided territory. The political economy 
approach looks at state power as the sole avenue to security in the absence of functioning 
institutions and national cohesion. Politics is seen as a fight for survival. A political economy 
analysis also reveals, as Mamdani (2001), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) Lamarchand (2009) Turner 
(2007) and Stearns (2011) have demonstrated in their work, that conflict and instability in the 
eastern Congo from the 1990s to 2010 were caused by the struggle for space, land and economic 
resources. The framework revealed that competition for access to resources in the east of the DRC 
has fueled citizenship crises, ethnic conflicts, rebellion and war during the period covered in this 
dissertation. The political economy analysis in this dissertation showed that with the creation of 
the class of Africans who became the elite at independence, competition and lust for power became 
the logical consequence and with external manipulation, the explosion of crisis was inevitable.  
 
Political realism is another approach used to understand and explain conflict and instability in the 
DRC since independence. Taking inspiration from Ayoob’s (2002) sub-theory of subaltern realism 
which shares the themes of interest and power as running through the actions of all states past and 
present,6 I demonstrate that the regional states that invaded the Congo from 1996 to 2003 took 
advantage of the security vacuum there due to state failure and collapse to address their own 
                                                 
local populations that continuing to resist was futile against Bula Matari, the Belgian occupier.  This is discussed by 
Rothschild in King Leopold’s Ghost (1998). 
6 From classical (Machiavelli) to enlightened (Morgenthau) realism, the realist tradition has always emphasized 
outcomes and not moral considerations in politics. It has focused on the actual needs and interests of leaders and states 
paying less attention to morality. This thinking in Ayoob’s analysis helps understand why regional states intervened 
in the DRC in the last decade of the 20th century. 
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internal political and security imperatives. Clark (2002) who calls Ayoob’s ‘subaltern realism’ a 
compelling analysis says that contemporary leaders of developing states are indeed emulating the 
leaders of European states of the early modern period. In his Inequality and Theorising in 
International Relations: The Case for Subaltern realism, Ayoob shows that when international 
relations theory emerged it did not cater for subalterns, weak and emergent third world nations 
because the power politics of the past century and before it was based on a Euro-centric state 
formation, expansion and power relations. According to him, the context in which regional states 
(Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, etc.) fought in the DRC in the 1990s was partly out of 
realisation that they have to do what others did during their own state formation experiences, a 
subaltern perspective of international relations different from the theorising of power and conflicts 
shaped by circumstances appropriate to big powers. I have used this third approach to an extent in 
my discussion of external intervention in the DRC in 1997 and 1998-2003. 
 
I adopted the interpretivist meta-theory of the social sciences as well as a qualitative methodology 
to interrogate and interprete data. Social reality is inherently objective but interpreting that reality 
involves dealing with rational, unpredictable, calculating, and subjective actors thus imposing 
multiple realities to deal with. I made a common sense reading of these different realities, 
perspectives and convictions after which I analysed them ending with conclusions that are 
grounded. I will now proceed to give a historical overview of conflict and instability in the DRC 






(ii)  Historical Background 
Before the Belgian takeover of 1908, the territory of the Belgian Congo7 was, in the words of 
Depelchin (1992), a virtual enterprise and a monopoly of the Belgian bourgeoisie led by the 
Belgian Royal Family and King Leopold II, supported by a few powerful trusts such as the Societe 
Générale Belge.8 The magnitude of the Belgian interest was demonstrated by the size of the 
Belgian presence in the country in the late 1950s. On the eve of independence, 10,000 civil 
servants, 1000 military officers, 6000 catholic missionaries and several thousand managers of 
colonial enterprises supported the colonial administration from a population of 110,000 Belgians 
(Young, 2007). Belgian colonial rule mainly served the interests of Belgian investors whose 
attitude to the colony began to change under pressure only after the 1959 Leopoldville riots for 
independence (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).9 
 
The Belgian Congo became independent on 30 June 1960 as the Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) 
and shortly afterwards, the new government of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was thrown into 
crisis by the secession of the mineral rich provinces of Katanga under Moise Tshombe and South 
Kasai under Albert Kalonji. Lumumba appealed to the United Nations for help to preserve the 
country’s territorial integrity, and, aware of the dimension of the conspiracy by Belgium and the 
United States, requested Soviet support (Kisangani, 2012). Devlin (2007,), former Chief of the 
CIA Station in the Congo in the 1960s has confirmed instructions he received to work with a CIA 
agent named “Joe from Paris” to remove Lumumba, if not peacefully, then violently. He said the 
                                                 
7 Map of the Belgian Congo in Appendix 1 (note the colonial names as opposed to the return to Congolese names at 
independence (Appendix 2) 
8 Belgian Investment Company, a major Belgian company 
9 According to Nzongola-Ntalaja, Belgian companies had dominated the economic space in the Congo colony from 
its inception to the late 1950s and were not keen to lose control after the territory’s independence. This was a key 
explanation behind the crisis of independence, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the subsequent political 
events that unfolded.  
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directives must have come from the highest instances of government, meaning President Dwight 
Eisenhower at the time. Devlin further says that the conspiracy against Lumumba was a result of 
the perception of the Congolese leader as a Communist and therefore a danger to United States, 
Belgian and French economic and ideological interests in Central Africa. For Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
Western actors and multinational companies also wanted the Congo to be oriented towards 
Southern Africa where the reactionary and oppressive capitalist regimes held sway in Rhodesia, 
Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa at the time (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). 
 
Lumumba was assassinated in 1961 in a political crisis that dragged on to 1965 when Colonel 
Joseph Mobutu seized power in a CIA-backed coup (Devlin, 2007).  Following Lumumba’s 
assassination, a nationalist rebellion erupted under Pierre Mulele, Lumumba’s Education Minister, 
in Bandundu in Western Congo in 1964 and later spread to engulf most parts of the country. The 
rebellion captured the eastern half of the country and was only defeated with American and Belgian 
support. Faced with a crisis of legitimacy and the threat of national disintegration, Mobutu 
embarked on a cultural revolution ostensibly to weld the country together and established a one-
party state. From the N’sele Declaration of 1967 on one party rule10 to the 1973 launch of the 
Cultural Revolution11, Mobutu experimented with strategies to stem challenges to state authority. 
For 32 years, he was sustained in power in a Cold War context that sought to keep Soviet influences 
out of Central Africa. Mobutu however did not solely rely on external support but internally, he 
                                                 
10 The Nsele Declaration was made in the district of Nsele, Kinshasa, in February 1967 during which the Popular 
Movement for the Revolution was launched. The ideology of Mobutism included nationalism, revolution, 
authenticity, and the return to authentic African values. 
11 The Zairean Cultural Revolution was mainly defined by the authenticity philosophy directing a return to cultural 
values and African dress codes. 
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embarked on policies designed to strengthen his power base.  These misguided strategies destroyed 
the economy and precipitated state collapse. 
 
Owing to economic crisis and pressure from his former Cold War allies, Mobutu, after 25 years of 
dictatorship, reluctantly agreed in 1990 to end one-party rule and allow a Sovereign National 
Conference (CNS) to usher in genuine democracy. The collapse of the Sovereign National 
Conference coinciding with the last years of Mobutu’s dictatorial rule is one aspect of the 
successive tragedies in the DRC’s post-colonial history. The historic Sovereign National 
Conference was the last chance for peaceful change and democracy and its disruption by a reluctant 
Mobutu added to the chain of events leading to the rebellion of 1996 and 1997.  
 
Mobutu was overthrown in May 1997 in a Rwanda-Uganda-backed rebel coalition with Laurent 
Desiré Kabila12 at its head. These two DRC neighbours  soon after supported a new rebellion (in 
1998) to remove Kabila which ignited regional war when Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia entered 
the country to defend Kabila. The war ended in 2002 with a National Unity Government (NUG) 
comprising all the groups that were involved in the fighting (Accords Global Inclusif sur la 
Republique Democratique du Congo, 2002).  Despite forming the NUG, fighting continued in 
several parts of the country as partly a reflection of the unresolved problems of nationality, deep-
seated ethnic mistrusts, greed and political manipulation amid economic and state collapse. This 
state of affairs dragged on to 2008 when the Goma Conference on Peace and Security in Eastern 
Congo was organised by the Joseph Kabila government (Joseph replaced his father assassinated in 
2001). In May 2010, Enyele rebels launched a series of attacks on Mbandaka, the capital city of 
                                                 
12 He changed the country’s name to The Democratic Republic of Congo 
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Equateur province. Throughout that year, Banyamulenge/Tutsi rebels attacked government forces 
in South Kivu (Fizi) and Oriental province (Ituri) where former rebels took up arms to resist state 
authority restoration. In this dissertation, I investigated the causes of conflict and instability in the 
DRC since independence and used Engelbert’s (2000) historical legitimacy theory, political 
economy analysis and subaltern realism as my analytical frameworks to understand state collapse, 
leadership failure and external intervention in the country during the period studied.  
 
(iii) Chapter Organisation 
 
I have divided the themes of this dissertation into seven chapters.  In the first chapter, I introduce 
the problem of conflict and instability in the Congo, identifying the key drivers of conflict. I then 
define the following key concepts as used in the dissertation: historical legitimacy, neocolonialism, 
dependency analysis, core-periphery thesis, state weakness, state failure, state collapse, civil 
society, ethnicity, subaltern realism and external intervention before reviewing extant literature on 
the research problem.  
 
I introduce my theoretical models as historical legitimacy theory, political economy and subaltern 
realism analyses, a somewhat eclectic approach to interpretivist qualitative research that has 
ensured grounded findings and conclusions. I explain my method of data collection as based on 
primary data from field interviews, field experience with the United Nations in the DRC over a 
six-year period, a field visit in 2012, United Nations and personal reports, copies of original 




In chapter two, I outline the historical context of conflict and instability in the DRC. The chapter 
is divided into three parts. In part one, I discuss the crisis of independence (1960-1961), the 
motivations and actors of that crisis and its impact on the future stability of the country. In part 
two, I examine the rise of Mobutu Sese Seko to power in 1965, his long period of rule marked by 
the struggle for national cohesion and its impact on governance and development in Zaire. I also 
examine the Cold War actions of Belgium, France and the United States in the perpetuation of 
Mobutu’s rule and, by extension, the Congolese tragedy. In part three, I focus on the nature and 
dimension of conflict under the Kabilas from the 1997 rebellion to the tumultuous political 
transition from 2003-2006 and its aftermath up to 2010. This historical narrative is interrogated in 
the analysis of primary data and extant literature using my key theoretical framework. The chapter 
sets the tone of the research analysis that follows. 
 
In the third chapter, on governance and leadership, I discuss the structure of power in the DRC 
under Mobutu and the Kabilas and the role of external intervention in the perpetuation of Mobutu’s 
rule during the Cold War. I then explore the links between natural resources and external 
intervention and how this in turn is facilitated by leadership failure and state collapse.  
 
Chapter four explores state capacity through a review of concepts such as state weakness, failure 
and collapse and properly situates the DRC within each phenomenon at different stages of the 
country’s history. I then examine one case study of internal conflict, the identity and citizenship 
crisis in the eastern Congo, and the international and regional dimensions of this problem.  I 
conclude that the DRC lacked capacity since independence and this has been the impetus behind 




In chapter five, I focus upon the struggle for multiparty democracy in Zaire bringing out the role 
of civil society, the Catholic Church, students and political actors and parties as well as exiles and 
the externally-based opposition. I analyse the factors that inhibited the success of the struggle for 
democracy paying attention to both Mobutu’s actions against the sovereign national conference 
and the greed and failures of the leaders of the multiparty movement. 
 
Chapter six interrogates the issues around conflict and instability and the alternatives with regard 
to the reconstruction of the state. On the issues, I explain the leadership paradox, governance, the 
“curse” of minerals and citizenship as key problem areas to look into if the DRC is to emerge from 
the cauldron of unending conflict. I then examine federalism, unitarism and integration (through 
functionalist cooperation) among countries of the Great Lakes region of Africa as important for 
stability. Concluding, I recommend a decentralized unitary system of government as appropriate 
for the DRC given its history of conflicts from secessions. 
 
In the final chapter, the conclusion, I summarize my dissertation, recapitulating the main points. 
The lack of historical legitimacy is fundamentally at the root of the crisis of governance and 
instability in the DRC since independence. The failure of leadership to build a cohesive and 
functioning nation-state resulted as a consequence of the absence of solid institutions amid mistrust 
among social groups that reject the post-colonial state. Interest in the state is only to ‘capture’ it, 
failing which it is rejected causing instability, a convenient situation for external intervention. I 
claim that this has been the problem in the Congo since independence in 1960. The country’s 
energies have been consumed by conflict from a lack of historical legitimacy and the failure of 
12 
 
leadership. Corruption and patrimonialism have been the facility with which to buy loyalty and 
under Mobutu, who placed his power above all institutions, the phenomenon drained the state’s 
resources. To this I add the role of mineral resources which influenced the struggles to capture 
state power, to access rent and resources. I discuss the crisis of governance, the failure/inability of 
civil society to triumph and usher in genuine multiparty democracy. These factors comprise the 





















Theory, Concepts and Methodology 
 
1.1 Definitions of key concepts used in this dissertation 
 
The concept of historical legitimacy, central to this dissertation, claims that the developmental 
capacity of a state relates directly to its level of historical entrenchment. According to Engelbert 
(2000), a state is deficient in legitimacy when it lacks the social capital, the institutions, 
relationships, attitudes and values that govern interactions among people in society and contribute 
to economic and social development.  
 
For Engelbert, the average African state is not empirical as its existence as an idea is limited to an 
urbanized, schooled minority.13 He says the weakness of most African states comes from 
heterogeneity which causes the adoption of policies that are inimical to growth and weakens the 
quality of institutions as resources are diverted towards the management of polarized social 
relations (ibid, p.56). In consequence, the cost of maintenance of an existing order, he rightly 
contends, is inversely proportionate to the perceived sense of legitimacy of the existing system 
(Engelbert, quoting Douglas North 1981, p. 73).  This is corroborated in this research as findings 
show that in an average African state, such as the Congo, the appointment of qualified personnel 
and development priorities are subordinated to national, ethnic or regional patronage for the sake 
of stability, in spite of economic consequences. R.H Jackson (1990) called the average post-
colonial state a quasi-state. The state legitimacy concept attracted the attention of this research 
                                                 
13 This also shows why politicians turn to ethnicity during periods of intense political competition to rally support. 
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because its insights are very instructive in the search for answers to the questions raised in this 
dissertation. 
 
Belgian colonialism in the Congo was based on authoritarian paternalism, the rule that has ensured 
the firm control of the territory by King Leopold II through business trusts from 1895 to 1905. 
Belgian colonialism was hardly ever close in comparison to the milder forms of control in British 
and French colonial Africa. To maintain a very firm grip on the territory to enhance the exploitation 
of natural and mineral resources, Belgium divided the Congo into provinces and territories and 
was physically present in each territory of the country which was directly administered with the 
help of appointed chiefs. By the end of the first half of the 20th century, Belgian companies had 
established all the networks and institutions linking the Congo to Belgium in the global economy 
as an appendage. Depelchin (1992) has reported on how Belgian colonialism introduced economic 
investments, trade and capital relations with the Congo which in later years would determine the 
contours of economic relations.   
 
The Core-Periphery concept, popular in Development Theory discourse in the 1960s and 1970s, 
refers to relations conditioned by the structure of the international economy as created by the 
expansion of global capitalism. With the expansion of the European home market after the 
industrial revolution, territories were subjugated overseas for the purposes of their transformation 
into markets for industrial products and sources of raw materials. Colonialism thus led to 
disarticulation and monetization of the local economy and, dependence. The local economy is 
today structured in a way that it supports the metropolitan economy by virtue of its position as a 
supplier of raw materials and consumer of its products. The core countries that act and decide the 
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fate of the global economy are supported by weak third world countries playing a very peripheral 
role, thus the centre-periphery thesis as espoused by the Argentinian structuralist Raoul Prebisch. 
This idea later developed into Dependency Theory to challenge neoclassical economic theory. 
 
The concept of delinking, promoted by Samir Amin as an extension of radical political thought on 
dependency and the development of underdevelopment, called for the ending of centre-periphery 
relations in favour of a restructured global order in which the periphery will not transfer wealth to 
the core and poverty to the periphery (Amin, 1984). 
 
External intervention according to Malan (1997) quoting Bull (1984) is a dictatorial or coercive 
interference by an outside party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state.  Heines 
(1996) defines intervention as the forcible interference of a state in the internal affairs of another, 
calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences. For Holsti (1994), intervention is a key 
foreign policy instrument of states in pursuit of their interests and goals. Interventions are a fact of 
international politics and the objectives for intervening usually range from ideology, national 
security, economic interests to humanitarian factors. In the case of the Congo external intervention 
was influenced, partly, by economic and ideological interests during the Cold War. In recent years, 
the security and political interests of intervening states have also explained the phenomenon. The 
continued intervention in the Congo from the imposition of the neocolonial State to the 1980s was 
purely economic and ideological. In the late 1990s, African States intervened in the Congo for 




Civil society as a concept denotes ‘a certain degree of common consciousness and awareness, 
binding together society, a common rationality which allows for common rules of the game to be 
accepted’ (Hartman 1994, p.218). Posner in Rothberg (ed. 2004) defines civil society as the 
complete reservoir of formal and informal organisations in society outside the control of the state. 
As such, it is an empty vessel as it can be filled with groups that foster social cooperation and 
improve peoples’ lives. Warlord gangs, mafia organisations and paramilitary groups are, for 
Posner, as much a part of civil society as are churches and women’s organizations. He further 
states that the job of civil society is to advocate and substitute (p. 236-237). The political opposition 
in Zaire discussed in this research is considered a part of the broader civil society that includes 
students, political parties, individual political actors, the church, and all other social groups active 
in the fight for multiparty democracy during the period studied. Lemarchand (2009, p.197) says 
democracy requires more than parties and elections. It requires other structures through which 
social demands can be formulated and acted upon. He sees the weakening of civil society in the 
Congo of the 1990s as the logical consequence of Mobutu’s rule which set sharp limits on the 
organization of independent power centres. Chapter five of this research is dedicated to civil 
society and its role, strengths and successes in the struggle for democracy. 
 
The term ethnic group refers mainly to a social group that shares a common language, history and 
culture and interacts and defines themselves as belonging to a name with whose interests they 
identify (Nwabueze, 2003). It is a group with a common identity and a common fate based on 
common kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness and a shared history, and possibly a shared 
language (Thompson, 2000, p.58). Osaghae who sees ethnicity in objective/involuntary and 
subjective/voluntary terms, says the salience of ethnicity is marked during competition (Osaghae 
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p138, in Himmelsrand et al, 1994). Ethnicity (as largely understood in contemporary discourse) is 
not, for Thompson and Osaghae, a primordial tribal force. Although ethnic identity is natural, 
ethnic competition, antagonisms and mobilization take place during political competition 
(Thompson, ibid). This is close to the materialist/Marxist view which sees ethnicity as class 
interests parading in traditional garb (Lemarchand 2009, p.49). My explanation of ethnicity and 
ethnic conflict in this dissertation will be influenced by this viewpoint. 
 
Bratton and Van der Walle (1997) define a patrimonial regime as one where the right to rule is 
ascribed to a person rather than to an office. Despite the official existence of a written Constitution, 
one individual dominates the state apparatus and stands above its laws. Relationships of loyalty 
and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system, and officials occupy 
bureaucratic positions less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. 
Although state functionaries receive an official salary, they also enjoy access to various forms of 
illicit rent which constitute an entitlement of office. The chief executive and his inner circle 
undermine the effectiveness of the nominally modern state administration by using it for 
systematic patronage and clientelist practices in order to maintain political order. Patrimonialism 
especially under Mobutu was one of the reasons for state collapse in the Congo. 
 
Realists believe the Congolese political and security vacuum caused by state collapse in the 1990s 
naturally had to be filled in adherence to the laws of nature (Turner 2007, p.8). This is close to the 
rational actor theory, or Ayoob’s Subaltern Realism. According to this theory, even peripheral 
states of the international system seek power and take advantage of vacuums to enhance their 
power and security which was what happened in the Rwanda-Uganda invasion of the Congo. Such 
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states are guided in their actions by their calculations of power, security and threats to their alliance 
systems. I have underlined in this dissertation that the invasions and wars on the Congo from 1996 
to 2010 were not motivated by the lust for mineral resources of the Congo. Rather, the loot of 
resources was a consequence of derailed objectives following the stalemate in the war. 
 
Weak states are usually a result of geographical or physical factors, constraints, and internal 
political and social contradictions, ethnic, religious, linguistic and intercommunal tensions. They 
are also characterised by urban crime as people resort to other means as the state’s capacity to 
deploy goods adequately is diminished or diminishing. Physical infrastructure networks are very 
poor, schools and hospitals show signs of neglect especially outside the main cities. Corruption is 
common and the rule of law is not adhered to.  According to Rothberg (2003), states can be weak 
regardless of whether they are ruled by despots or those who have been elected.  
 
A failed state, for Rothberg, refers to a situation characterised by civil wars, an inability to control 
peripheral regions, criminal violence, rampant corruption, dramatically declining economic 
growth and the loss of political legitimacy. 
State collapse as defined by Zartman (1995) occurs in a situation where the structure of authority 
(legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart. According to him in Hendrix (2002, 
p.1), this represents ‘a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup or riot, and not necessarily 
anarchy’. Rothberg (2003, p.9) says it is that ‘rare, extreme version of a failed state’.  By the 1990s, 
the Congo was both a failed and collapsed state, albeit depending on what part of the country 
geopolitical zones in question.  
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   1.2 Methodological reflection 
The meta-theory through which I have approached this dissertation is interpretivism which focuses 
upon knowledge produced through an understanding of people, their views, positions, feelings and 
inter-subjectivity. The corresponding methodology is qualitative and thus I attempt to both explain 
and understand social phenomena and emphasize the importance of the human character and its 
unpredictability. In my approach I represent “the truth” that human beings are rational and make 
sense of their social world based on their experiences, interests and everyday fears. The approach 
rejects the positivist approach to social science. Hallowell (1944) in his response to the crusade for 
a positivist American political science at the time warned that even during data collection, the 
positivist forgets that the way he interprets data is influenced by a pre-formulated conceptual 
scheme, thus a prior value attitude. Interpreting social reality involves dealing with rational and 
unpredictable people.  
 
I employed the methods of interviews, documentary analysis and personal observation to gather 
information for this dissertation. I interviewed people from different categories. They included 
political and civil society actors, academics, military officers, students and traditional leaders. I 
made use of on-the-ground experience and participant observations to make personal observations.  
I have worked and lived in Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC, as well as in eastern and central 
Congo (Kisangani, Kisangani, Kananga, Mbuji Mayi) over a six-year period. I lived through 
several events and crises that are discussed in this research. Documentary sources included 
Congolese government reports, archival documents, and audiovisual documentaries, UN reports 





Social reality is inherently objective and interpreting that reality involves dealing with rational 
persons. I therefore made a common sense reading of these different realities, perspectives and 
convictions, before analysing and interrogating all data.  
 
1.3.  Scope and limitation 
 
The research covered the 1960-2010 period and mainly focused on key political events and crises 
including the crisis of independence, the rule of Mobutu from 1965 to 1997 and the period after 
Laurent Desiré Kabila’s assassination through the political transition and the post-election period 
to 2010. 
14  Theoretical models 
My theoretical models in the research are historical legitimacy theory (Engelbert, 2000), political 
economy, and subaltern realism as espoused by Ayoob (2002). This eclectic approach to 
interpretivist qualitative research ensures in-depth and extensive analysis and grounded findings. 
1.5  Literature Review 
 
Dependency theorists writing on underdevelopment and conflict in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s 
emphasised the colonial and neocolonial context of relations between a European centre and a 
Third World periphery. Wallerstein’s World Systems analysis (1974), Amin’s Delinking: Towards 
a Polycentric World (1985) and Frank’s Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America 
(1966) are useful historical/neo-Marxist perspectives in discussions on underdevelopment and 
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conflict in the world’s peripheral or fragile states. Nkrumah’s interpretation of the Congo crisis of 
1960 – 1964 also provides an important insight (Nkrumah, 1967). In his The Challenge of the 
Congo published after his overthrow in 1967, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana said what happened in 
the Congo – the killing of Patrice Lumumba – was evidence that neocolonial powers will always 
resort to force to maintain their control over Africa’s resources and the global capitalist order (p. 
265). Nkrumah’s view of neocolonialism as an instrument of global capitalism is pertinent for a 
fuller grasp of the crisis of independence in the Congo and the murder of Lumumba. 
 
Hochschild (1998) on  the Congolese tragedy says it can be explained in terms of pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial continuities, a perspective akin to the historical/dependency analyses of 
Cardoso (1969), Frank (1967), Amin (1973; 1985), and Rodney (1973). According to these 
scholars, important historical linkages must be grasped for a fuller comprehension of 
underdevelopment and instability in most ‘peripheral’ states of the developing world. Marxist 
historical materialism from which  all the authors above drew inspiration during their scholarly 
careers analyse underdevelopment and conflict in poorer countries as a function of the evolution 
and expansion of capitalism and the home market towards states of the periphery (Cardoso, 1969). 
 
There is however an inherent shortcoming in the dependencia tradition found in its assumption 
that colonialism and neocolonial interventions alone account for instability in fragile post-colonial 
states. While colonialism has had disastrous consequences in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
we must not ignore the many important legacies of colonial rule such as the modern state, its 
institutions and infrastructure. Kisangani (2012, p.14) highlights the relatively advanced health 
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facilities of the Belgian Congo at independence which was also the most industrialised territory on 
the continent after Apartheid South Africa.  
 
On the other hand, it is not appropriate to ascribe conflict in DRC to internal factors alone. In his 
account of civil wars in the Congo from 1960 to 2010, Kisangani points to the politics of exclusion 
as the trigger for conflicts more than any other factor. However, his supposition that all conflicts 
in the country since independence were mainly caused by political and economic exclusion are 
challenged in this study. For instance, the Mulelist rebellions weren’t as much a reaction against 
exclusion as they were a genuine uprising to restore the Lumumbist State in a regional setting of 
competition among political actors.  
 
Writing on the role of leadership failure in the explanation of Congo’s tragedies since 
independence, Mwamba (1991) and Wrong (2000) focus on President Mobutu’s survival strategies 
of nationalisation and patronage which accounted for the country’s economic decline and collapse 
by 1996. Corroborating this view, Kisangani (2012, p. 24-25) demonstrates that Mobutu’s 
nationalisation of foreign businesses and plantations in 1973 ‘de-industrialised the Congo’, 
increased her foreign debt and precipitated the collapse of the country’s economy thus setting the 
stage for crisis.  It is here important to state that there was an explanation for the policies of 
nationalization, patronage and corruption which translated into massive spending that destroyed 
the economy of the then Zaire. Lacking legitimacy in history after Lumumba’s murder, Mobutu 





For Mwamba (1991) and Kisangani (2012), nationalisation and patronage were among the main 
causes of the decline and collapse of the Zairean state under Mobutu. From Wrong’s findings, 
billions of dollars were lost in three decades to misguided policies and patronage in a long period 
of dictatorship in which the ‘leopard’ reshuffled 51 governments (Wrong 2000, p.97). By the end 
of his rule, Mobutu had personalised the country’s finances (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, p.150; Wrong 
2000, p.118).  
 
Clapham on corruption in Zaire of the 1980s ironically states: ‘there is no embezzlement because 
the ruler’s personal income is the same as government revenue; there is no nepotism because there 
is no criterion for appointment to office apart from the ruler’s favour’ (Clapham, 1985, p.47-50). 
According to Wrong, between 1975 and 1984, Zaire received $9.3 billion in foreign aid, and $542 
million yearly between 1985 and 1994. Copper revenues ensured that the state’s main source of 
revenue Gecamines14 earned between 700 and 900 million dollars annually until 1974. But there 
was nothing to show for it. Between 1989 when the World Bank lamented the failure of leadership 
and crisis of governance in the country (World Bank Report, 1989) and 1994 when Gecamines 
needed $3 billion to be fully operational as in pre-crisis levels, the country’s external debt stood at 
$10 billion (ibid). By the end of Mobutu’s rule, Zaire’s economy had totally collapsed (Kabemba 
2006, p.104; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002 p.150). 
 
                                                 
14 Gecamines, the Generale Carriere des Minies, the country’s mining agency, was the main source of revenue for 
the country since independence. Under Mobutu, it managed revenue in taxes from the Katangan copper mines and 
the Kasai diamond fields 
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After Mobutu’s overthrow in 1997, Laurent Desiré Kabila inherited a chaotic situation and a 
collapsed state.15  As soon as he took over, Kabila demonstrated inexperience, incompetence and 
“self-destructive tendencies” (Kabemba 2006, p.105). Assessing his leadership, Nzongola-Ntalaja 
(2002, p. 246) says Kabila was neither a statesman nor a wise patrimonial ruler, but a man who 
lacked vision and skill. The 1998-2003 war which began when Rwanda and Uganda invaded the 
Congo with rebel forces to overthrow his government has been the subject of various scholarly 
analyses. Some have explained it as a rebellion internally fomented against Kabila’s style of rule 
(Kabemba, ibid). For others, it was a punitive action by regional powers or foreign aggression 
aimed at looting the Congo’s resources (Braeckman, 2004; Barouski, 2006 and Willame 2007). A 
more plausible explanation, subaltern realism which is a theoretical model in this dissertation, sees 
regional actors as having reacted to the vacuum in the Congo caused by state failure and collapse 
which made invasion of the Congo a security and opportunistic imperative. Both Rwanda and 
Uganda, being young regimes at the time, used the Congo campaigns to enhance their security, 
improve their strength and douse domestic tensions at home16. It is therefore inappropriate to 
analyse the 1997-2002 invasions by those countries through monofocal lens the lure of natural 
resources. 
 
Challenging the resource loot postulate, Ottaway (2001) argues that mineral resources abundance 
alone cannot be a recipe for the invasion of a country. Mills (2001) buttresses this view by giving 
                                                 
15 The Congo was a collapsed state by the time of Mobutu’s overthrow in 1997. See the definition of a collapsed 
state in this chapter. 
16 In Uganda, the National Resistance Movement Government of Yoweri Museveni faced domestic opposition 
especially from the north of the country who fought back against the ousting of Okello’s government. In the south, 
although the Baganda Kingdom was an ally in the fight to overthrow Okello, the power of the monarchy and 
resistance to any land grab in the central region exposed some of the weaknesses of the regime. Added to this was 
the Allied Democratic Front-National Liberation Army of Uganda operating against his regime from the eastern 




the example of Angola, a resource-endowed state that faced a prolonged rebellion but survived it 
without consequences in the magnitude of the Congo’s. More interesting is Clark’s (2002) analysis 
that the chaos in the Congo between 1998 and 2003 was a function of state collapse and scramble 
by unscrupulous neighbours over the spoils. 
 
In this dissertation, I challenge the assumption that war was waged by regional states to loot 
Congo’s mineral wealth. I argue that a coincidence of circumstances including a regional military 
stalemate derailed the war from its original objective of overthrowing Kabila and engendered and 
perpetuated its own dynamics resulting in the massive looting of resources. The illegal exploitation 
of resources was thus an unintended consequence of invasion by Rwanda and Uganda that was 
foiled by Zimbabwe and Angola. After Kabila’s assassination, his son Joseph presided over a 
transition period that is now famous for the corruption and pillage that characterised it. Up to 2010, 
he failed to end anti-government rebellions and the looting of Congo’s natural resources.  
 
With the above review of the literature, what conclusion can be made of the explanations for 
conflict and instability in the Congo from 1960 to 2010? I posit that colonialism and 
neocolonialism alone do not fully explain post-independence conflicts and instability in the Congo. 
This research affirms the state’s lack of historical foundations and provides this as a new emphasis 
in the conflict. The average African state’s lack of historical legitimacy and acceptance partly 
explains the policies of leaders, patrimonialism and corruption to keep challenges at bay. 
Leadership failure is evident in the inability to forge a nation with visionary and selfless leaders. 
While this research concedes that external manipulation has contributed to the phenomenon of 
conflicts, it must not be the scapegoat for the failures of Congo’s leaders.  Drawing on insights 
26 
 
from the literature and field interviews, I demonstrated that although the colonial impact and 
neocolonial interventions have largely contributed to instability in the Congo between 1960 and 
2010, this explanation is not sufficient given the inadequate space to issues of leadership failure 
and state collapse.  
 
Ong’ayo (2008) highlights the need for a balanced look at both internal and external factors when 
he blames both colonialism and bad leadership for the lugubrious state of the continent. Ayee 
(2006) and Alemazung (2010) have emphasised the same in their analyses of the predicament of 
instability facing African states today. That so many scholars agree on the negative role of internal 
factors (leadership failure and state collapse) in the Congolese tragedy is a pointer to the need to 
revisit the literature on the debate on Congo’s crises and other endemic ones in Africa. This 
dissertation affirms the following:  
 
1. Although political economy analysis and the political realism of neighbours are powerful 
investigative and analytical tools, the DRC state’s lack of historical legitimacy best explains crises 
and instability in the country since independence;  
2. Governance and leadership failure and external intervention are interrelated and the latter is 
insufficient in explaining conflict and instability in the Congo since 1960; 
3. Power, governance and leadership are double-bind and the misuse of power can lead to bad 
governance and leadership failure; 
4. Civil society groups failed in the pro-democracy struggle in DRC owing to the greed for power 
of leaders;  
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5. Political economy dynamics (actors, their incentives and resources) explain many conflicts in 
DRC since independence 
6. Decentralization within a unitary system, functionalist regional integration and the rule of law 
are identified the solutions to the problem of conflict and instability in the DRC  
 
1.6  Theoretical framework 
 
Shultz (2014) defines a theoretical framework as a broad theory-based explanation for the 
behaviour, actions, opinions and attitudes of interest to the research problem. My theoretical 
models for this research are historical legitimacy theory, political economy and subaltern realism. 
.  
 
1.6.1            Historical legitimacy 
 
Engelbert sees Africa’s crises of underdevelopment and conflict through the lenses of the state’s 
lack of historical legitimacy (2000, p.71). The state’s lack of genuine historical foundations is, 
according to him, a key reason for instability in Africa. For him it does not matter whether a state 
is just, democratic, inclusive, popular or accountable. It is about being rooted in the history if it 
wants stability; a historical, structural condition.  
 
Failing the historical legitimacy test, the state becomes illegitimate and governance becomes 
difficult. As a result, predation, neo-patrimonialism, rent-seeking, administrative decay, ethnic 
conflict and state collapse become inevitable. Developmental capacity, according to Engelbert, is 
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weak in historically illegitimate states. Asked whether the Congo’s problem was because the 
country was illegitimate in the sense in which Engelbert explains it, the majority of university 
students in Bukavu agreed (Personal Interviews with students, Bukavu, 2009). Asked whether they 
thought the leadership in the DRC would always face opposition more than the situation would 
have been in a homogeneous society, all answered in the affirmative. The lack of historical 
legitimacy is responsible for ethnic tensions because nations parading as ethnic groups were 
grouped together by Belgian colonialism under what Jackson refers to as a Quasi states (Jackson, 
1993). Patronage, clientelism and corruption have been state survival strategies which, as 
discussed in this dissertation, led to economic collapse and crisis.  
 
Engelbert’s thesis is similar to Chabal’s broader analysis that the postcolonial state was created 
‘on the false assumption that it could be conceived a-historically’ (Chabal 1992, p.70). Created 
outside the African historical and evolutionary processes, and bequeathed to a petty bourgeoisie 
accepting ‘instruments of sovereignty’ without any thorough grasp of what was at stake, the state 
became a failure at independence (Zartman, 1995). Rene Dumont wrote about a false start 
(Dumont, 1966). Chabal contends that the legal and political super-structure of the post-colonial 
state in Africa was created to serve the requirements of the colonial enterprise, and was left behind 
to function in predominantly alien African systems. Thus, the African post-colonial state is not as 
solidly anchored to African political communities as the modern European state was anchored to 
European societies earlier. On the lack of congruence between nation and State, he says the myth 




Citing the example of the Congo in his thesis, Engelbert says the degeneration of Congo’s 
leadership in the 1980s, policies, and eventually institutions, was the consequence of the nation-
building ‘over expenditures’ around the neo-patrimonial logic of power brought about by the lack 
of historical legitimacy of the post-colonial State. He went on to say that the Congo was created 
as a commercial venture by King Leopold II of Belgium.  The focus was extraction of resources, 
unification of the territory acquired from conquest and the economic destruction of preexisting 
kingdoms. (ibid, p.107). Colonisation destroyed the preexisting systems of power but provided no 
alternative path to political socialization at a hypothetical Congolese level, since Africans had been 
kept in an artificial state of political childhood until the 1950s about politics. It was therefore 
during the search for solidarities in their uprooted urban environment that evolués17  began to 
organize politically on a mostly regional or ethnic basis. This is how Joseph Kasavubu’s ABAKO 
represented Bas Congo province, Moise Tshombe’s CONAKAT drew its support from southern 
Katanga province and Antoine Gizenga’s Parti Solidarité African relied on the Bandundu (Kwilu) 
region.18 The elites at independence naturally fell back on their tribes and regions of origin for 
support as the concept of a Congolese nation was new to most actors at the time. Thus comes into 
sharp focus the central question of lack of legitimacy in history. 
 
During his reign, Mobutu tried to forge a united nation with Zaireanisation and authenticité 
(nationalization and return to shared African values) resorting to what Engelbert calls the ‘fiction 
of a national family’ (ibid, p.110). According to him, and confirmed by the literature and my 
                                                 
17 This was a derogatory term after independence. It meant the new class of educated Congolese elite. 
18 ABAKO, formed in 1956, was the first Congolese indigenous organization to demand improvement in the 
conditions of its ethnic members during Belgian colonial rule. Moise Tshombe’s CONAKAT was formed in 
Katanga at the behest of the CARTEL Katangais, a white settler Belgian organization opposed to Congolese 
nationalism and independence. Antoine Gizenga’s Parti Solidarite Africaine was formed in the 1950s in Bandundu 
Province. It was a key ally of Patrice Lumumba and Gizenga and emerged in 1962, after Lumumba’s murder, to 
head the Lumumbist government established in Kisangani. 
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personal interviews, Mobutu ‘purchased’ support from regional elites and clients who 
systematically plundered the state. The lack of historical legitimacy is the main theme in this 
research as it will be used to explain conflict and instability since independence. 
 
1.6.2 Dependency Theory 
 
The Marxist approach to the analysis of political systems, based on Marxist historical and 
dialectical materialism and political economy, is the basis on which 20th century theory of 
Dependency theory was developed, but importantlyfrom the writings of Latin American 
structuralists Celso Furtado and Raoul Prebisch and the Marxist Paul Baran.. It was later used by 
Afro Marxists such as Nkrumah (1965), Rodney (1972) and Amin (1974) to demonstrate that 
owing to the capitalist division of the world between core and peripheral countries, a flawed 
structure and system of interdependence resulted causing the continued enrichment of the core and 
the impoverishment of the periphery. According to dependency theory, conflict and crisis in the 
periphery can best be explained from the dynamic in these relations. 
 
According to dependency theory, the continued development of capitalism in past centuries has 
meant the development of capital in the core countries of the developed world and the perpetuation 
of the conditions of dependency in the peripheries or developing world. This had meant the 
transformation of the peripheral countries – the third world during the Cold War - into suppliers 
of raw materials and consumers of manufactured goods, an objective of colonialism and 
neocolonialism. From the above could be understood why the emergent capitalist sectors in the 
developing countries (for the most part export-oriented agricultural and mineral production) 
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developed as dependent sectors, ‘integrated into the international economy but horizontally non-
integrated in their national economies’ (Froebel et al, 1981, p.13). Colonial finance capital created 
a state whose sole purpose was to exploit the periphery that was the Congo after investing almost 
nothing as clearly outlined by Depelchin (1992): 
 
‘…finance capital found itself in a situation where it could only operate 
profitably if it could set up a politico-military structure designed to enable it 
to harvest the treasure from its trove while investing nothing at all…’ 
(Depelchin 1992, p. 36).  
 
Owing to the colonial integration of colonial economies, the national economies of former colonies 
were subjugated in an integrated global economy whose domination of the periphery was 
explained by a core-periphery relationship. Andre Gunder Frank speaks of the development of 
underdevelopment. Baran (1957) developed ideas about dependency in the world dominated 
capitalist system and Rodney (1972) wrote How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Based on this 
state of affairs and the intricacies of international entanglements, Amin (1984) called for the 
delinking of the periphery in 1984 (Amin, 1984). The dissertation demonstrates that instability in 
the Congo is a function of colonialism and neocolonialism with the ramifications on the economy 
which breeds instability. 
 
1.6.3 Political Economy 
 
Political Economy developed in the 18th century as the study of the economies of states, polities, 
hence political economy. French physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and German 
philosopher and social theorist Karl Marx were some of the exponents of political economy. 
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Originally, political economy meant the study of the conditions under which production or 
consumption within limited parameters was organized in the nation-states.  
 
Many fields use political economy to understand and explain social phenomena. These include 
sociology, political science, anthropology, history, economics, psychology, and law, among 
others. The ideology or political system that is best renowned for using political economy to 
understand and explain conflict in society is Marxism. In the Marxist Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy, Marx said:  
 
‘Legal relations as well as forms of state cannot be understood by themselves 
nor by the so-called general progress of the human mind, but rather are 
rooted from the material conditions of human existence’ (Marx, 1859, p.3) 
 
Marxist analysis of societal phenomena is therefore hinged upon materialist monism, only one 
material factor, the economy. For Marxists, the economy and the material conditions emanating 
from it dictate the nature and consciousness of society. Political economy analysis essentially 
focuses on the economic explanations of political and social conflict, power, exclusion and 
vulnerability of groups or actors within a community. It identifies shifting interests that influence 
state actions, the nature and sources of state capacity, authority and legitimacy, and how and why 
rent seeking and patrimonial political systems can either contribute to, or undermine, state stability. 
As an approach, it can explain crisis in the Congo from a stand point of the social expressions of 
political and economic interests since the colonial period.  
 
Using the eastern Congo as a case study, political economy analysis reveals that instability in the 
eastern Congo from the 1990s to 2010 was caused by the struggle for space, land and economic 
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resources. Mamdani (2001), Lamarchand (2009) Turner (2007) and Stearns (2011) have 
highlighted the importance of land, grazing, customary leadership in the regional political 
economy and how competition among groups led to a citizenship crisis, rebellion and war. The 
study demonstrated that the competition for economic opportunities among Congolese politicians 
and ethnic groups is always the motivating factor for conflict in Ituri, the Kivus, Katanga and Kasai 
provinces. The political economy approach puts the conflicts in the DR Congo into proper 
perspective and offers a concrete explanation of the local, regional and global dynamics that shape 
or underpin them.  
 
1.6.4 Subaltern Realism 
 
In his analysis of the 1998-2002 war, Clark (2002) discussing Ayoob’s Subaltern Realism explains 
why regional states intervened in the Congo during the period. Calling it a compelling analysis, he 
quotes Ayoob as saying that contemporary leaders of developing states are emulating the leaders 
of European states of the of the early modern period. In his Inequality and Theorising in 
International Relations: The Case for Subaltern realism, Ayoob shows that international relations 
theory did not cater for subalterns, weak and emergent third world nations as the power politics of 
the past century and beyond was based on a Euro-centric state formation, expansion and power 
relations. In the African context in the 1990s, emergent states merely emulated these processes. 
The context in which regional states fought in the Congo was partly out of realisation that they 
have to do what others did during their own state formation experiences, a subaltern perspective 
of international relations different from the theorising of power and conflicts shaped by 




Their main goal, like that of their European predecessors, is to build up their states in terms of their 
economic strength, administrative capacity and military power. In doing so, war fighting and 
intervention in neighbouring states is often a logical part of that process (Clark, 2002, p.4).  This 
theoretical approach partly answers the reason for regional intervention in the Congo by Rwanda, 
Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. While true that both Rwanda and Uganda were 
developing states whose intervention in the Congo strengthened them and aided cohesion at home, 
their interventions were partly punitive and subsequently derailed into the exploitation of the 
resources of an occupied territory. This is demonstrated in this dissertation. 
1.7 Conclusion 
As the premise to the substantive part of the dissertation, I have introduced the research, the 
problem statement and my objectives after which I defined key concepts and thematic variables as 
used in the research. I then discussed my methodology as interpretivist allowing me to interrogate 
a wide scope of data from interviews, and participant observation to be analysed in light of my 
theoretical framework. Historical legitimacy theory, political economy and subaltern realism 
which constitute my analytical and theoretical framework are discussed as well as extant literature 
on conflict and instability in the DRC since independence. These set the context of my research 








Conflict and Instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1960-2010)  
A Historical Perspective 
 
Part One: The crisis of independence 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
From 1960 to 2010, the DRC has experienced seventeen civil conflicts and wars (Kisangani, 2012). 
In his book Civil Wars in the Congo, 1960-2010, Kisangani calls the country a laboratory of civil 
conflicts. In this chapter, I broadly narrate the key events and conflicts that have characterized the 
DRC’s post-independence history. I start from the crisis of independence, its actors and 
consequences. I then discuss Mobutu’s misrule up until his overthrow in 1997 by Laurent Desiré 
Kabila, the causes of the 1998-2002 regional war in the DRC, the political transition led by Joseph 
Kabila and the conflicts in Bukavu, Katanga, North Kivu and Ituri. In the chapter, I demonstrate 
that all the crises in the Congo since independence have been a function of the state’s lack of 
historical legitimacy as elites, ethnic groupings and regions fought for relevance in the new post-







2.2  The June 1960 elections and the crisis of independence  
 
The Congo as the Congo Free State was the property of King Leopold II of Belgium from the 
second half of the 19th century to 1908. After nearly half a century of brutal exploitation which 
claimed 10 million lives (Hochschild, 1998), the Belgian government annexed the territory as a 
colony in 1908.  In 1998, Michiko Kakutani in his review of King Leopold’s Ghost by Adam 
Hochschild said half the Congolese population (which at the time was between 16 and 20 million) 
died from King Leopold’s greed. 
 
By the 1950s, Belgium came under pressure to decolonize. At the time, Joseph Kasavubu’s 
Alliance des Bakongo pour l’Unification et l’Expansion de la Langue Kikongo (ABAKO)19 was 
the only active pressure group whose activities resembled a freedom movement. Although the 
1959 ABAKO-led riots were historic for the Congo, the movement was ethnically and regionally 
based (in Leopoldville, present-day Kinshasa) and the Bas Congo region in the west of the country. 
It was only after the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) of Patrice Emery Lumumba emerged 
and mobilised around a national and pro-independence platform that the independence struggle 
was sped up (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). 
 
During the 1960 independence (legislative) elections, there was no outright winner. Lumumba’s 
MNC obtained 26% of the national vote followed in second place by Antoine Gizenga’s Parti de 
Solidarité Africaine (PSA) with 12%. ABAKO, in spite of its historic credentials as the first 
indigenous sociopolitical organisation, came in third place with only 9%. The other regionally 
                                                 
19 The Association for the Unity and Expansion of the Kikongo Language (the language spoken by the BaKongos). 
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based parties obtained the following percentages: the white settlers’ Cartel Katangais (4.9%), 
Moishe Tshombe’s Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) (4.7%) 
and Anicet Kashamura´s Centre de Regroupement Africain (CEREA) in Kivu (4.3%). The rest of 
the votes were distributed among a dozen parties that had no influence outside their home bases 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Kisangani, 2012). 
 
 
In Leopoldville, the PSA defeated ABAKO. In Katanga province, Moishe Tshombe’s CONAKAT, 
strong in the urban south and allied to the Cartel Katangais which represented powerful 
multinational interests (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; 99), only narrowly defeated the nationalist Baluba 
des Katanga (BALUBAKAT) party, strong in north and led by the pro-Lumumba nationalist Jason 
Sendwe. In Kivu province (North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema provinces today) CEREA won 
but did not obtain a majority. Lumumba’s MNC came second. In Kasai province (East and West 
Kasai today), MNC-Lumumba and MNC-Kalonji (after the party split) contested for control which 
the MNC-L won through a coalition with two small parties. In Eastern province (Kisangani), 
MNC-L won a clear majority and in Equateur province, parties were weak though two politicians 
Justin Bomboko (UNIMO) and Jean Bolikango (PUNA) emerged as the main actors.  The historic 
reports of the 1960 elections by Kisangani (2012) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) are almost 
identical and as much as they touched on the intense mutual tribal and regional mutual antagonisms 
that characterized the elections, these elections were to show the first visible signs of the weakness 




Overall, Patrice Lumumba benefitted from the nationalist appeal of his party to emerge as Congo’s 
undisputed leader in 1960. He forged a coalition involving his MNC-L, PSA, BALUBAKAT, 
CEREA, UNC and COAKA to form the government that was to emerge from Belgian colonial 
rule.  Lumumba’s Congolese rivals however immediately demonstrated determination to resist his 
leadership and this was the opportunity for Lumumba’s foreign enemies to hatch the anti-
Lumumba conspiracy during which he was called a Communist  and subsequently assassinated 
(Devlin, 2007). 
 
After independence, two perspectives on the future of the Congo defined the position of the two 
camps of moderate African nationalists and radical African nationalists. During the struggle for 
Africa’s liberation from colonial rule, African nationalists were divided over strategy and this was 
reflected in the two groups that represented these differences (Sallah, 2002).  Colonial countries 
like Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Libya favoured rapid decolonization and an 
immediate federation of all African states. They met in Casablanca in Morocco in 1961 and hence 
the name the Casablanca group. They represented the group of radical African states and all other 
leaders of this motivation, like Patrice Lumumba, were associated with their ideals. Another group, 
led by Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, comprised Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia and most 
francophone African states preferred a gradual political federation through gradual economic 
cooperation. They met in Liberia and hence the Monrovia group of moderate African states. It was 
from this history that African leaders in the early 1960s were grouped into moderates or 
“collaborators” on the one hand and radical African nationalists on the other. According to Sallah 
(2002) moderate African nationalists in the context of that period referred to those African leaders 
who called for gradualism in the process of integrating African states. Their outlook on politics 
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was one of caution and collaboration with the departing colonial powers. This was in opposition 
to radical African nationalists who wanted a rapid unification of African states confident in their 
world view as well as concern that the forces of imperialism will benefit from any delay by 
undermining Africa’s unity.  
 
The extent to which the moderates served the interests of neocolonialism is elucidated by Nkrumah 
who gives a pertinent analysis of the ideological underpinnings and neocolonialist influences in 
the Congolese conflict at around the same period. Under neocolonialism, Nkrumah says 
colonialism returns through the back door and controls the former colonial economies through 
international institutions and direct intervention when necessary (Nkrumah, Kwame in 
Neocolonialism: The last stage of colonialism, 1965).  In the Congo, the division was clear 
between Patrice Lumumba and the group of Congolese with a moderate approach to dealing with 
the Belgian colonialists. Examples were Joseph Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe. Whereas the 
nationalists wanted a unitary system for the Congo, the federalists were opposed to that objective. 
It was in pursuit of their respective positions that moderate African leaders called for the federal 
approach which in essence was more akin to a confederation of African states. Federalism entailed 
surrendering some powers to the centre while the respective states retain defence and foreign 
policy principally. This would have defeated the purpose of union as the unitarist group of radical 
African leaders held (Personal Observation). 
 
Six days following the independence celebrations, the Force Publique, in the process of mutation 
into becoming the country’s new army, mutinied. Soldiers attacked Europeans and without 
invitation, Belgium sent in troops in violation of the new country’s sovereignty (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
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2002). As chaos prevailed, Tshombe (CONAKAT) declared the secession of the mineral rich 
Katanga province on 11 July 1960 with the support of Belgian business interests and over 6000 
Belgian troops in the provincial capital of Elizabethville, now Lubumbashi. A few weeks later 
South Kasai declared its secession from the Congo. The Lumumba government, overwhelmed, 
appealed to the United Nations to help preserve Congo’s territorial integrity. It was under these 
circumstances that Lumumba was overthrown and killed (Michel, Thiery (1999) in Mobutu: Roi 
du Zaire, documentary film on Mobutu’s Congo).  
 
2.2. i The political economy of secession in Katanga and Kasai 
 
Before independence, the province of Katanga was economically the most important region in the 
Congo after Kinshasa. It was its richest in terms of resources and the country’s second most 
developed region. In his account of the Katanga crisis, Kisangani (2012) indicates that Katanga 
was the most industrialized province of the Congo having its share of wage earners at 36.2% in 
the 1950s, the highest in the colony. This industrialization was, however, the work of a single 
employer, the Union Meniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK) in a province known to be rich in high-
value minerals. As already outlined, Belgian multinational companies in 1960 were determined, 
for obvious economic and financial reasons, to wrest Katanga from the control of the new 
nationalist government led by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja 
(2002), the United States, Belgium, France and Britain were at the time determined to have 
decolonization favourable to their economic and strategic interests with the help of moderate 
leaders (ibid, p. 95). These external interests were soon to find willing accomplices in South 
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Katangese politicians frustrated by the humiliating results of the 1960 national elections (Personal 
Observation).   
 
On the eve of independence, Belgium decided to wind up the Comite Special du Katanga (CSK), 
the majority shareholder in the UMHK. The aim, in Depelchin’s (1992) view, was to deny the 
nascent Congolese state the majority shareholder status enjoyed by the Congo as a Belgian colony 
within the UNHK. Before independence, the CSK’s shares among all the important concessions 
in the Congo ware nearly 60% with capital increase of 8 billion Belgian francs. Its profits were 3.4 
billion Belgian francs (Depelchin, p.171).  
 
The “agreement” of 27 June, published by Depelchin in his book and cited below, also stipulated 
that the CSK was entitled to take over Congolese shares for 12% of its assets. What did this 
agreement entail? Depelchin states that the Belgian Congo had enjoyed a majority shares status 
within the UMHK throughout the period of Belgian colonial rule. However, as independence 
approached, and worried about rising Congolese nationalism, Belgium acted to protect its interests. 
It began with a decree 3 days before Independence Day (27 June 1960) which made it impossible 
for the future State to exert control over the company. The CSK, at that time to be inherited by the 
independent Congo, ran the UMHK and had statutory powers that were supposed to run until 1999. 
This would have allowed the independent Congo to have more votes at general assembly meetings 
of UMHK than all other shareholders. With this “agreement”, Depelchin (1992) reveals that the 
CSK was wound up prematurely with two-thirds of its shares going to the Congo and the remaining 
one-third to the Compagnie du Katanga20 (CK), another company of lesser importance.  
                                                 




As a result, the distribution of votes among the major shareholders of UMHK, according to 
Depelchin’s account, was as follows: Congo: 478,292; Tanganyika Concessions Limited: 375,160; 
Compagnie du Katanga: 202,976 and Societe Generale21: 128,792. The Belgian interests combined 
had over 700,000 votes while the Congo was left with 478,292 votes. The importance of this 
development as a prelude to the Katanga crisis is instructive for it confirmed the determination of 
Belgium and multinational interests to keep the Congo from falling into the hands of those 
perceived to be nationalist, communists or revolutionaries (Depelchin 1992, p.169 and Kisangani 
2012, p.37). After the 1960 elections, the so-called moderates and regional leaders who favoured 
a federal structure (so as to continue exerting control and power over their regions following failure 
in the elections) found convenient allies in multinational interests opposed to Lumumba. 
Tshombe’s CONAKAT party closed ranks with the Belgian controlled UMHK and Belgian and 
Western neocolonial interests in precipitating the secession of Katanga and political crisis in the 
country  
 
In South Kasai, the second economically most endowed province after Katanga, secession was 
more influenced by the frustrated ambitions of some of its political leaders. Kasai province as a 
whole at the time produced for Belgium 60% of the world´s industrial diamonds and before 
independence, Meniere de Batwing22 (MIBA) contributed significantly to Congo’s budget with 
391.3 million francs, that is to say $55 million by 2010 estimates (Kisangani 2012, p.45). Young 
in Clark (2002, p17) confirms this. The importance of the province both economically and 
                                                 
21 The General Enterprises Company was a Belgian investment concern in the DRC during the colonial period. 
22 Bakwanga diamond  mines 
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politically contributed to the heightened level of struggle for control among its leaders and the 
subsequent secession crisis. 
 
2.2 ii Demography and the political economy of conflict in Katanga and Kasai 
 
In Katanga, the demographic strength of the Lubas was the result of the massive recruitment of 
ethnic Luba labour from Kasai into Katanga by Belgian and other multinational companies in the 
early 20th century. By the 1950s, Lubas of Kasai23 origin constituted 26% of the population of the 
Katangan capital of Lubumbashi whereas the Luba Katanga from the north of the province 
comprised 18.1 %. Although there was no open alliance between the two, the Lunda and Bemba 
of south Katanga, respectively 6 and 3 percent of the entire provincial population, were 
apprehensive about the overall demographic strength of the Lubas (Kisangani 2012, p. 39). Despite 
being ethnic strangers, the Luba Kasai, as they were called, represented 56% of the African work 
force at UMHK. Kisangani (2012) reveals that in the African Katuba quarters of the city, Lubas 
represented 40% of the population and owned 42% of houses. Twelve percent of houses were 
owned by Lubas from north Katanga (BALUBAKAT). Thus, more than 50% of houses were 
owned by ethnic Lubas in Katuba in Lubumbashi around the period (Kisangani, 2012).  
 
During the 1957 legislative elections, four “non-authentic”24 Katangan burgomasters were elected 
to the national parliament (2 Luba Kasai, 1 Songe from Kasai province and 1 Kusu from Kivu). 
                                                 
23 Following the collapse of the precolonial Luba Empire in the late 19 Century, then centred in north Katanga, the 
Lubas spread out to different locations especially following the slave raids of the Arab slave raider Tippu Tip. Lubas 
are today found in the two Kasai provinces (one Kasai region at the time) and north Katanga (see maps of the Luba 
Empire and distribution of Lubas in today’s Congo). 
24 In the context of the time, they were not considered genuine Katangese because they were migrants or the children 
of migrants who went to Kasai in search of work (Kisangani 2012). 
44 
 
They were not considered genuinely Katangese because they were migrants or the children of 
migrants who went to Kasai in search of work (Kisangani, 2012). Determined to fight this 
perceived threat, the Lundas formed CONAKAT under Moise Tshombe to address their 
frustrations through identity politics. It was under these circumstances that the 1960 elections took 
place. Following the 1960 legislative elections, CONAKAT obtained 8 seats in the lower house in 
Kinshasa while the BALUBAKAT cartel won 7 (Kisangani, 2012 and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002). 
At the provincial level, CONAKAT obtained 25 out of 60 contested seats while BALUBAKAT 
won 22 seats. Fifteen individual tickets and those for traditional representatives went to 
CONAKAT confirming its lead in the province. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) and 
Kisangani (2012), the BALUBAKAT party objected to the results alleging irregularities.25 The 
data from this chapter is taken from Kisangani’s 2012 comprehensive report on the background to 
the crises of 1960-1961. In protest, it boycotted the first meeting of the provincial legislature and 
while the crisis persisted, Belgium, in support of CONAKAT, amended the Fundamental Law 
which then allowed CONAKAT to carry on with proceedings in the regional parliament if 
BALUBAKAT boycotted two consecutive meetings of the Katanga provincial assembly. 
 
When BALUBAKAT boycotted a subsequent parliamentary session, CONAKAT members on 16 
June 1960 elected Tshombe as President of the Provincial Government of Katanga. CONAKAT 
was determined to exert control over the province especially given its belief that BALUBAKAT 
was allied to its political enemy represented by the Patrice Lumumba-led government (Personal 
interview with Jean Omasombo, 2012)26. Earlier, the BALUBAKAT announced a separate 
                                                 
 
26 The interview has mainly covered all the crises the country has known since independence. From Kasai province 
and non-Luba, what happened in Katanga and Kasai during his fellow kinsman Lumumba’s brief tenure makes the 
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government on 21 June 1960 and lobbied its nationalist ally in the Lumumba Government for 
support. Lumumba had named a BALUBAKAT politician Jason Sendwe as State Commissioner 
for Katanga with powers to override those of the provincial government (Kisangani 2012) On 11 
July 1960, Tshombe announced the secession of Katanga from the Congo. Pursuing their interests, 
Belgian industrial companies, Belgium and other European countries supported the entry of 
mercenaries from South Africa, Belgium and other European countries to defend Tshombe’s 
Katanga Republic (Kisangani, 2012). The crisis lasted 30 months. 
 
In Kasai, the social circumstances of secession were not dissimilar to what happened in Katanga. 
On the eve of independence, the Luba people (Lulua and Luba) found themselves competing for 
political control of Kasai province. As in Katanga, Luba settlers from the south of the province 
were more visible and active in the colonial administration and were therefore more influential 
than their Lulua hosts who became apprehensive about losing out after independence.  
 
During the first popular elections in the provincial capital Luluabourg (later renamed Kananga, 
and not to be confused with Katanga) in December 1958, the Luluas who hoped to address the 
perceived Luba threat of domination voted along ethnic lines in the two African quarters of Nganza 
and Ndesha obtaining 16 seats though they represented only 26% of the city’s population 
(Kisangani, 2012).27  According to Kisangani, the Luba, 56% of the Kananga population, obtained 
17 seats. However, contrary to expectations, Sylvetre Kalamba, a Lulua political leader, soon after 
                                                 
subject passionately interesting to him. For instance, he revealed to me that given the strong ethnic identities in the 
DRC, crisis was inevitable even without external intervention. 







demanded being recognized by the Belgian government as King of the Bena Lulua (Lulua people) 
which was granted according to Kisangani. Here too, Belgian interference, as in Katanga, escalated 
the crisis.  Kalamba went on to demand the allegiance of all Lubas (Luluas and Luba) and a wave 
of Luba protests against threats to their hold onto land led to the banishment of Luba leaders Albert 
Kalonji, Evariste Kalonji and Albert Nyembwe from the south of the province (South Kasai). The 
Lulua then raised the question of indigeneity having their sights on land that the enterprising Luba 
had acquired during the colonial period (Kisangani, 2002). 
 
During the 1960 national elections, Kasai province had to fill 70 seats in the national parliament 
in addition to its quota in provincial institutions. Voting went along ethnic lines and the results 
reflected the deep ethnic divisions not only among Lubas in the west and south, but also among 
non-Lubas. Albert Kalonji benefitted from the Luba demographic strength and won 21 seats while 
the MNC- Lumumba obtained 17.  The Lulua Union Nationale Congolaise won 10 seats and the 
Songo Unity Party got 6 of the remaining seats.  Following announcement of the results, Patrice 
Lumumba flew to Kasai and brought together his party, with the Lulua group and the Songe party 
in a common front against the MNC-Kalonji. The coalition thus obtained 7 out of 10 positions in 
the provincial government and legislature (Kisangani 200, p.50). In addition, the later decision by 
two smaller parties to join the coalition led to the total control over the provincial government by 
Lumumba’s coalition.28 
 
                                                 
28 Lumumba was from Kasai province. A Mutetela from the north, he was able to mobilize people around his 




Lumumba appointed a supporter of what was considered the nationalist cause Barthelemy 
Mukenge as Governor of Kasai province, after Albert Kalonji lost the popular vote narrowly. The 
appointment of Mukenge occurred at a time of heightened tensions between Luba and Lulua and 
according to Kisangani, Kalonji’s frustrated ambition drove him to secession (Kisangani 2012, 
p.50). Although soon after crushed by Lumumba’s government forces with heavy casualties, it 
was from this legitimate action by the State that Joseph Kasavubu unconstitutionally dismissed 
Lumumba29 precipitating the constitutional crisis of 1960 (Persona interview with Omasombo, 
2012). 
 
2.2 iiic  The assassination of Patrice Lumumba  
 
Congolese Lumumba specialist Professor Jean Omasombo30 informed me during my interview 
with him that his encounters with Victor Nendeka and Larry Devlin confirmed more or less the 
truth about the conspiracy to eliminate Lumumba. Speaking to me about the Lumumba’s 
assassination, Omasombo explains that Lumumba was not a ‘radical’ before 1958, that as early as 
1956, he believed in a Congo that in future would work in association with Belgium. He made 
known the importance of friendship and cooperation between Europeans and Africans and 
appreciated the transformations Belgium had made in the Congo (Personal Interview with 
Omasombo, 2012). He however denounced the atrocities of Belgian King Leopold II and the 
segregationist policies of colonial rule. In Omasombo’s words, he was rather radicalized by 
‘Belgium’s lack of commitment to addressing the grievances of the evolués and the heavy-
                                                 
29 Discussion with Omasombo (op cit))  
30 The only Congolese and African to have sat as a member of the Lumumba murder investigation Commission in 
Brussels in 2001 
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handedness he Lumumba was subjected to from the time of his arrest in 1959 to 1960’ (Jean 
Omasombo, and Benoit Verhaeghe, Patrice Lumumba,acteur politique : De la prison aux portes 
du pouvoir, juillet 1956-février 1960, L'Harmattan, Paris 410. p.) 
 
On the day of Congo’s independence (30 June 1960), Lumumba gave a nationalist and 
inflammatory address (annex 6) that was as honest as much as it was undiplomatic. During his 
address, Lumumba said independence was the culmination of a struggle of the nationalist 
liberation movement rather than the result of Belgian concessions. He said, ‘Although 
independence was based on an agreement with friendly Belgium which we are dealing with today 
on equal terms, the Congolese people will always remember the struggle, humiliations, suffering, 
forced labour, racial discrimination, land seizures and physical mistreatment by the colonialist’. 
He went on to inform the audience in the presence of the Belgian delegation led by King Baudoin 
that no Congolese worthy of the name will forget the cost of the struggle for liberation and the 
wounds of 80 years of colonial domination with the very low salaries and the lack of a decent 
living. He said Belgium’s decision to decolonize was because of pressure from the strong and 
irreversible currents of history. He said the new Congolese government would deliver social justice 
adding that the independence of the Congo was a decisive step towards the liberation of the African 
continent (see annex for the full speech as archived by Assata Shakur Forums, Collected Speeches 
and Writings of Patrice Lumumba. 31 August 2010). 
 
Given the Cold War context of the event, the speech raised concerns in the United States, Belgium, 
the United Kingdom and France. As outlined above, it resulted in conspiracy (Devlin, 2007). Soon 
after the Katangan crisis erupted, Lumumba’s trusted army chief Colonel Joseph Mobutu staged 
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his coup d’état against Lumumba. This intervention by Mobutu, prodded on and supported by the 
United States, has been confirmed by Devlin (2007) and Kabemba (2006, p. 103). After the coup, 
ceremonial president cum political rival of Lumumba Joseph Kasavubu was left in office while 
Mobutu remained the de facto power behind the new government. Lumumba was soon after taken 
away and delivered to his mortal Katangese enemies to be executed on 16 January 1961 as cited 
above. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba, shocking as much as it was an act of betrayal by 
Mobutu, was significant in Congolese history for two reasons. First it signified the end of 
‘independence’ as fought for by Lumumba. Second, it represented the triumph of the neocolonial31 
project of control over the Congo in subsequent decades. 
 
The Lumumba assassination is best explained in terms of the ideological and economic policies of 
Western powers (the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium), 
Apartheid South Africa and multinational corporations as well as the frustrations of Congolese 
political actors in Katanga, Kasai and Kinshasa. These interests collided in a set of circumstances 
in which the removal of Lumumba became the inevitable and relished consequence. Devlin’s 
(2007) account, which confirms this, has been corroborated in my personal interviews (Personal 
Interview with Omasombo, 2012). 
 
Following Lumumba’s assassination, Cyril Adoula, Lumumba’s former Vice President in the 
MNC was named Prime Minister and all Lumumba supporters were retained in their or other posts 
in the government to emerge led by ceremonial president Joseph Kasavubu who had earlier been 
neutralized by Mobutu. 
                                                 




2.2.iv Rebellions in Kwilu and eastern Congo - 1964-1968 
 
The rebellions that erupted in the Congo following Lumumba’s assassination were mainly directed 
against the institutions established by Mobutu following their triumph over the nationalists. It was 
a struggle to eliminate the new bourgeoisie that for Cabral (Cabral, 1966) was created after 
independence to fight the illusion of national political power and independence. Cabral identifies 
two phases of what defined the independence revolution in Africa at the time. First was the 
nationalist phase when all classes of colonial society united to fight colonialism. The second was 
the social phase of reconstruction and transformation in which the essence of the task was to fight 
against neocolonialism and its internal allies.  
 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) in his research identifies two issues that inspired the rebellions namely 
i) the treachery and complicity of Congolese leaders in the murder of Lumumba and ii) their failure 
to live up to their promises of independence, namely the abolition of taxes, provision of housing, 
water, electricity, free healthcare, free education, jobs and better wages . 
 
A political economy study reveals that the Kwilu rebellion was as much a reaction to Lumumba’s 
assassination as it was a response to the changed socio-economic and political dynamics in the 
Bandundu region of the Congo from where some of the independence era leaders hailed. Up to the 
1960 elections Kwilu’s economy relied on palm oil production engaging one in every five men 
(Kisangani, 2012). Price fluctuations in the 1930s have always influenced a series of minor 
rebellions which were suppressed bloodily by the Belgian colonial authorities. The diminished 
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importance of the trade however meant people will turn elsewhere for their livelihood and as 
independence approached, politics became the only perceived means of easy access to resources 
(Kisangani, 2012). 
 
Besides the much publicised anti-neocolonial revolt by Pierre Mulele, personality conflicts and 
antagonisms among political actors in the Bandundu region had persisted alongside the 1960s 
crises. At independence, three key players from province had emerged on the national scene, 
Antoine Gizenga, Pierre Mulele and Cleophas Kamitatu32. This is not to dismiss the more 
important role of resistance influenced by Lumumba’s murder and led by Pierre Mulele and his 
Conseil National de Liberation (CNL)33 in the Kwilu region in 1963. The CNL rebellion rejected 
the imposed reactionary state which confiscated their power and sought to extend its influence to 
areas where Lumumba, Gizenga and Mulele had their support – Kwilu (Bandundu), Kisangani, 
Kivu and north Katanga. However, because they were narrowly confined to the Mbunda (Mulele’s 
ethnic group) and Gizenga’s Pende areas of Kwilu in Bandundu province, the resistance fizzled 
out in mid-1964 (McCalpin in Clark, 2002, p.42). 
 
The rebellion in the east began in April 1964 when rebels seized Bukavu, the then capital of Kivu 
province. In early August, Kisangani, the country’s third largest city fell to Mulele lieutnant 
Christophe Gbenye’s Simba rebels who established a revolutionary government in September. The 
                                                 
32 They were respectively from the Pende, Gungu and Bulongo ethnic groups. After the 1960 elections, the national 
leader of the PSA Gizenga and his Secretary-General Pierre Mulele respectively became Vice Prime Minister and 
Education Minister in Lumumba’s coalition government. Cleophas Kamitatu was left out of the national government. 
When Lumumba’s government in Kinshasa fell in 1961, Kamitatu was appointed Interior Minister by the new 
reactionary government of Kasavubu while Gizenga was imprisoned by Mobutu, then the power behind Kasavubu. 
This change in power relations in Bandundu alienated both Gizenga and Mulele and their ethnic groups (The problem 
of ethnicity being a function of the African continent’s lack of legitimacy in history has already been discussed in 
chapter one) and contributed towards influencing the shifting alliances between moderates and nationalists). 
33 National Liberation Council 
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rebellion however was weakened by indiscipline and subsequently defeated by Western 
mercenaries deployed by Belgium and the United States to defend Mobutu. Mobutu seized power 
again in 1965 and subsequently imposed a thirty-two year dictatorship that was supported by the 




2.3 Actors and motivations in the crisis of independence 
 
The main actors in the crisis of independence were the three groups that fought for control over 
the Congolese State in 1960. These were (i) the moderates, otherwise called the counter elites, 
captured or coopted (Wong, 2010), (ii) Lumumba and his supporters otherwise referred to as the 
nationalists and (iii) multinational interests and their powerful allies. The terms counter elites, 
coopted elites or captured elite refer to the same group of people. Thompson (2000) defines these 
elites as the relatively educated bureaucrats and professionals who had benefitted from colonial 
rule and were set to profit again as the most closely associated with the post-colonial cum 
neocolonial State. I now discuss the elites and their motivations. 
 
2.3 (i)   The counter-elites and their motivations 
 
Thompson (2000) defines these counter elites as the relatively educated bureaucrats and 
professionals who had benefitted from colonial rule and were set to profit again as the most closely 
associated with the post-colonial cum neocolonial State. I now discuss the elites and their 
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motivations. Among the counter elites of the 1960s, Justin Bomboko and Victor Nendeka 
alongside Mobutu Sese Seko the Army Chief were the most powerful. According to Devlin (2007), 
Bomboko, Nendeka and Mobutu were an informal group that formed a troika and the centre of 
power from 1961 to 1967. They were known collectively as the Binza group, after the location 
they were based in Kinshasa with their families. Together with Cyril Adoula and other lesser 
historical personalities such as Joseph Ileo, Albert Ndele, Damien Kandolo and Jonas Mukamba, 
they constituted the moderates who collaborated with Western powers such as the United States, 
Belgium and France after Lumumba’s murder (Omasombo, 2012). The first trio knew they wielded 
real power given their influence and closeness to the United States (Devlin, 2007). 
 
Opposed to Lumumba and having lost the independence elections, they hid behind demands for a 
system that paid attention to regional specificities. Through this, they had hoped to be in charge in 
their regions. Two key advocates for federalism were Thombe in Katanga and Kalonji in Kasai. 
Joseph Ileo was among the figures of the Lumumba-led Mouvement National Congolais until the 
split between Lumumba and Kalonji in 1960 when he joined MNC-Kalonji. He later served as 
Prime Minister after Lumumba’s assassination in 1960, a post he held twice before later becoming 
Speaker of the National Parliament. These men were all accomplices in the overthrow of Lumumba 
and the imposition of the neocolonial state of Mobutu. This has been corroborated by the Lumumba 
Commission Report of 2005 (Lumumba Commission Report, 2005). 
 




The Western actors in the Congo’s crisis at independence were the Belgian royal family, Belgium, 
France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Belgian multinational companies in 
Katanga and their allies in southern Africa. These powers had reasons enough to want a change of 
government in Kinshasa in 1960. The nationalist and revolutionary government of Patrice 
Lumumba in Leopoldville was perceived as a threat to entrenched ideological and economic 
interests and, given their perception of the dangers that he posed in a Cold War context, were 
determined to remove him (Delvin, 2007). Belgium, the United States and France, for ideological 
reasons, organized the conspiracy against Lumumba, ostensibly to preempt the spread of Soviet 
influence into the region. The Western actors and multinational companies wanted Congo to be 
oriented towards Southern Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002) where racist reactionary and 
oppressive capitalist regimes held sway in southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, Namibia and South 
Africa at the time.  
 
2.3 iii  Lumumba’s supporters and their motivations 
 
Lumumba’s supporters included Vice Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga, Education Minister Pierre 
Mulele who led the revolt in the Kwilu region of Bandundu, Christophe Gbenye and Gaston 
Soumialot who led the rebellions in the east, the Balubakat leader Jason Sendwe and Anicet 
Kashamura of Kivu province, among others. While Antoine Gizenga and Pierre Mulele had 
important nationalist credentials, personal ambitions and frustrations partly influenced their 
support for rebellion as already outlined. They were however much influenced by Lumumba, his 
nationalist outlook and the African independence revolution blowing across Africa at the time. 
Although not as directly involved in the crisis of independence as the Western powers, Kwame 
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Nkrumah’s Ghana, Sekou Toure’s Guinea, the Soviet Union, Cuba, China, Socialist Tanzania, 
Ngouabi’s Congo-Brazzaville and Nasser’s Egypt morally supported Lumumba and after his 
death, the nationalist rebellions (Kisangani, 2012).  
 
2.4  The impact of the crisis of independence on the future stability of the Congo 
 
The first impact of the crisis of independence was the triumph of the neocolonial state and the 
advance of neocolonialism in Central Africa. For Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002), the immediate result 
was the polarisation of the Congolese political class, the outbreak of rebellion and a long period 
of crisis that has continued to 2010. The crisis of independence was the original sin that continues 
to haunt the Congo to date. The 1960-1964 crises ended any prospect of Soviet expansion in Zaire 
and Central Africa and the death of Lumumba, in a great irony according to Omasombo (2012), 
heralded the birth of the Lualabourg debate.34 It had since been taboo to talk of federalism in the 
Congo and this has continued to date. Patrice Lumumba died therefore to keep the Congo united 
and one notable legacy of the 1960 crisis was the keep Congo united.  
 
The elites of what was clearly a neocolonial regime produced the 1964 Unitary Constitution (the 
Constitution is popularly called the Lualabourg Constitution, with the name of the place where it 
was adopted) for three reasons; The elites of what was clearly a neocolonial regime produced the 
Unitary Constitution for three reasons; 1) Their neo-colonial masters had no more interest in 
dividing the Congo once Lumumba was out of the way; 2) Secession had only been a front for 
                                                 
34 Lualabourg, present-day Kananga, was where the country’s unitary constitution was drafted after Lumumba’s death. 
All subsequent attempts to chart a new political system for the country in the decades that followed used the 
Lualabourg document as a useful reference to keep the country united. 
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opposition to Lumumba. Once he was out of the way, their objectives were attained, and 3) They 
sought to isolate the nationalist revolts of Mulele and the Lumumbists in eastern Congo by posing 
as unitarists, a ploy to expose the rebels as wanting to divide and break up the country (Discussions 
with members of Congolese civil society (2009). With the pro-Western faction at the helm in 
Kinshasa, the way was open to surrender the country to foreign interests. Curiously though, the 
Congo which could have gone federal with the nationalist Lumumba in 1960 was turned into a 
unitary country by the federalist moderates who opposed Lumumba’s centralizing tendencies.  
 
Half a century later in 2006, following a bitter four-year regional war, the government of Joseph 
Kabila, haunted by history, avoided the word federal in the new Constitution which was replaced 
by “decentralization” (Personal Interview with Omasombo, 2012). I have confirmed during this 
interview that the triumph of the neocolonial state in 1965 resulted in the entrenchment of 
illegitimacy and instability.  The country under Mobutu came to be run based on ‘patronage for 
legitimacy’ which would later destroy the foundations for a viable State (Personal Interviews with 
Fikily, Congolese United Nations Staff, 2005.  I discuss this in subsequent chapters with reference 
to Francois Bayart’s (2009) The State in Africa, a study of corruption and patrimonialism 
influenced partly by his experiences in Cameroon. With the consolidation of power by the 
neocolonial state under Mobutu, Congo became a proxy ally serving the ideological interests of 
the United States. Subsequently, Congo under Mobutu worked to undermine revolutionary regimes 
in Marien Ngouabi’s Brazzaville Congo, Angola’s MPLA and other liberation movements in 
southern Africa. The crisis of independence denied Congolese people the right to choose what 




2.5  National politics and the international context 
 
The crisis of independence was a convergence of national politics and the Cold War context in 
which it occurred. The origins of the conflict among Congo’s leaders lay in the struggle for power 
and control over the institutions of the nascent state. The subsequent Western intervention was to 
preserve strategic ideological and economic interests.  
 
The Cold War context at the time significantly influenced developments and the crisis of 1960. 
The West wanted to keep the Congo within the orbit of its ideological reach much as multinational 
companies were determined to maintain their hold over the country’s strategic resources. The false 
perception of Lumumba as a Communist fed their fears, and as explained, resulted in conspiracy.  
 
The Soviet Union’s support for Lumumba may have been strategically and ideologically 
calculated. However, that Moscow did not go as far as committing the Soviet Union to an all-out 
conflict with the West points to Congo’s lesser significance than, say, Cuba at the time. Despite 
the absence of deeper Soviet involvement, the international climate at the time was characterised 
by a bitter ideological confrontation between East and West which was played out in the Congo 
with tragic consequences. As happened in Cuba in 1962 and Vietnam from 1955-1975, the Congo 









Neocolonialism and the narrow considerations of ambitious Congolese politicians explain the 
tragedy of independence in the Congo between 1960 and 1965. In addition, although Belgium was 
to blame for granting independence without creating a national cadre, or a strong institutional basis 
for an independent state Congolese leaders’ acts of betrayal borne out of frustrated ambitions 
worsened the situation of their country in 1961. Most of the Congo’s leaders had no collective 
vision of what an independent Congo should be like and each of the political groupings they 
formed represented the tribal or occupational interests of evolués and were lacking any knowledge 
of the complex external challenges their country faced. Their ambitions and frustrations played 
into the hands of outside powers and actors who helped to deepen the crisis which resulted in the 
death of Lumumba and the triumph of the neocolonial State of Mobutu. 
 
Part II: Mobutu Sese Seko and the collapse of the Zairean State 1965-1997 
 
2.2 1 Introduction 
 
I have discussed how the ambitions and failures of Congo’s leaders in 1960 set the stage for crisis 
and instability until Mobutu seized power in a CIA-orchestrated coup in 1965. In this section, I 
discuss the long rule of Mobutu during which his strategies of survival in the absence of political 





2.2.2  Struggle for national cohesion and its impact on governance in Zaire 
   
Mobutu is remembered by most Congolese people for his unitarist outlook in Zaire from 1965 to 
1997. He came to power in 1965 at the height of the Cold War and superpower rivalry in the then 
third world. Very early in his rule, he realised the problem of political legitimacy facing his regime. 
In 1967, he established a one-party state under his Mouvement Populaire pour la Revolution 
party35 (MPR) and abolished the parliamentary system. To unite the country around him and secure 
his rule, he cynically declared Lumumba a national hero, an action that surprised even his Western 
allies (Devlin, 2007). In a drive to stem tribalism and regionalism, he initiated his famous 
nationalization programmes in 1973 under Zaireanisation which saw the country, the national 
currency and river renamed Zaire. 
 
Mobutu then decreed that all foreign owned farms, plantations and commercial enterprises, mostly 
in the hands of the Portuguese, Greeks, Italians and Pakistanis, be turned over to Zairean nationals 
and went on to confiscate all foreign and private enterprises, including 14 cocoa and rubber 
plantations which were distributed to cronies, generals and MPR chiefs (Wrong 2000, p.92-93). In 
their analysis of state failure and collapse in the Congo under Mobutu, Kisangani (2012), Muamba 
(1991), and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) agree that nationalisation and patronage featured among the 
main causes. Mobutu’s nationalization policies were another name for the misappropriation of 
resources for eventual distribution to cronies so as to perpetuate his hold onto power. Soon after 
seizing enterprises controlled by foreigners, Mobutu transferred them to supporters, party bigwigs 
and generals who hardly had any knowledge of running an enterprise let alone economics.  
                                                 




He launched the equivalent of a cultural revolution, authenticité36. It was hardly taken seriously in 
the later years of his rule after people became disillusioned and frustrated by government failure 
and economic crisis.  Although Mobutu wanted to unite the country around him, his methods were 
destructive to the economy and compromised the future development of the country. His 
programmes were only sustainable as long as world copper prices and Zaire’s strategic Cold War 
importance permitted.  
 
Through the MPR, he distributed hundreds of posts, resources and money lavished on the Central 
Committee of the MPR, the Executive Council, regional administrations and heads of State 
enterprises. On top of these were the endless cabinet reshuffles. From Wrong’s findings, 51 
governments were appointed during the entire period of his rule from 1965 to 1997 (Wrong 2000, 
p. 97). Kisangani (2010, p.25) counted 40 cabinet reshuffles from 1966 and 1989 alone. Wrong 
(2000) demonstrates how cronyism and patronage under Mobutu precipitated the country’s 
economic collapse because the system he built around him required massive resources to sustain 
it. For instance, $400 million in mineral export earnings disappeared from the national treasury in 
the midst of an economic crisis in 1988 (ibid, p111). Under Mobutu, the state-owned mining 
company Gecamines37 was drained after being made the guarantor for state debts, unpaid loans, 
hospital and hotel bills and other liabilities. During his rule, Gecamines and the Miniere de 
Bakwanga (MIBA), the state’s cooper and diamond parastatals and main sources of revenue, were 
milked until they collapsed. Jonas Mukamba, the long standing state representative in MIBA in 
                                                 
36 Autenticity demanded the return to African values, dress codes and a rejection of all aspects of European cultural 
practices 
37 Generale des Cariere des mines, the National Mining Company 
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his briefings after Mobutu was overthrown said between $1.5 million to $2 million was diverted 
to Mobutu every month and this had continued until 1997 even when diamond production had 
fallen from 10 million carats to 6.4 (Wrong, ibid, p.111).  
 
Mobutu manipulated citizenship tensions in eastern Zaire and sided with both sides of conflicting 
ethno-social divides at different times in furtherance of his interests. This rendered him relevant 
as a patron, arbiter and unifier, which according to Muamba (1991) were the means through which 
he preserved his power. My analysis of personal interviews reveals that, Mobutu deliberately 
manipulated the citizenship debate in the Congo since 1972 for personal political gain (Personal 
Interviews with Sebeneza, 2009; Ndabagoye, 2009 and Kirhero, 2012). In 1972, citizenship was 
granted to all Congolese who were in the country before independence in 1960. The move was 
directed at Tutsis whose nationality was disputed by Congolese and was the cause of tensions in 
North and South Kivu provinces. Mobutu’s wanted to win the support of the wealthy and 
influential Tutsis of eastern Congo to strengthen his power base and increase his options. Owing 
to this strategy and parallel nationalisation policies of the 1970s, 90% of land in Masisi in North 
Kivu were in Tutsi hands by 1974. In 1981, when his perception of his political interests demanded 
a change of strategy, the nationality law was revoked and most Tutsis lost their nationality. 
Mobutu’s action was in response to threats to his support base from the large non-Tutsi population 
in the eastern Congo. This however set the stage for future conflicts that erupted in the 1990s. As 





In Katanga, he encouraged ethnic violence to weaken his opponents. In 1992 for instance, he 
encouraged Katangan expulsions of Kasaians from that province when opposition leader Etienne 
Tshisekedi, a Luba Kasai38, opposed Nguz-Karl-I-Bond’s appointment as Prime Minister by 
Mobutu. Mobutu sought to undermine the then sitting Sovereign National Conference (CNS) 
which had elected a rival Prime Minister in the person of Tshisekedi (Lemarchand 2009, p112). 
Under Mobutu, professionalism in the country’s Forces Armeés Zairoises was undermined 
significantly. He favoured his own Ngbandi ethnic group in recruitment and, in 1978, ordered the 
enlistment of soldiers from the group and his native province of Equateur. By 1980, 90% of 
defence ministry personnel were from that region (Kisangani 2010, p.112) and strategic command 
positions were in the hands of officers from Equateur.  
 
Rytjens refers to the period as that of the commercial Generals (Discussion with Filip Ryetsens, 
Bujumbura, July 2012) in reference to the economic influence of Generals Nzimbi Ngbale Kongo 
Wa Basa, Head of the Special Presidential Division and Baramoto Kpama Kata, Commander of 
the Civil Guard, among others. In the 1980s, Mobutu’s Generals contributed to instability in 
Angolathrough its links with the then UNITA rebels under Jonas Savimbi. Zaire was throughout 
the Cold War a base for UNITA rebel commanders who used the territory for the transit of arms 
and money for conflict diamonds.  
 
Mobutu’s destructive rule surpasses in its negative consequences the impact of Belgian colonial 
rule in the Congo. Mobutu’s historical role was different from what Belgian colonialism 
represented. He assumed the reins of office ostensibly to build and transform the independent 
                                                 
38 Ethnic Luba from Kasai Province, now East Kasai 
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Congo and presided over a state recognized internationally and which benefitted from decades-
long inflows of resources from Cold War international support, rent from minerals, as well as other 
forms of bi-lateral and multilateral support. 
 
In spite of the infrastructure left by Belgian colonialism the generation of patrimonial spoilage 
under Mobutu, reversed what development there was in the country before 1960 (Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2002). By 1997, the health infrastructure of the country had all but collapsed. For decades, 
the state and its organs and institutions served him, undermined the judicial system and trampled 
over voices. By 1992, people stopped identifying with the state. By 1995, Zaire was on its knees, 
a failed and collapsing state. 
 
According to Kisangani (2012), the nationalisation of foreign businesses and plantations in 1973 
de-industrialised the Congo, increased her foreign debt and precipitated the collapse of the 
country’s economy. While many had believed the Zairean State to be strong, it never was. It was 
supported by a machine of intimidation with different and competing security apparatuses. 
Through them, Mobutu suppressed civil society and all forms of dissent and used his security arms 
to keep the country quiet, at least until 1985.39 
 
According to Wrong (2000), during the entire period of Mobutu’s rule, billions of dollars in 
revenue were spent to serve his political survival strategies. The effect of uncontrolled government 
spending was a soaring inflation in the 1970s. According to Kisangani (2010, p. 25), Mobutu spent 
32% of government outlays on himself alone and in the 1970s, the country’s foreign debt increased 
                                                 
39 The role of civil society in the struggle for democracy in Zaire will be discussed in detail in chapter five. 
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from less than 50% to more than 100% of GDP in the late 1980s. In 1979, a parliamentary 
commission of enquiry found that the president had illegally withdrawn $150 million ($450 million 
in 2010 prices) in foreign exchanges from the Central Bank for his personal use in defiance of 
austerity measures imposed by the IMF in its stabilisation programme (ibid). 40 
 
As a result of politicisation and ethnicisation of the Forces Armees Zairoises, the country’s future 
capacity to defend itself was compromised. During my interviews, I was informed by a senior 
Congolese army officer in an interview that on several occasions, Mobutu’s Western allies had to 
go to his rescue in Oriental, Kivu and Katanga provinces where rebellions threatened his regime 
during the decades he ruled the country. (FARDC 10 Military Region interview, Army Officer 1, 
Bukavu. 13 May 2010). In spite of his failures, amid the nationalist rhetoric that characterized his 
reign, Mobutu was overthrown in 1997 by a rebel coalition led by Laurent Desiré Kabila. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Role of the West in the perpetuation of Mobutu’s rule 
 
By the West, I refer to the United States, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and allied countries 
of a similar ideological persuasion who were implicated in the Congo crises of the 1960s as they 
fought to keep Soviet influence out of Central Africa. These countries consistently supported 
Mobutu throughout the Cold War and tolerated his repression of his people to cling on to power. 
Mobutu’s thirty-two year longevity in power were thus the unintended consequence of the United 
States’ anti-communist policies. Kisangani rightly quoted the “America’s Tyrant” cliché in his 
                                                 
40 I explained in the preceding chapter how the IMF-appointed German head of Zaire’s Central Bank Erwin 
Blumenthal left the country in frustration at the extent of mismanagement in the country’s revenue institutions. 
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analysis of the role he played for the West which in return supported his misrule (Kisangani 2010, 
p117).  
 
There are several explanations for the West’s support for Mobutu between 1965 and 1997, the 
most common being the exigencies of the Cold War and the economic and political importance of 
Zaire to Western economic interests.  The enormous riches of Zaire and its strategic and political 
importance made it an attraction for both East and West at the time and the latter, once securing 
Lumumba’s elimination in 1961, ensured that the new reactionary status-quo remained as long as 
the Cold War permitted (Omasombo, 2012). Mobutu was a guarantor of Western ideological and 
economic interests in return for his security. His nationalist rhetoric, according to a former South 
Kivu vice Governor, was only for home consumption different from reality on the ground. Mobutu 
had never dared to threaten the foundations of the neocolonial state (Personal Interview with 
Didace Kaningini, 2009). Economic imperialism and ideological imperatives were mainly the 
explanations for the support Mobutu received from the West between 1965 and 1995. Western 
countries saw in Mobutu a staunch ally and bulwark against the spread of Communist ideology in 
the region. He was a reliable partner who supported Western interests as long as his power base 
was protected by the West. It was a symbiosis that continued as long as both sides mutually served 




Mobutu’s reign was characterised by massive corruption, loot of resources, failed policies, 
intimidation and patronage. In three decades, Mobutu abandoned the institutional mechanisms of 
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rule and destroyed all the country’s key institutions like the Central Bank, public corporations and 
the army all of which he controlled through cronies or relations within the MPR. According to a 
Congolese social activist, Mobutu had well-intentioned policies but which were never followed by 
serious action because the imperatives of political survival took precedence, and as a result he 
deliberately destroyed institutions to ensure this (Personal Interview with Arsene Kilhero, July 
2012). 
 




This part of the chapter examines the period when Laurent Desiré Kabila came to power after 
Mobutu’s overthrow, from 1997 to the end of the first four years of President Joseph Kabila in 
2010. It examines conflict and instability during this period, in particular, the role played by 
Laurent Desiré Kabila and his son Joseph in the 13 years that followed Mobutu’s political demise. 
 
2.3.2 Laurent Desiré Kabila and the second collapse of the Congolese State  
 
Laurent Desiré Kabila was president of the Congo from May 1997 to January 2001 when he was 
assassinated.41 His becoming president was due to colliding regional and international political 
circumstances. Unlike Presidents Museveni and Kagame who led rebellions to capture power 
                                                 
41 Laurent Desire Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001. He was shot by a formerchild soldier Rashidi 
Kasereka who was instantly killed by Colonel Eddy Kapend, Kabila’s military aide. Colonel Kapend was in turn 
arrested and accused of treason in the murder. The conspiracy against Kabila is the subject of continuing speculation 
that outside forces have been involved.  
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respectively in 1986 and 1994 in Uganda and Rwanda, Kabila was catapulted to power by a 
coalition led by Rwanda and Uganda, supported by foreign powers as outlined in the first chapter. 
A long-standing Lumumbist from Katanga,42 Kabila formed his own Parti de la Revolution 
Populaire43 to fight and overthrow Mobutu’s neocolonial state by force of arms in the 1960s. In 
the decades that followed, he created his own fiefdom in Fizi in eastern Congo espousing collective 
agriculture, rudimentary Marxist re-education, carrying out extortion and mineral smuggling 
(Dunn 2002, p55). He retired to Tanzania in the 1980s where he was engaged in gold trading. It 
was President Museveni and late Tanzanian President Nyerere who introduced him to President 
Paul Kagame and who afterwards agreed to place him as the figurehead of the anti-Mobutu 
rebellion in 1996. With the strong backing of Rwanda and Uganda, he swept to power in May 
1997. 
 
Once in power, he set about reorganizing the country based on his own convictions. His early 
success in restoring hope in the country is noteworthy. However, in spite of his initial successes 
such as the introduction and stabilisation of the new national currency (Turner 2007, 38), Kabila 
began to derail very early in his reign. According to Kabemba (2002), Kabila came to power 
unprepared to accept the changed international situation of the 1990s. Once at the helm of affairs 
from 1997, he showed little appetite for adjusting to the new international climate at the end of the 
Cold War. His demagoguery44 and intransigence alienated Western countries, especially the 
United States which more or less welcomed him in 1997.  
                                                 
42 He was a BALUBAKAT youth activist during the crisis of 1960. 
43 People’s Revolutionary Party still re-echoing the language that was common during the Cold War. 
44 A demagogue is a populist, appeals to popular desires although they may know about their impracticability. 
Kabila paraded as a Lumumbist, and made use of socialist rhetoric even though he dealt with multinational 




He refused to recognise the country’s debt obligations and rejected World Bank and IMF 
adjustment programmes and further refused to grant mining contracts to Western economic 
interests (Kabemba 2002, p.106.) On the administration of the country, Kabila disregarded 
experience and merit and placed people he could trust in important positions regardless of ability 
or skill. He controlled all revenue from customs to mining and nothing was allowed to happen 
without his permission (Kabemba, ibid). Placed in power by Rwanda and Uganda, he expelled 
these regional powers from the Congo by asking all their forces present in the country to leave in 
1998 when he had no army to protect his power base. This was perhaps an act of political naivety. 
 
Kabila wanted to launch his own transformation programme for the country disconnected from the 
process of political change set in motion by Congo’s civil society in the 1990s. He rejected every 
opportunity to involve other forces in the ongoing change process referring to opponents or civil 
society activists as Mobutists or agents of foreign powers. On democratic reforms, he dragged his 
feet and refused to accommodate the opposition even when 86% of people in Kinshasa wanted this 
(Afoaku in Clark 2002, p.112). The outbreak of the externally supported RCD rebellion further 
evidenced his lack of diplomatic skills which prolonged the suffering of the Congolese people. As 
the war raged from 1998 to 2000, Kabila was considered unsuitable in the search for a negotiated 
solution. He resisted all efforts to stop the war and form an all-inclusive government and despite 
signing the Lusaka Accords of 1999, he made every effort to block their implementation. The 
Accords were engineered to include rebels in future efforts to reorganize the State through a 
sharing of responsibilities: ‘Forty-five days after the signing of the Lusaka agreement (see 
appendix 5) , the DRC government, the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD), the 
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Mouvement de Liberation Congolais (MLC), unarmed opposition groups and Congolese civil 
society are to begin up to six weeks of open political negotiations, to culminate in the setting up 
of a new political dispensation in the DRC. The negotiations are to be held under the authority of 
a neutral facilitator acceptable to all Congolese parties, to be chosen within 15 days of the signing. 
The dialogue's agenda would include the organisation of democratic elections, among other topics. 
Following the negotiations, a restructured national army is to be formed, which would integrate 
the forces of the Congolese army, the RCD and the MLC.’ (2002 Global and Inclusive Agreement 
on Transition in DRC: Inter Congolese Dialogue, Congolese negotiation on the peace process and 
on transition in the DRC (see appendix 8) 
 
Kabila however refused to accept this. In pursuit of his obstinate stance, he refused to meet the 
United Nations representative to Congo, restricted the United Nations Mission’s movements and 
did little to stop demonstrations or propaganda against the International Community (Kabemba, 
2006). In the words of Dunn, Kabila’s subsequent downfall was the result of his inexperience in 
governing. Kabemba blames him for alienating the West very early in his reign. Less than a year 
into power, opinion polls in Kinshasa found out that less than 20% of voters would support Kabila 
if elections were held at the time (Dunn, 2002, p.61).  
 
In spite of his tragic failures, Kabila was the archetypal Lumumbist who inspired hope and 
confidence in the Congolese during the early months of his brief rule. It was however tragic that 
he failed to learn from history to effectively deal with the delicate issues that he was condemned 




2.3.3 The regional war of 1998-2003 and its impact  
 
According to interviewees the 1998-2002 war was caused by a unique combination of six factors 
namely state weakness, regional export of instability and civil wars, the profitability of war, local 
stakes, land and resources and Rwandan impunity (Personal Interview with Filip Ryetsens, 2012).  
The 1998 rebellion was precipitated by Kabila’s expulsion of Rwandan forces from the country. 
While it is important for any worthy country to wrest itself of external influence, this research 
observed from the literature and interviews that the outbreak of war was more a reaction to Kabila’s 
lack of diplomatic skills. In July 1998, after he expelled all Rwandan troops in the Congo to satisfy 
growing local opposition to the foreign presence, the Rwandan Government encouraged the 
Ressemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) rebellion45 to overthrow Kabila. Rwanda 
felt betrayed by Kabila’s independent line and nationalism and discovered that its mortal enemy, 
the FDLR rebels, would not be expelled from eastern Congo. It must however be stated that Kaila’s 
failure to address the FDLR problem was both part incapacity and part reluctance (Personal 
Interview with Sebeneza, 2010).46  
 
The rebels captured the eastern city of Goma in August, followed by Uvira, Bukavu and Kisangani 
in the same month and, leaping across the country in captured aircraft, Rwandans troops and rebels 
                                                 
45 The RCD’s leaders including several non-Tutsi Congolese people who had various reasons to want to see Kabila’s 
back. Emile Illunga, President, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba - Chairman, Arthur Z'Ahidi Ngoma - Co-founder , Jacques 
Depelchin - Executive secretary, Lunda Bululu - Executive council coordinator, Tambwe Alexis Mwamba - Executive 
council member and Mbusa Nyamwisi - Executive council member were all non-Tutsis. Two Tutsis who were part of 
the original group were Moise Nyarugabo - Deputy Chairman and Bizima Karaha - Executive council member and 
head of external relations department. 
46 Though Kabila quickly made use of FDLR rebels in the war against RCD and Rwanda, it was an act of 
desperation as there is no evidence of prior links before the war. 
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under Rwandan Colonel James Kabarebe, dismissed by Kabila as Congolese army commander, 
landed in the west of the country, initially capturing Kitona, Matadi, and the Inga Hydroelectric 
power complex threatening the eastern suburbs of Kinshasa including the airport. 
 
Kabila quickly prevailed upon Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia to come to his aid. Angolan troops 
attacked the rebels in the west whilst Zimbabwean commandoes retook control of Njili airport and 
moved to halt the rebel advance across the country. The actions of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia 
halted the Rwandan advance but ignited the regional war with the RCD rebels, Rwanda and 
Uganda fighting against the pro-Kabila armies. The war lasted four years47 from 1998 to 2002 
even though the Lusaka Peace Accords (see appendix 7) were signed in 1999. Kabila was 
assassinated during the war period as indicated above and succeeded by his son Joseph who signed 
the Comprehensive and Inclusive Accords (see appendix 8).  
 
The war’s humanitarian impact is the subject of varied reports. Turner (2007) writes of three 
million deaths while The Lancet in 2006 indicated 4 million deaths since 1998 (The Lancet 
Medical Journal, January 2006) A report by the International Rescue Committee gave its own 
figure: 5.4 million by April 2007 from 1998 (IRC report, 22 January 2008). What is no longer in 
doubt is that the Congo lost at least three million people from direct confrontation and the 
humanitarian consequences of war. Displacement, disease, malnutrition, arms proliferation, state 
collapse, occupation by Rwanda and Uganda and the massive loot of resources were among the 
consequences of the war. 
 
                                                 
47 Its impact has already been discussed in Chapter One. 
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The country was partitioned into three main zones under the government, MLC and RCD control 
while other smaller armed groups reigned in other zones they occupied. As a result of state 
collapse, the Congo remained occupied, unstable and violent until 2010, the limit of my 
investigations. 
 
2.3.4 The political transition (2002-2006): An evaluation 
 
Joseph Kabila was chosen to succeed his father who was assassinated in 2001. He was selected to 
preside over the transition (which was to end in 2006). The 2002-2006 political transition in the 
Congo originated in the Lusaka and Sun City Accords respectively signed in 1999 and 2002. On 
10 July 1999 while the war raged, leaders of six countries involved in the conflict (the Congo, 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda), signed for peace in Lusaka, Zambia, without 
the rebel groups. This effort dragged to 2002 when the Sun City Accords were signed. 
 
2.3.4i Background: The Sun City Accords 
 
On 17 December, the Congolese government, MLC, RCD, the Mayi Mayi, RCD-Nationale, RCD-
KML and the unarmed opposition signed the Accords Global Inclusif. The Accords became known 
as “Sun City 2” to differentiate them from the earlier April Accords that left the RCD out of the 
arrangement. In the Global and Inclusive Accords, the warring factions mainly agreed on the 
following: Joseph Kabila, following the assassination of his father whom he replaced, was to 
remain President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces and head of the Transition initially 
expected to end in 2005. He was assisted by four Vice Presidents one each from the RCD, the 
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MLC, the outgoing (Kabila) Government48 and the unarmed opposition. The four were placed in 
charge of ministries of which the most important were Defence (RCD) and Foreign and Economic 
and Financial Affairs (MLC). The country’s Defence and Security Commission was headed by the 
RCD, an Economic and Finance Commission by the MLC, a Reconstruction and Development 
Commission by the Kabila Government and a Social and Cultural Commission by the political 
(unarmed) opposition as outlined  in the agreements (Global and Inclusive Agreement on transition 
in the DRC). 
  
The big government was the price to pay for peace. It comprised 36 ministers, 25 deputy ministers, 
500 parliamentarians and 120 senators. The ex-government, the RCD and the MLC obtained the 
lion’s share of appointments. The Transitional Parliament was headed by the MLC and the Senate 
by the Forces Vives49 that included all civil society organisations. Five institutions in support of 
democracy were to be headed by civil society (Section V of the Accords, on Transitional 
Institutions, 2002). 
 
2.3.4 ii Corruption during the transition 
 
During the transition in the DRC, several political actors concurred that the strongest belligerents 
were those that benefitted the most from the Sun City Accords (Personal Interviews with Aziane 
2005; Sebeneza, 2009; Biringingwa, 2009, and Kisangani regional office report on RCD 2005)50 
It was an occasion for hundreds of actors, nationalists, opportunists, agitators and armed militia 
                                                 
48 He stepped down as President to be sworn in again as President of the Transitional Government. 
49 Civil society’s active forces 
50 The notes on the transition were partly obtained from archives at the United Nations Mission in Congo. These 
include personal reports and interviews during the period the author was based in the country from 2004 to 2010. 
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leaders and rebels to profit as ministers, deputy ministers, colonels, generals, ambassadors, heads 
of public enterprises, governors and heads of other transitional institutions. (NiZA, Netherlands 
2006). 
 
In 2006, the Netherlands Institution for Southern Africa NiZA, published a report entitled State 
versus People: Governance, Mining and the Transitional Regime in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo to expose the extent of the problem and how politicians enriched themselves from the 
transitional government whose members remained loyal to their respective factions. For the 107 
Excellencies of the transition, 405 new cars were ordered as early as 2004. In September 2005, 
620 four-wheel vehicles were commissioned by the National Assembly Chairman from a Belgian 
Company Demimpex at a time when teachers went hungry and unpaid. Every component of the 
transition literally sat on its budget, used it up, asked for more and threatened the transition when 
it felt less considered (NiZA, Netherlands 2006). 
 
In 2004, according to NiZA, the Presidency exceeded its budget by 100% (7.9bn Congolese 
Francs) while the Vice Presidency responsible for defence overran its own by a similar percentage. 
The Vice Presidency responsible for finance exceeded its budget by 600% at 5bn francs and Vice 
President Zahidi Ngoma’s Social and Cultural Commission swallowed a surplus of 780 million 
Congolese francs (100%). Allocations to the presidency were 8 times the national health budget, 
6 times the social affairs budget and 16 times the agriculture budget (ibid).  
 
In response to concerns about institutional corruption, a parliamentary commission headed by 
Gregoire Bakandaja, a parliamentarian, was appointed to audit state run enterprises in 2004. In 
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January 2005, 6 ministers as well as several public sector executives were dismissed as a result of 
the Bakandaja Report. The parliamentarian Roger Lumbala, former RCD-Nationale leader, 
appointed his wife to replace him after he was accused of corruption and removed.51 During the 
same corruption investigations, Vice President Jean Pierre Bemba’s close collaborator and 
Minister Jose Endundo, a fellow MLC party member and co-proprietor of Hewa Bowa Airlines 
was also affected. Jean Pierre Bemba threatened to leave the transition over the removal of 
Endundo. In another report, Human Rights Watch indicated that 30$mn from the Kivus Defence 
Budget was embezzled by the Defence Department (Human Rights Watch, 2005).  
 
Corruption continued alongside sporadic armed conflicts exacerbated by the struggle for access to 
resources. In Katanga between 2003 and 2006, Government officials colluded with mining 
companies to circumvent control procedures and the payment of taxes. By the end of 2005, three 
quarters of minerals exported from Katanga were leaving illicitly (Global Witness, 2006).  
 
2.3.4 iii The Lutundula Commission 
 
The 2002 Sun City Accords under section 4 dealing with Institutions Supporting Democracy, in 
the subsection on Fight against Corruption, sanctioned a commission to investigate the validity of 
all mining, economic and financial contracts from 1996 to February 2003. Referred to as the 
Commission chargée d’examen de la validite des conventions de character economique et 
financier pendants les guerre 1996-1997 et from 1998 otherwise the Lutundula Commission, it 
                                                 
51 Hon. Roger Lumbala was the former rebel leader of the RCD-N which, as a signatory to the Sun City Accords of 
2002, was guaranteed a percentage of power throughout the transition. 
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was established in 2004 and comprised 17 parliamentarians from a cross section of Composantes52 
of the Transition and headed by Christope Lutundula, an MP.  The 271-page report which 
contained detailed information gathered during investigations in different parts of the Congo as 
well as in countries including Belgium, UK and USA, found out that dozens of contracts signed 
during the war were illegal and had nothing to do with the development of the country. Cases cited 
included 40 contracts signed with Gecamines, 10 Contracts signed with the Congolese State, 7 
with the Société de Dévélopment Industriel et Minier du Congo (SODIMICO)53 and 3 with Societe 
Nationale des Chemins de fer (SNCC) (The Lutundula Commission).54 The Lutundula 
Commission report unearthed tax exemptions of between 15 to 30 years leading to loss of 
significant revenue and concluded that deals were disproportionately advantageous to private 
companies (ibid). The report in its recommendation called for the rescinding, renegotiation or 
amendment of some of the contracts and the placing of a moratorium on new contracts until after 
the elections. Submitted to the transitional National Assembly in June 2005, it was ignored by the 
authorities and after much national and international pressure (and despite attempts by political 
actors to suppress the publication of the report), was made public in February 2006.  However, the 
transitional government never took any serious action on the issue. Here again, failure of 





                                                 
52 Major and other armed groups that signed the Sun City Accords 
53 Industrial and Mining Development Company 
54 National Railways Company 
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2.3.4 iv Conflicts in Ituri, Bukavu and Katanga during the transition 
 
The Ituri crisis was first a struggle for control over land between the province’s two main ethnic 
groups, the agricultural Lendu who owned ancestral land and the Hema (Ituri Tutsi) who legally 
bought land and amassed wealth during ex-President Mobutu’s nationalization programmes of the 
1970s as already outlined. Owing to their economic power, the Hema had long controlled political 
power in the province from the colonial period to the Mobutu era and were virtually in charge of 
chefferies and collectivités (administrative entities) at the expense of the majority Lendu. With the 
demise of the Mobutu regime, the reordering processes that followed revived many hitherto 
dormant conflicts, xenophobia, and the nationality and land tenure problems of the eastern Congo.  
 
The land conflict in Ituri had its origins in the Bakajika Law of 1973, which took away people’s 
automatic right to ancestral land whether vacant or occupied. Land automatically became saleable 
resulting in the massive buying from poor sedentary Lendu and new acquisitions by the 
enterprising Hema. In the 1990s, the Tutsi-versus ‘Congolese’ conflict in North and South Kivu 
over land influenced the negative perception of Tutsis in the entire region including Ituri 
(Sebeneza, 2010) where the two sides formed ethnic militias to self-protect, one to take back 
ancestral land and the other to protect land that was bought. Mutual killings went out of control 
and led to massacres. The scramble for gold and diamonds in Mongbwalu in the district while the 
regional war of 1998-2002 was ongoing became entwined into the wider land conflict in the 
province leading to a series of alliances (Lemarchand 2009, p. 24). Uganda, Rwanda and 
multinational companies got involved for a variety of reasons including interest to illegally exploit 
the Congo’s mineral and natural resources (United Nations Panel of Experts Report on the Illegal 
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Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 2001, appendix 12). Uganda encouraged Hemas to form the Union des Patriots Congolais 
(UPC) under Thomas Lubanga.55 Lendu’s in response formed Front Nationaliste Integriste (FNI) 
under Mathieu Ngudjolo. Another group, the Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais under Jerome 
Kakawavu Bukanda, a Munyarwanda from Masisi in North Kivu province, soon entered the 
fighting on the Hema side. At this time, the government of the DRC that was busy fighting the war 
against Uganda and Rwanda saw in the Lendu useful allies. Within the province, the Bira 
supported the Hema and the Ngiti supported the Lendus. Thousands of people perished between 
1999 and 2004 from the conflict (International Crisis Group, Africa Report no. 84, August 2004). 
The BBC in a report published in 2006 mentioned tens of thousands killed (Report by Karen Allen, 
30 November). 
 
2.3.4 v  The Bukavu crisis of June 2004 
 
In line with the Sun City Accords of 2002, political power and military command responsibility in 
the Congo were shared among the former warring factions as already explained above. In line with 
the arrangements, the commander for South Kivu province’s military region was a military officer 
from the government side whilst the RCD held the position of deputy commander. Politically, the 
RCD appointed the province’s Governor. It could thus be seen that the failure to take into account 
the dangers inherent in bringing two mutually antagonistic politico-military forces in a province 
next to Rwanda without any safeguards was a failure that could only have been explained by 
political naivety (Personal Interview with Kaningini, 2009). 
                                                 




In late 2003, when the mainly Tutsi and Rwanda-backed RCD appointed Xavier Chiribanya as 
Governor of South Kivu province, Kinshasa viewed this as a provocation. Chiribanya was tried 
and sentenced in absentia by a military court in Kinshasa for complicity in the late President 
Kabila’s assassination in 2001. During the Rwandan occupation of eastern Congo from 1998 to 
2003, the RCD exercised control over the whole of South Kivu. Following the peace accords, most 
Tutsi/Banyamulenges soldiers refused integration into the new Congolese army which they feared 
would disperse and weaken if not arrest them.  Mistrustful of integration, RCD political leaders in 
Kinshasa and Bukavu who stood to lose their influence in peace time sympathised with and 
remained in constant contact with the reluctant ex-RCD soldiers of the 10th Military Region. This 
was confirmed to me in several interviews (Kaningini 2009, Sebeneza 2009, University of Bukavu 
students 2009). 
 
In early 2004, South Kivu’s RCD Governor Chiribanya was suspended for keeping weapons (like 
most RCD soldiers in Bukavu at the time) in disregard for the centralization efforts of the 
transitional government. In executing this order the then 10th Military Region Commander General 
Nabyolwa ordered the search of residences of RCD soldiers. This order was immediately opposed 
by his Second in Command Colonel Jules Mutebutsi, a former RCD officer as reported by the UN 
Peacekeeping office in its Daily Situation Report of 10 February 2004.  
Tensions weeks later got out of control and Mutebutsi launched an attack on his commander’s 
residence intending to kill him on the night of 23 to 24 March 2004.56 The Kinshasa authorities 
                                                 
56 This assault on Gen. Nabyolwa was led by Col. Mukalay who was to soon afterwards escape to Rwanda with Col. 
Mutebutsi as well as then Shabunda RCD Cdr Lt. Col Bisogo. Bisogo and Mukalay reemerged in the Hauts Plateux 
in 2005 as the “Group of 47” who later merged with another rebellious former RCD-FARDC officer (former 109 
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replaced Nabyolwa with General Mbuja Mabe who immediately demonstrated his determination 
to establish firm State control over South Kivu. From 26 May and 2 June, heavy fighting broke 
out in Bukavu city and Colonel Mutebutsi gained the upper hand over General Mabe due to 
General Nkunda’s arrival from North Kivu with his ex-RCD troops to support his former 
colleagues. General Mabe counterattacked and recaptured Bukavu but only after Mutebutsi’s 
troops began negotiating their retreat. FARDC troops went on hounding Tutsis dozens of whom 
were killed in retaliation for alleged rapes and deaths when Mutebutsi controlled the city. The 
United Nations Mission regional office in South Kivu witnessed the events and compiled a series 
of reports which I frequently consulted while in South Kivu from 2006.The Bukavu crisis impacted 
seriously on interethnic relations but more especially on trust among the actors of the Transition 
from the RCD and President Kabila’s supporters. 
 
2.3.4 vi  The Katanga crisis of 2005 
 
In North Katanga from 2004, 19 Mayi Mayi groups fought each other, against FARDC and their 
civilian enemies. They resisted being disarmed by the central government in Kinshasa whom they 
blamed for not rewarding their role in the resistance against the RCD and Rwanda during the 1998-
2002 war. The Mayi Mayi also chided the government for wanting to turn its back on the Rwandan 
FDLR rebels through disarmament and repatriation after the latter fought on its side during the 
war. Katangan politicians like the late President Laurent Kabila and military actors such as John 
Numbi and former Governor Aime Ngoy had used the Mayi Mayi as a bulwark against the 
                                                 




advancing RCD/RDF forces during the 1998-2002 war. Numbi was known to have transferred 
weapons to the Mayi Mayi of North Katanga up to early 2004 (Human Rights Watch, 2004).  
 
In a demonstration of commitment to disarm all armed groups as agreed upon at Sun City, 
government troops were sent to disarm Mayi Mayi fighters in Katanga and this precipitated the 
fighting. In October 2004 in the southern mining town of Kilwa, the Congolese army clashed with 
Mayi Mayi groups and 70 people died in the fighting. More than 100,000 people were displaced 
in Katanga in January 2006 (Global Witness, 2005). The fighting which increased in momentum 
in mid-November 2005 was concentrated in Mitwaba, Pweto and Manono (International Crisis 
Group, 2006). 
 
2.3.5 The Nkunda rebellion and its impact on the Joseph Kabila administration 
 
Laurent Nkundabatware was born in Rutshuru in eastern Congo to Tutsi parents in 1967. He grew 
up in the region, saw and lived all the ethnic tensions that plagued the region in his youth. In the 
early 1990s, frustrations from xenophobic attacks against Tutsis following the democratization of 
the 1990s led many of them to flee and join the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in the hope of finding 
solace in a movement whose ideals for a Rwanda “free from discrimination” sounded inspiring. 
After the capture of Kigali by the RPF in 1994, Nkunda returned to the Congo where ethnic 
tensions were high amid the presence of ex-Rwandan Hutus who had taken part in the Rwandan 
genocide of Tutsis in the final days of the Hutu-led regime of Juvenal Habyarimana. That situation 




Following the Bukavu crisis of 2004, Nkunda created the Congres National pour la Defense du 
Peuple (CNDP) in 2006 with the purported objective of protecting his fellow Tutsis from 
persecution by Rwandan Hutu rebels and Congolese opponents. Supported by Rwanda57, he 
controlled parts of north Kivu province and established a fiefdom outside the control of the central 
government. The government reaction was to encourage and arm Mayi Mayi groups to assist the 
FARDC in the fight against the Nkunda rebellion. As confirmed by a former RCD official in 
Bukabu, the Patriote Resistants Congolais, a Congolese Hutu armed group emerged in 2007 to 
defend Hutus of Masisi against Tutsi forces and soon naturally became Kinshasa’s ally (Personal 
Interview with Fidele Ruhorimbere, Bukavu, June 2009).  I was informed by sources in North and 
South Kivu that most government arms were either sold or supplied by the FARDC officers to the 
armed groups supporting the government. This was confirmed in interview with a serving 
Congolese FARDC Battalion Commander (Personal Interviews during Mission to Mwenga, 
January 2010). I was able to confirm this with the civil society in Minova, (Personal Interviews in 
northern South Kivi in March 2010). 
 
Stearns (2012) traces the Nkunda rebellion to 2003 when he formed the Synergie pour la Paix et 
Harmonie, a supposed self-defence group to protect Tutsis and their investments in North Kivu. 
After the 2006 elections which the powerful RCD lost having obtained with only 1.69% of all 
votes, the CNDP rapidly emerged forcing many Congolese to conclude that it was an “RCD Plan 
B” in waiting (Biringingwa, 2010). Fighting between the CNDP and government forces continued 
in north Kivu with the rebels controlling parts of the province, having routed the FARDC many 
                                                 
57 Rwanda ended the Nkunda rebellion when he crossed over to that country in early 2009 and was arrested by 
Rwandan authorities who replaced him with his deputy Bosco Ntaganda. The Rwandan support was the subject of 




times thanks to Rwandan support. The United Nations Mission regional office has reported many 
times on infiltrations into zones under CNDP control to supply weapons and technicians to the 
CNDP. 
 
While the conflict continued, the government lacked the will and capacity to control the illegal 
smuggling of mineral resources owing to the multiplicity of political and interests and networks. 
The fighting continued until Rwanda and the Congo agreed on a deal to arrest Nkunda (by Rwanda) 
in exchange for joint operations to track down Rwandan Hutu rebels in the eastern Congo. 
 
The Nkunda rebellion had serious consequences for the Congo and, in particular, the stabilization 
efforts of the Joseph Kabila administration after the 2006 elections. The fighting led to hundreds 
of deaths, displaced tens of thousands and thousands more lost their lives from the direct fighting 
or related humanitarian consequences. There were massive human rights abuses including rape 
and mutilation on both sides. Both the Congolese armed forces and CNDP were accused of various 
human rights violations by the UN Peacekeeping Mission (MONUSCO Report, 2007).58 This 
resulted in tensions between Kinshasa and the international community with relations frequently 
strained between the government and the United Nations Mission.  
 
The government had concentrated resources in fighting the Nkunda which not only diverted its 
focus on other pressing needs but also weakened the government. The Nkunda rebellion weakened 
the government both politically and economically. To a large extent, it prolonged the illegal 
exploitation of resources of eastern Congo. The government lost revenue as it lacked total access 
                                                 
58 The United Nations Mission in the Congo, known by its French acronym, supported the transition and was the 
instrument of the international community in its efforts to stabilise the country and rebuild it after the war. 
84 
 
to some parts of the country. It thus brought to the fore the urgency to restore state authority in the 
east of the country first through successful security sector reform. The Congolese government by 
2010 was not successful in these due to lack of commitment (Personal Interview with Ryetsens, in 
Bujumbura, 2012). 
  
2.3.6 Conclusion  
 
In this second chapter I provided a broad but in-depth historical analysis of conflict and instability 
in the DRC. This establishes the context of my further analysis by outlining the key cause of 
conflict in the DRC – the state’s lack of historical legitimacy - and the consequences of political 
crisis, secession, dictatorship, ethnic conflicts and rebellions. I conclude that owing to challenges 
of legitimacy, the DRC has since independence in 1960 faced numerous crises that have always 
rendered the country weak and unstable. The various manifestations of this are explored in further 
chapters. 
 
As such, in the next chapter, I analyse governance and leadership in the DRC under Mobutu and 
the Kabilas in an effort to demonstrate how political power is a preoccupation in the DRC, how it 










Governance and Leadership in the Democratic Republic of Congo under  






Governance as a process refers to the institutions, mechanisms, practices and procedures through 
which a system carries out extractive, distributive and regulatory functions of addressing society’s 
needs (Brautigam, 1996). Good governance pays attention to such key concepts as organization, 
participation, accountability and transparency but the legitimacy of the regime and political system 
are crucial. Good governance and leadership are what make states strong. They are what it takes 
for a state to live up to its pedigree of providing the services of security and development in any 
political entity. When a leadership fails in governance, a Pandora’s Box of consequences opens up 
often leading to collapse. Governance failure results in failure to penetrate society and the state 
becomes a source of insecurity. In the absence of institutions as had occurred in the Congo, 
patronage takes over and the state’s resources are diverted at will to sustain the Praetorian Guard 
or buy off society. In a situation of governance and leadership failure there are, in reality, no 
permanently enforceable codes and procedures in the furtherance of the rule of law. In this chapter 
I examine governance and leadership in the Congo first looking at the structure of power in various 
regimes before discussing the role of mineral resources in governance and conflict. I then explore 
the related conflicts and their dynamics and the extent of failure under Mobutu and the Kabilas 
during the period studied. My objective in this chapter is to underscore the centrality of power 
86 
 
instead of authority in the absence of legitimate rule, and how it causes an obsession and a dynamic 
that shifts the focus of leaders and diverts resources for regime sustenance. Through political 
economy analysis, I also demonstrate that the presence of mineral or natural resources in a 
misgoverned country such as the DRC afflicted by the Dutch is responsible for the violent conflicts 
most of which take on an ethnic dimension. I conclude that the inability to resolve conflict is a 
result of the failure by the Congolese state (since independence) to be truly functional, both 
because the state is contested and because the leadership failed to build functioning institutions. 
 
3.2 The Structure of Power in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Incentives 
 
3.2.1    The Structure of power under Mobutu 
 
Key actors of the Cold War namely the United States, France, former Colonial power Belgium and 
the United Kingdom were the most important support for Mobutu during the Cold War as they 
ensured that he stayed in power for more than three decades. Besides Western support, Mobutu 
built an army and a network of security services as well as established a one-party state in 1967. 
This party, the Mouvement pour la Revolution (MPR) was a key instrument to protect his hold on 
power, besides the security forces.  
 
3.2.1 i  Western support to Mobutu 
 
Mobutu owed his rise to power and his astonishing political longevity to the decades-long support 
he received from the US, France and Belgium. As explained in the previous chapter, Mobutu was 
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a product of the Cold War and owed his rise to power to the strategic calculations of Western 
powers at the time. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) contends that the United States at the time ‘preferred 
leaders with no social or political base and therefore without a strong national constituency to be 
accountable to’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, p.142).59 Further, he says France continuously supported 
the illegitimate and dictatorial regime of Mobutu relishing the failure and attendant political 
conflicts that would prevent Zaire from becoming a regional power and rival to France. Mobutu’s 
stay in power was also part of the West’s Cold War logic of having strong men believed to maintain 
stability in strategically important Third World states (ibid, p.160). Quoting Jean-Pierre Alaux, he 
says “according to this grand strategy, the ruin of Zaire is better for western interests than a strong 
Zaire” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, p.162). 
 
The West defended Mobutu during the Kwilu and eastern rebellions between 1965 and 1968 and 
saved his regime in Kolwezi in 1977 and 1978 when rebels invaded Shaba from Angola. We will 
discuss this in the fourth chapter in detail. Until the 1990s, Western countries provided economic, 
military and political support to the regime which remained a faithful Cold War ally that defended 
Western ideological interests in the Central African region. While I served with the United Nations 
Mission in the Congo, I had frequently attended the weekly meeting of foreign embassies in 
Kinshasa of countries supporting the Comite International d’Appui a la Transition (CIAT)60 which 
brought together the US, UK, France, Belgium, South Africa, Angola and Russia among other key 
                                                 
59 Fifty years on in 1997, it has been the same with regard to external intervention. The only difference is the 
involvement of ‘subalterns’ for a variety of reasons. In recent years, Rwanda, Uganda and Angola have interfered with 
and sought to have leaders supportive of their interests. The historic powers are now more sophisticated than 
yesteryears, in their intervention. 
60 International Committee in Support of the DRC Political Transition 
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actors. I have during meetings I attended observed the heightened interest the key Western powers 
had in the stability of DRC as a strategically important country (Personal Observations). 
 
During the Cold War, the incentive for collaboration with the United States, France and Belgium 
to render Zaire a bulwark against the spread of Communism, assured political power for Mobutu 
which remained with him as long as the Cold War permitted. While the West ignored his excesses 
and misrule, Mobutu had the free hand to do whatever he deemed necessary to ensure total control 
over the country. He did this through his grip over the party and the armed and security forces over 
a 30-year period.  
 
3.2.ii  The armed and security forces 
 
The armed and security forces were second only to Western support in terms of the extent of 
influence in keeping Mobutu in power. He created a large army by regional standards which, at its 
peak, numbered 70,000 men, trained and supplied with weapons from the West and divided into 
various formations to keep vigil over one another (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). Lemarchand’s 
account gives a far higher number of 120,000 soldiers (Lemarchand, 2009, According to Kisangani 
(2012), Mobutu reorganized and raised his army’s prestige by sending hundreds of officers to 
military schools in Europe and the United States. Well paid, fed, and armed, the army and the 
security forces on three occasions (in 1960 when he overthrew Lumumba, in 1965 when he 
removed Kasavubu and in 1992 when he prevented the transitional government of Tshisekedi from 
being elected by the Sovereign National Conference) were used to remove regimes from power. 




In Nzongola-Ntalaja’s account, Mobutu’s army and security forces were organised thus: a) The 
Special Presidential Division (DSP) of 10,000 troops (Lemarchand’s account is 12,000) was 
commanded by General Nzimbi Mbale, Mobutu’s relative. This most loyal force was mostly made 
up of ethnic Ngbandi soldiers with the few remaining elements coming from other tribes in 
Equateur. The DSP, according to Lemarchand (2009), was responsible for the shooting dead of 
more than 1000 regular army soldiers for looting Kinshasa in January 1993. b)The Civil Guard of 
15 to 20,000 soldiers was commanded by General Kpama Baramoto, another relative of Mobutu 
who “began his career as a military vehicle driver” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, p.154). The Guard was 
Mobutu’s main repressive arm against the pro-democracy movement and was used in the massacre 
of Christians who marched to demand the reopening of the Sovereign National Conference that 
Mobutu sought to close in 1992;  c) The Military Action and Intelligence Service, another 
instrument of political repression which raided and killed several students at Lubumbashi 
University in 1990, three weeks after Mobutu’s 1990 speech ending one-party rule; d) The Special 
Research and Intelligence Brigade commanded by General Bolozi, a relative of Mobutu by 
marriage, was a police investigation unit-turned paramilitary force best known for its torture and 
brutal treatment of detainees; e) The National Intelligence and Protection Service, under 
Honore Ngbanda, a Ngbandi like Mobutu and one of his closest aides who served as his Defence 
Minister and National Security Adviser, was the eyes and ears of Mobutu. It orchestrated most 
crackdowns and acts of terror meted out to the population.In 2009, I travelled on a mission with a 
former Mobutu intelligence official to the city of Uvira, 12 years after Mobutu’s overthrow and 
witnessed how terrified our interlocutors were when they saw him. He had since left the 
government and was working for another organization. He informed me that day that the security 
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services under Mobutu were so effective that they at times supported regional intelligence services. 
He later informed me that under Mobutu, they competed for Mobutu’s attention and in the process 
despised one another which Mobutu was very happy about (Personal Observation). f) The Agence 
Nationale d’Immigration61 which spent its time watching over the movements of potential 
opponents, and g; The Special Action Forces referred to as Mobutu’s death squads (Nzongola-
Ntalaja p. 154-156).   
 
3.2.1 iii  The Mouvement Populaire pour la Revolution  
 
The Mouvement Populaire pour la Revolution (MPR)62 party was another instrument through 
which Mobutu controlled Zaire from 1967 to 1990. Formed in 1967, the MPR was progressively 
integrated within the administrative branches of the state apparatus with which it became fused 
into a party-state. After three years of a de facto party state, it was declared de jure in 1970 and the 
MPR became the supreme institution of the State. According to Kisangani (2012), Mobutu became 
the head of all the country’s political institutions and a special provision of the party’s statutes 
allowed for his election as party chairman and therefore Head of State indefinitely. The MPR 
penetrated all levels of society from the capital to the provinces to the lowest and most isolated 
hamlets where loyalty took precedence over any other consideration. All civil servants were 
compulsorily members of the MPR. Ministers, generals, ambassadors, businessmen, market 
women, farmers, soldiers, and students were herded into the Mobutist creed of one country, one 
people and one leader. It was through the MPR that Mobutu perfected his system of patronnage 
around which he controlled the grid of loyalty for 32 years.  At a Civic Education seminar in 
                                                 
61 National Immigration Agency 
62 Popular Movement of the Revolution 
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support of the electoral process in Kisangani, Oriental Province, in 2005, I was informed during a 
presentation that in the Congo, incumbents who replicate the Mobutist system of political 
patronage through a party control will always win elections, thus pointing to the likelihood of 
President Kabila’s longevity in power ‘since he will continue that style for obvious reasons’ 
(Exchanges with Professor Otemikongo, Kisangani, 2005). 
 
3.2.2 Political power under Laurent Desiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila (1997-2010) 
 
Laurent Desiré Kabila, whose Alliances des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-
Zaire63 overthrew Mobutu in 1997, stayed in power for less than four years. The rebellion that 
brought him to power was supported by Rwanda and Uganda, and to a lesser extent, Angola.64 
Several Banyamulenge Tutsis have confirmed the role of Rwanda to me between 2006 and 2010 
(Exchanges in Bukavu with Banyamulenge leaders and interlocutors with the regional UN Office 
in South Kivu – Personal Observation). Mobutu’s erstwhile allies in the West sympathised with 
the AFDL march to power because, partly, the Cold War had ended and Mobutu’s usefulness as 
an ally had waned.  
 
                                                 
63 Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire. It was at this early stage of the rebellion that 
Laurent Desiré Kabila indicated his readiness to return to Zaire’s former name of Congo.  
64 The seizure of power by the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front in Kigali has always irritated Mobutu who had sent 
troops to Kigali during the invasion from Uganda in support of President Habyarimana’s troops. Mobutu harboured 
Hutu genocidaires who fled into the Congo after killing hundreds of thousands of Tutsis just before the RPF seized 
power in Kigali. Condoning Hutu FDLR attacks against the new regime in Kigali, Mobutu invited Rwanda’s wrath 
and the conclusion that he posed a serious threat to its security. In Ituri district, the West Nile Bank Front rebels and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels opposed to Yoweri Museveni’s regime in Uganda used Zairean territory to launch 
infiltrations into Uganda after it was never lost on both Museveni and Kagame that Mobutu abhorred the emergence 
of Kampala and Kigali as the new Anglophone/Anglophile regimes that could dent French influence in the region. 
Angola welcomed and supported Mobutu’s removal because he was Luanda’s most hated enemy in the region, having 
allowed the use of Zairean territory to be used to receive UNITA diamonds and through which arms shipments were 




At the onset, Kabila’s power base was secure owing to the sympathy he received after removing a 
corrupt and despotic regime that was partly the reason for regional stability. From 1997 to 2001, 
his power was first protected by Rwandan forces and, after their expulsion by Kabila in 1998, by 
Katangan elements (former Zairean soldiers and ex-Katangan gendarmes) and close personal allies 
he trusted. From the outbreak of the Rwanda and Uganda-backed rebellion in 1998 to his death in 
2001, he mainly relied on Zimbabwean and Angolan troops for his security (Lamarchand 2009; 
Turner, 2007).  While at the Political Affairs Division of the United Nations Mission in Kinshasa, 
I was informed by Congolese senior officials about the role Zimbabwe and Angola played in 
defending Kabila’s regime from the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion in 1998 (Particippant 
Observation, 2007; UDPS-South Kivu, 200765). 
  
When Joseph Kabila succeeded his father in 2001, he reversed his controversial policies of non- 
negotiation with the RCD rebels and foreign forces demonstrating more flexibility to resolve the 
crisis (Dunn in Clark 2002, p. 69). The Global and Inclusive Accords signed at Sun City in South 
Africa which he signed with the various armed groups earned him international admiration.  The 
Accords fundamentally distributed power among the warring factions in the Congo and created 
five institutions to support the democratic process that was to lead to elections after two years 
(Accords Global et Inclusifs, 2002).  
 
However, still aware of the risks inherent in being in power in a country as complex as the Congo, 
he moved to strengthen his position and established a Personal Guard, the Garde Republicaine 
(GR)66, separate from the new national army that was being formed through the integration of 
                                                 
65 Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social (Union for Democracy and Social Progress) 
66 Republican Guard 
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former warring groups. The troops of the GR were mainly recruited from his home province of 
Katanga, a case of history repeating itself since Mobutu before him also only trusted recruiting his 
own Ngbandi kinsmen into the army. Kabila then exploited the advantages of incumbency to 
restructure the police and intelligence services in a way so as to significantly strengthen the coterie 
of loyal elements around his power base. It was this guard that attacked Vice President Bemba’s 
forces following incidents and mutual recriminations in Kinshasa after the announcement of the 
2006 presidential election results (Braeckmann, 2006). As a political officer in Kinsaha at the time, 
I have monitored and reported on these developments and prepared reports on the threat the rival 
groups posed to the transition. On one occasion I attended a meeting with Presidential Candidate 
Jean Pierre Bemba who strongly attacked President Kabila’s PPRD party for provoking his 
militants (participant observation). Several incidents of mutual insults and shootings were reported 
as the country approached elections in a tense atmosphere where both sides were armed to the teeth 
with the United Nations Mission in between and a few thousands crossing the river into the 
neighboring Republic of Congo67 fearful of the eruption of fighting which in fact happened 
(participant observation). 
 
During the 2006 elections, Kinshasa was the stronghold of the opposition. This was so given the 
long grip and support the people of the west of the country (including former president Mobutu’s 
Equateur region) had over the region. Joseph Kabila’s father Laurent had led his rebellion against 
Mobutu from the eastern Swahili regions of the country from where he hailed and this was the 
reason for the informal dichotomy of a Lingala west versus a Swahili east during the contest in 
2006 between Kabila’s son and Jean-Pierre Bembe who not only recruited for elements of 
                                                 
67 The Congo River separating the two Congo’s takes 10 minutes to cross. 
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Mobutu’s army into his rebel group during the war, but many supporters. As tensions mounted 
between a Swahiliphone feast and a Lingalaphone west, transition president Joseph Kabila was 
accused of being an easterner in western territory. He was accused of being a ‘foreigner’, the son 
of a Tutsi woman, a thief and Rwandan Trojan Horse (Personal reports from meetings with 
political actors in Kinshasa, 2006). 
 
The stakes were high during the 2006 elections. Following the first round of presidential elections, 
held on 30 July, Kabila won 44% of the national vote while Jean-Pierre Bemba obtained 22% but 
defeating President Kabila in Kinshasa. On 20 August, fighting erupted in the capital when I and 
a colleague political officer were monitoring and reporting on the meeting at Jean Pierre Bemba’s 
residence between him and foreign ambassadors. The Special Representative of the Secretary-
General of the United Mission and Head of the United Nations Mission William Swing was in 
attendance when the shooting towards Jean-Pierre Bemba’s residence began. Fighting engulfed 
the city and heavy artillery was used. We were trapped within the zone of the fighting but later 
moved to safety. By the time the fighting subsided, many were killed. The international community 
represented by the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT-Comite 
International d’Accompagnement de la Transition) and the United Nations Mission helped to 
establish a ceasefire (Participant Observations).  
 
With his power legitimised by the 2006 elections, he moved to diminish the power of his main 
rivals, the RCD under Azarias Ruberwa and Jean Pierre Bemba’s MLC. Legitimacy and 
international support in addition to his subsequent control over the armed and security forces 
helped to secure his position from which he gradually but effectively eroded the power of his 
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rivals. I had frequently noted the concern of diplomats over Joseph Kabila’s actions to undermine 
his political rivals.68 (Personal observation based on reports and analyses from our Political 
Division).  
 
Deployed to the eastern Congo in late 2006, I was informed by political actors from the RCD, the 
MLC and civil society of the threat of dictatorship that lingered from Kabila’s post-election 
disregard for consensus (Personal observation from consultations with civil society coordination 
of South Kivu). Up to 2010, a combination of political legitimacy, international support and 
manipulation of the advantages of incumbency ensured Kabila’s stay in power (analysis from 
interviews and personal observations). 
 
3.3            Mineral resources, misrule and conflict in the Congo since independence 
 
The Congo is arguably Africa’s richest country in terms of its strategic minerals. I have already 
demonstrated how Belgian policy to keep the country and its resources under its control influenced 
the first post-independence crisis of the 1960s. Throughout his rule, Mobutu was sustained in 
power by the financial resources at his disposal coming from the country’s mineral 
wealth. Congo’s resources are so vast, and institutions so weak, that those in power always seek to 
remain in power to directly control the power that comes with control over rent. The Lutundula 
Report which investigated corruption later in 2005 revealed that the country lost hundreds of 
                                                 
68 CIAT comprised South Africa, France, the USA, the UK, Russia, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, Zambia, the EU, the 
AU, Angola and MONUC. 
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millions of dollars during the transition because the government, hardly answerable to anybody, 
spent much time ensuring that all financial appropriations to the composantes69 were paid.  
 
Under Mobutu, while mineral resources oiled the machinery of control and enrichment, it also 
became the reason for Mobutu’s determination to cling on to power. For more than thirty years, 
reliance on rent from the exploitation of minerals made the central government the centre of 
attraction for Zaire’s political class. Wrong (2000) cites how the country’s financial cows, 
Gecamines and MIBA70, were over the decades milked dry by Mobutu to support his patronage 
policies. As his regime collapsed in early 1997, concern over an impending power vacuum 
motivated external actors to court incoming leader Laurent Kabila for contracts and access to the 
country’s mineral resources. According to Turner, as the AFDL rebels advanced against Mobutu 
in late 1996, Kabila’s ‘Finance Minister’ Mawampanga Mwana met with businessmen (Goldman 
Sachs, First Bank of Boston, Morgan Grefel and other economic investors)71 in Lubumbashi to 
sign mining contracts (Turner, 2007, p.59). Turner further informs us that in April 1997, while the 
                                                 
69 Other rival components of the transition government 
70 The General Cariere des Mines (GECAMINES) was the national administration of mines which exercised political 
and administrative control and oversight over the country’s entire mining industry.  The Miniere de Bakwanga 
(MIBA), was the Bakwnga diamond mining authority in Kasai Province. The two were the country’s main sources of 
revenue since independence. 
71All three banks are major international investment banks actively involved in the international banking and financial 
system. Goldman Sachs is a leading multinational investment banking firm with headquarters in New York and 
engages in other investment management and financial services for key global organisations and concerns. Goldman 
Sachs was formed in 1869. Bank of Boston merged with Bay Bank as Bank Boston dates back to 1784 and is widely 
connected and involved in international banking and industry. Morgan Grefel is another London-based investment 
bank established in 1838. One of the oldest British banks, it played a key role in the reconstruction of Europe in the 
1920s and has been linked to JP Morgan another renowned international bank. This ended in 1982. After being 
acquired by Deutsche Bank it was renamed Deutsche Morgan Grefel..Such was the nature and extent of engagement 
in the Congo that the United Nations in its 2001 panel report mentioned the expression conflicts prolonged by the role 
of foreign involvement and exploitation of strategic minerals. 
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fighting was ongoing, Jean-Ramon Boulle, a cofounder of the mining concern Adastra72 signed a 
billion dollar deal for mines in Kolwezi (Cobalt) and Kipuzi (Zinc) from Kabila. 
 
After Mobutu was overthrown in 1997, the quest for and role of mineral resources continued to 
influence political conflicts. Soon after the 1998 war to remove President Kabila was launched by 
Rwanda and Uganda, it derailed into a struggle over mineral resources.  With the stalemate 
between the opposing sides, Rwanda, Uganda and the RCD rebels massively exploited minerals 
in eastern DRC as elucidated in the 2001 UN panel of experts’ report  which revealed that : 
‘Between September 1998 and August 1999, occupied zones of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo were drained of existing stockpiles, including minerals, agricultural and forest 
products and livestock. Regardless of the looter, the pattern was the same: Burundian, 
Rwandan, Ugandan and/or RCD soldiers, commanded by an officer, visited farms, storage 
facilities, factories and banks, and demanded that the managers open the coffers and doors. 
The soldiers were then ordered to remove the relevant products and load them into vehicles. 
The Panel received numerous accounts and claims of unlawful removal of products by 
Rwandan or Ugandan armies and their local RCD allies. The Panel has chosen to illustrate this 
point with some examples’ (Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2001)  
 
After Laurent Desire Kabila’s assassination, his son Joseph succeeded him and was chosen to lead 
the political transition during which period the question of mineral resource exploitation largely 
                                                 
72 Adastra Minerals is a London-based mineral mining company with heavy operations in Central Africa (D.R.Congo, 
Zambia and Angola) and focuses on copper, cobalt and zinc mining. Its properties and concessions were acquired by 
First Quantum Minerals in 2006. 
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accounted for the lack of focus on governance. All factions showed more interest in the resources 
and appropriations to their ministries. This unfortunate phenomenon, the illicit misappropriations 
of funds and revenues from the mining industry, is well documented by the Lutundula 
Commission. While in Bukavu as a political officer in 2008, I discussed corruption and the illegal 
exploitation of minerals during the Joseph Kabila-led transition frequently with former Vice 
Governor of South Kivu Ignace Mupira who served in the Lutundula Commission as a secretary. 
This phenomenon however predates Joseph Kabila’s presidency. 
 
As early as April 1997, Jean-Ramon Boulle, a cofounder of Adastra (then AMFI) received a 1bn 
dollar deal for mines in the Congo at Kolwezi (Cobalt) and Kipuzi (Zinc) from Laurent Kabila’s 
Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire before he even captured 
power (Barouski et al, 2006). According to Barouski the AFDL were even allowed to use Boulle’s 
private jet. According to Barouski in his report, coltan ore is widely used in the aerospace and 
electronics industries for capacitors, superconductors and transistors after it is refined to tantalum. 
The USA is entirely dependent on foreign sources for tantalum, an enabling technology for 
capacitors essential to aerospace weaponry and every pager, cellphone, computer, VCR, CD 
player, PDA, and TV.  American import records show a dramatic jump in purchases from Rwanda 
and Uganda during the time they were smuggling tantalum and cobalt out of the country. The 
report also mentioned that Sony, Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, Nokia, Lucen, Motorola, Dell, 
Microsoft and Eriksson are large-scale consumers of coltan (ibid) 
 
The United Nations Expert Panel on the illegal exploitation of the Congo’s mineral resources in 
its October 2002 report identified elite networks within Congo centring on the Rwandan and 
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Ugandan occupation zones and on the Kinshasa Government. Between January and June 2004, 
1760 tons of casseterite in Walikale were shipped out of the country. Eighty five foreign companies 
were afterwards named by the Panel of Experts as participating in the exploitation of the Congo’s 
natural resources. It was the panel’s 2003 report that forced the UNSC to shift its emphasis from 
the illegal exploitation of the Congo’s resources to the wars that are financed in the exchanges 
between arms and weapons (UN Panel of Experts Report on the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003).   
 
When Uganda withdrew from the DRC in 2002, Ugandan General and brother of President Yoweri 
Museveni Salim Saleh began training paramilitary groups to act as proxis to sustain the flow of 
minerals into Uganda. The UN Panel of Experts had recommended that Saleh to be put on a travel 
ban and his assets frozen, but nothing was done. Almost all armed groups deviated from their 
original goals of resisting the Ugandan and Rwandan occupation of eastern Congo to focus on the 
wealth and riches of the eastern DRC. FDLR, Mayi Mayi, ADF/NALU, have all benefited from 
the mining riches of areas they are deployed and all commit large scale human rights abuses (ibid) 
Several UN Mission reports on Ituri district later confirmed this much as national UN staff and 
colleagues in Bunia, Ituri district, confirmed to me in 2005. 
 
The analysis of the 2005 Lutundula Report revealed how the state lost revenues from high-level 
deals with foreign interests in the country’s copper mining industry. Katanga’s militias, according 
to Snow and Barouski (2006), were connected to criminal networks of businesspeople including 
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, Billy Rautenbach, John Bredenkamp and Mark Rich. US 
diamond magnate Maurice Tempelsman has profited from Katanga concessions since the Kennedy 
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era. Snow and Barouski reported in July of 2006 that 10 million people had died since 1996 and 
said that the war in the DRC was, still, driven by the desire to extract raw materials, including 
diamonds, gold, columbite, tantalite, niobium, cobalt, copper, uranium and petroleum.  
 
The transition period from 2003 to 2006, and the first four years of legitimately elected government 
led by Joseph Kabila, did not represent any change in the pillage of the Congo’s mineral resources. 
Up to 2010, rebellions in the east of the country erupted and persisted in resource-endowed regions 
such as Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and pockets of locations that are rich in minerals. The 
continued challenge to the restoration of state authority had continued until after 2010 (Personal 
Observations,). I worked and monitored the security situation in eastern Congo throughout the 
2006-2010 period in Masisi-Minova, Mwenga, Shabunda and Fizi territories and visited and 
reported armed conflict in areas reputed to be endowed with mineral resources. We were part of 
the team of UN Mission officials that worked in eastern Congo to support the authorities to restore 
state authority across the region (Participant Observation, 2009). 
 
Whereas the exploitation of resources was not the original cause of the war, it became an obstacle 
to efforts to end it.73 In exchanges with a United Nations Colleague working with the UN Panel of 
Experts in 2012, I was informed first hand that the conflicts in Central Africa were encouraged by 
the lust for strategic minerals (Personal exchange - with a former colleague in South Kivu and 
                                                 
73 Throughout history, economic factors have always played a central role in warfare. Civil wars have become 
increasingly self-financing (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003). Given the role of lucrative natural resource in fuelling 
war economies, the term “resource wars” has become popular among analysts and policy makers. More broadly, 
attention on the economics of conflict has found expression in the concept of “war economies”. A political economy 
analysis will reveal how war and security in the DRC was in the interest of all involved. This involved had a vested 
interested in its continuation (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2009). Research carried out by the two indicate that countries 
with important natural resources have a high risk of conflict. 
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subsequently a member of the UN Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of mineral resources 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo - Steve Hege, Bujumbura, 2012) The ‘resource war’ 
explanation sees the war as having been caused by the interest in the Congo’s mineral resources 
and is the view of many Congolese people. Students at a seminar organized by the United Nations 
peacekeeping regional office of South Kivu in 2009 (and which I moderated) generally emphasized 
this view (Participant Observations, 2009). Apart from students, several regional and national 
politicians, religious leaders, soldiers and ordinary people held similar views although one of my 
objectives as a result of my analysis is to debunk the view. Congolese Information Minister Henri 
Movan Sakanyi in 2005 consistently defended his country’s territorial integrity and wars 
orchestrated to access mineral resources. During personal interviews of regional MP Ngoma-
Gbaliamutu (2009), traditional leader in South Kivu Mwami Kabare (2010), Mayi Mayi resistance 
rebel Amuri Yakutumba (2008), and even the archbishop of BukavuXavier Maroy (2010), my 
interlocutors have always themed their views on what they regard as the imposition of wars on the 
DRC to exploit her mineral and natural resources.)74. This view is challenged in this dissertation. 
 
3.4 Ethnicity, regionalism and legitimacy in the explanation of conflict in the Congo 
 
In this part of my research, I discuss ethnicity through the lens of Osaghae’s (1994) analysis, seeing 
it as the mobilisation of identity and differences to gain advantage in situations of competition or 
                                                 
74 Henry Mova Sakanyi, Congolese Information Minister, television broadcast, 2005, Interview with Enoch Sebeneza, 
former AFDL rebel movement member, 2009, Interview with Ngoma Gbaliamutu, South Kivu regional MP, Fizi, 
2009, Interview with General Pacifique Mauzunzu, South Kivu 10th Military Region Commander, 2010, Interview 
with Mwami Ndare Kabare, South Kivu United Nations Mission Office, 2010, Congolese rebel leader Amuri 
Yakutumba, statements recorded during peace talks in Fizi, South Kivu 2008, Interview with Ombeni David, South 
Kivu regional MP, Bukavu 2010, and meeting with Archbishop Xavier Maroy of Bukavu,  2010). 
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conflict. I will from this premise agree with Nnoli (1978) that ethnicity becomes evident as social 
and political cleavages when relations between groups are competitive rather than cooperative. 
 
The negative effect of politicised or instrumentalised ethnicity in the Congo became clearly evident 
at independence when ethnic identity was used as a convenient tool in competition for political 
power among the various political actors. It is my view that the instrumentalisation of ethnicity is 
possible only because the legitimacy of the state is in question from the very society it tries to exert 
control over. Engelbert’s theory (2000) of the state as discussed below and political economy 
analysis, discussed in the next chapter, are relevant in that regard. In a situation where one ethnic 
group or region is perceived to have captured state power, the losing side leans, in reaction and 
frustration, on the state’s lack of historical legitimacy to challenge it, as happened in Kasai and 
Katanga in the 1960s. In addition, from the 1980s to the first decade of the 21st century, ethnic 
conflicts in the Congo can be explained as a function of the struggle for land and access to 
resources developing into more complex conflict dynamics or struggle for political power among 
politicians. The following examples will elucidate the points raised. 
 
3.4.1 Ethnicity and regionalism during the independence crisis of 1960 
 
During the late 1950s, when the struggles for independence across Africa were at a peak, 
Congolese tribal associations emerged to demand improvements in the colonial system. They were 
led by the few partially educated or “transformed” low ranking African participants in the Belgian 
colonial establishment referred to as the evolués. Their world view was narrow and their 
grievances lacked any strategic focus beyond rectifying injustices in the colonial system 
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(McCalpin in Clark 2002, p.36). The Association des Bas Congos75 (ABAKO) rose to defend the 
interests of the people of Bas Congo, the Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga 
(CONAKAT)76 for South Katanga, the Balubas du Katanga77 (BALUBAKAT) for North Katanga 
and Kasaian Union for Kasai (Kisangani 2012, p.16, Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, p.81-85).78 After the 
ABAKO-inspired 1959 riots79 which were followed by the rapid approach of independence, ethnic 
and regional antagonisms were accentuated in the context of struggle to control power at the centre. 
These ethnic and regional tensions continued after independence.  
 
I have explained in chapter two that the earlier protests of ABAKO were in reaction to abuses in 
the colonial system. However, the changing context and the prospect of independence brought in 
a new reality, ethnicity, as rival political actors vied to inherit the nascent state. The independence 
crisis of 1960-1961 in which the Mouvement National Congolais80 (MNC) leader Prime Minister 
Lumumba was assassinated was partly a reflection of this struggle for power between nationalists 
represented by Patrice Lumumba, and those politicians who were mainly ambitious regional 
                                                 
75 Bakongo People’s Association 
76 Confederation of Katangan Tribal Associations 
77 Balubas of Katanga 
78 ABAKO, formed in 1956, was the first Congolese indigenous organization to demand improvement in the 
conditions of its ethnic members during Belgian colonial rule. It was a Bakongo ethnic solidarity association, the first 
to present what resembled a challenge to the abuses of the colonial system and transformed in the late 1950s into a 
political party. It, however always remained in essence a regional party like Moise Tshombe’s CONAKAT formed in 
Katanga at the behest of the CARTEL Katangais, a white settler elgian organization opposed to nationalism and 
independence politics. Mistrustful of the centralizing state, the Katangese regional leader opted for secession when 
his party lost the 1959 elections to Lumumba whose MNC with its nationalist credentials received nation-wide support. 
The BALUBAKAT party, formed in 1959, was the rival to the CONAKAT and was intensely nationalist and pro-
MNC that emerged in 1958 (Emizet Kisangani, Civil Wars in the Dem. Rep. of Congo, 2012) 
79 The ABAKO riots were the violent demonstrations by the local population in Kinshasa to demand changes in the 
colonial system. The Belgian reaction and heavy-handedness when ABAKO rioted led to between 49 and 500 deaths 
according to Kisangani (2012). The significance of the riots was that they sped up the drive towards independence. 
80 Congolese National Movement 
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politicians who lacked nationalist credentials. These were Tshombe in Katanga, Kalonji in Kasai 
and Kasavubu81 in Bas Congo.  
 
As already outlined, the prospect of Lumumba winning the elections at independence was 
perceived as a serious blow to Joseph Kasavubu and ABAKO, the first to organize people in the 
territory against abuses of the colonial system. Lumumba’s nationalism and widespread support 
across the country had quietly aroused the envy of his rivals in the opposing camps. No other word 
than jealousy or phrase like frustrated sense of humiliation better explain the basis of “hate” and 
conspiracy leading to crisis (Omasombo 2012, Fikily 2006).These frustrations resulted partly in 
the ease with which ceremonial President Kasavubu was easily influenced by conspiring forces to 
dismiss Lumumba unconstitutionally. It also explained the crises in Kinsasha in 1961 and 
secessions in Katanga and Kasai in 1960. 
 
3.4.2 Ethnic conflict in the eastern DRC since independence 
 
Owing to the Belgian colonial policy of bringing into the Congo labour migrants from Rwanda 
(1926-1937) and immigrants from the same country (after 1937) to work in colonial plantations in 
North Kivu, the Banyarwanda (Hutus and Tutsis from Rwanda), on the eve of independence in 
                                                 
81 Moise Tshombe was the Premier of Katanga province, Zaire’s richest province that was at the centre of the crisis of 
independence during which Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was assassinated. He was opposed to Lumumba’s 
nationalist appeal and fearful of losing control over his region, joined the conspiracy in Lumumba’s overthrow in his 
failed bid to secede with the support of Belgium and Belgian setters. A similar situation occurred in Kasai where 
Albert Kalonji, having lost the national elections to Lumumba’s MNC, in an act of frustration and desperation declared 
secession of his diamond rich province. This rebellion was crushed by Lumumba. Kasavubu was the Congo’s first 
ceremonial president and founder of the first social group that got muted into a political party which never extended 
its influence beyond its native Bas Kongo region. History accuses him of having band wagoned in the conspiracy 
against Lumumba out of frustration over his loss of the elections to Lumumba. Details of all three are in the literature. 
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1960, heavily outnumbered the local Hunde population of Masisi whose traditional ownership of 
land was perceived to be threatened. Over time, the Banyarwanda immigrants had insisted and 
obtained a native authority in Gishari in 1938,82 and had thereafter decided to stop paying tribute 
to their Hunde hosts until 1957 when the Gishari native authority was disestablished by the Belgian 
colonial authorities. Nevertheless, the Banyarwanda, especially the Tutsis, become economically 
very powerful after independence owing to their effective use of links to power to acquire land 
(Mamdani, ibid). 
 
The early influence of Tutsis was owed to Mobutu’s Chef de Cabinet83 in the 1970s, a Tutsi refugee 
from Rwanda called Barthelemy Bisengimana (Kisangani, 2012 p.176; Lemarchand 2009, p.14, 
p. 210; and Mamdani, 2001 p. 243). Tensions arising from opposition to Tutsi influence had earlier 
caused the “Banyarwanda wars” of the 1960s (ibid).84 Intermittent fighting at the time resulted in 
the large scale killings of Tutsis and Hutus, the first outward display of anti-Tutsi sentiment in post 
independent Zaire. At the time, the Banyarwandas (Tutsis and Hutus) were considered as a single 
ethnic unit by virtue of their origin (Rwanda) and their common language (Kinyarwanda). Their 
rivals for land and influence, the Nandes, Hundes and Nyanga were generally opposed to their 
influence (Lemarchand, 2009, p.13). With the increasing threat to their traditional power, the 
Hunde in particular leaned on their ‘native rights’ arising from their ‘ethnic citizenship’ to assert 
                                                 
82 A native authority in Gishari was established by the Belgian colonial authorities in 1938 after Banyarwandans 
(Hutu and Tutsi immigrants post-1937) to appease them after they demanded it to stop paying tribute to their Hunde 
hosts. When disestablished in 1957, the Banyarwandans lost the ethnic space within which to channel their 
problems. 
83 Chief of Staff 
84 The Banyarwanda wars were the revolts by the Banyarwandas who were denied administrative rights over land they 
occupied. Owing to years of immigration from Rwanda by the Belgians, the Banyarwanda population on the eve of 
independence outnumbered their Hunde hosts. By virtue of their numerical strength, they won more than their Hunde 
hosts but were still prevented from assuming new roles because they were still considered “ethnic strangers”. They 
rose up in arms in 1963-1964 in what is popularly referred to in history as the Banyarwanda wars. 
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control and to begin questioning the rights of Banyarwanda, who in their view lacked  rights to 
own land. These heightened inter-ethnic tensions were however allowed to fester alongside a 
failing economy and a weak state under Mobutu.  
 
In 1993 armed Nande, Hunde and Nyanga youths attacked Banyarwandas, apparently encouraged 
by the Conference National Sovereign (CNS) taking place at the time to introduce genuine 
democracy in Zaire.  By the time the weak and failed Mobutu regime forcefully intervened and 
14,000 people, mostly Banyarwanda, had died (Lemarchand, ibid). The 1993 CNS occurred at a 
time when Mobutu’s power was waning alongside a heightened nationality and citizenship crisis.  
 
Most Tutsis lived in the Congo well before those resettled by the Belgians in the early 20th century 
given the proximity to Rwanda. However, the distinction became blurred from the continued 
migrations (Mamdani, 2001, p.246). South Kivu Province’s former Agriculture Minister informed 
me in 2009 during an exchange that he, a Tutsi, traced his ancestors in the Congo as far back as 
the early 20th Century (Interview, 2009). The borders being arbitrarily drawn by colonialism, cross 
border relations remain strong throughout Africa. Although in the Congo the question of who 
therefore is Congolese Tutsi is complex, most people would choose to simplify a complex 
problem, by considering all Tutsis as Rwandans. Tutsis subsequently concluded that the CNS was 
nothing but a forum to deprive Banyarwandas of their “Congolese identity” and rightful political 
participation (Kisangani, 2012).  
 
In Fizi in South Kivu province, the unresolved tensions between Banyamulenge Tutsis and the 
Bembe ethnic group led a Mobutist Bembe politician Anzuluni Bambe, then Deputy Speaker of 
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the Haut Conseil de la Republique – Parlement de Transition (HCR-PT)85, an organ of the CNS, 
to push through a resolution in April 1995 calling for the expulsion of Banyamulenge Tutsis from 
the Congo, referred to as “recent Rwandan refugees” (Lemarchand 2009, p. 34).  This problem has 
lingered on and the political authorities have not been innocent. During a meeting with middle 
level South Kivu authorities in 2009, I have cautioned against the return of such tendencies at a 
time when the United Nations was engaged in supporting the stabilisation processes in eastern 
Congo (Participant Observation). One of the participants at the meeting, a civil society activist, 
gave a short but significant response: ‘Talk to the authorities in Kinshasa. They are the problem’ 
(Participant Observation - Seminar on Reconciliation in Fizi Territory, 2009). 
 
 In 2009, Mwami Ndabagoye of the Rusizi Plains of Uvira territory informed me during a 
monitoring mission that xenophobia against Tutsis and Barundis of the plains was never going to 
go away easily. He said the Tutsi sense of siege in Central Africa comes from this deep hatred 
(meeting in Bukavu in 2009).  Back to my office in Bukavu, the local chief called me to say he 
was under threat from the territorial administrator who continued to refuse to recognize his 
authority. 86 
 
At around the same period the manipulation of ethnic tensions in the struggle for political power 
brought back to life the ghosts of the 1960s ethnic conflicts in Katanga.  In August 1992 when 
opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi was appointed Prime Minister by the HCR-PT, an estimated 
150,000 Luba Kasai people were expelled from Katanga by Lunda youths inspired by the then 
                                                 
85 High Council of State – Transitional Parliament  





Governor Kyungu who supported President Mobutu’s rival appointee Nguz Karl-I- Bond, a native 
of the province (Mwamba, 1991). My analysis shows that in the Congo, political support is often 
personalized and people do not direct their support at ideas and policy, but rather individuals, either 
local heroes, sons and daughters of historic figures, ethnic gladiators, those who pay for the 
support. Mobutu mastered the art of managing and circulating the list of politicians forever 
assembled behind him for appointments, money and influence. Mobutu has always known that 
having a ‘liste consistent’, that is to say a list of serious actors (regionally powerful, influential and 
potential threats) on his side guaranteed the security of his power. Ethnicity and its misuse for 
political purposes have been the bane of Congolese politics since independence (Personal 
Observation). 
 
History came full circle because just as secessionist Katangan Lundas supporting Moise Tshombe 
attacked Luba Kasai migrants in the 1960s, Lunda youths who supported their kinsman Nguz 
attacked Lubas from Tshisekedi’s ethnic group living in Katanga in 1992. All this happened thanks 
to Mobutu’s manipulation to divide his rivals and stay in power (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). As 
could be seen, in both the Kivus and Katanga, ethnic manipulation was a result of the struggle for 
power. As outlined earlier, ethnic tensions became the manifestation of the struggle for power. 
Mobutu’s appointment of Nguz, a Katangan, was mainly to undermine and divide his enemies in 
the CNS by pitching them against one another. By naming Nguz, Katangans quickly became less 
critical of Mobutu because once again their province has returned to the political limelight. This 
demonstrates the saliency of a political economy analysis and the insights from historical 




3.5 The regional dimension of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict  
 
The history of the Tutsi-Hutu conflict is generally considered by some scholars (Mamdani, 2001; 
Kisangani, 2012) as the consequences of Belgian manipulation of ethnic identity. Through what 
Mamdani (2001) refers to as the hamitic myth, the Belgians placed Tutsis above Hutus and justified 
Tutsi royal rule over the majority Hutus of Rwanda.  
 
In 1959, the Belgians switched sides and gave way to the 1959 revolution it encouraged which 
caused the shift of power to Hutus as Tutsis became refugees in Uganda, Congo and elsewhere. 
Mamdani (2001) elucidates the idea of the Hamitic myth in his demonstration of how a flawed 
conception of racial difference, carried over into colonialism, sowed the seeds of hatred and 
genocide. According to him, the Hamitic theory held that the Hamitic race was superior to, or more 
advanced than the negroid populations of sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of this belief, the policies 
of European imperial powers in Africa in the 20th century were affected by this misconception. 
German and Belgian displayed preferential attitudes in Central Africa, especially in Rwanda and 
Burundi where the Tutsis were said to be of Hamitic origins and therefore destined to lead the 
Hutus who were rooted in south of the Sahara, i.e the negroid peoples of Africa. Hutus have since 
viewed Tutsis as usurpers and invaders of “their” land and the continued domination with support 
by imperialism and colonialism continued into the mid-20th century resulting in genocide. 
 
The roots of rivalry and hatred, caused by Belgian’s disruption of pre-colonial social organization 
of the Rwandan Kingdom under Tutsi Kings, exploded into genocide when Tutsi rebels and 
refugee children of the 1959 revolution from Uganda under Paul Kagame seized power in Kigali. 
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The 1994 Tutsi takeover empowered children of Tutsi refugees in Congo most of whom served in 
the Tutsi-led RPF. These developments coincided with the post-1991-1993 Sovereign National 
Conference which had voted to expel Tutsis from the Congo (Mamdani, 2001, p.245 The 
Sovereign National Conference and the Resolution on Citizenship in 1991). From role reversals in 
Rwanda to shifting fortunes in a citizenship crisis (Hutus and Tutsis), both Banyarwanda people 
parted company after Tutsis seized power under the Rwanda Patriotic Front. The explosion in the 
eastern Congo was only a matter of time. As Tutsis of the eastern Congo after 1994 had a new-
found confidence following the seizure of power by Tutsis in Rwanda, the Hutus in the eastern 
DRC in an apparent solidarity with their kinsmen, not only collaborated, but joined in aiding 
fleeing genocidaires and former Rwandan Hutu soldiers in attacks on Tutsis in the region 
(Mamdani 2001, Lemarchand 2009, Reed 1998, Turner 2007 and McCalpin 2002).  
 
After 1994, while the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army struggled to establish firm control over 
Rwanda, tensions were peaking along the border with the Congo from where Rwandan Hutu rebels 
of the former government launched attacks against the new Rwandan government.87 Hutu militias 
and former Rwandan army soldiers (numbering tens of thousands) were tolerated and even helped 
to reorganize and rearm by Zaire (Reed 1998, 134-138). In spite of international calls for the Zaire 
government to dislodge or control them, nothing happened because the collapsing Mobutu 
government was complicit, militarily unable, and not keen in doing so (Reed, 1994).88 According 
                                                 
87 By this time, persecuted Tutsis had begun reaching out to the RPF with which they shared a common plight and a 
common enemy. Congolese autochthones were already sympathetic to the Hutu refugees and saw Tutsis in general as 
the problem. 
88 The French were strong allies of the Hutu-led government of President Juvenal Habyarimana up to the time of the 
Tutsi rebel victory in 1994. They trained and armed the then Hutu-led Rwandan army and up to 1994 armed the 
government forces and provided training and technical support. 
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to Reed, states of the region repeatedly expressed concern over the destabilising activities of the 
FDLR and Zairean inaction or complicity. 
Two years of sporadic and disparate attacks against Rwanda’s new government and Tutsis in 
eastern Zaire, specifically in Giseyni (Reed, 1998, p.145) intensified. It became the rationale for 
the 1997 AFDL rebellion/Rwandan invasion. Enoch Sebeneza, former MP and Tutsi 
Banyamulenge activist, confirmed to me at his residence in 2009 that the 1997 and 1998 rebellions 
against President Mobutu and Laurent Desire Kabila were planned and executed from Rwanda 
(Personal Interview, 2009). Mr. Sebeneza said the overthrow of Mobutu was deemed necessary 
and carried out by Presidents Museveni and Kagame given his support of the FDLR, the attacks 
on Ugandan soil by the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels, the threat he posed to the region and his 
manipulation of the citizenship crisis in the eastern Congo. He further confirmed that the second 
invasion (the 1998-2003 war) was a punitive action against Kabila by Rwanda and Uganda for 
expelling them from the Congo after they brought him to power (Personal Interview, 2009). 
 
The 1997 rebellion and overthrow of Mobutu was by an amalgam of four disparate rebel groups 
brought together principally by the Rwandans with the contribution of the Ugandans. Within seven 
months, Tutsi Banyamulenge troops, Kadogos 89as well as Rwandan advisers and few RPA troops 
approached Kinshasa precipitating Mobutu’s flight into exile. 
 
The failure to address the citizenship question in the eastern Congo since independence has been 
a key cause of the regional crisis, the wars from 1996 to 2002 and the resulting instability up to 
                                                 
89 Kadogos were Congolese child soldiers who swept across the country from the east with President Kabila in the 




2010. The 1998-2002 war which erupted 13 months after Kabila came to power was partly caused 
by a lack of confidence in the Congolese state’s efforts to resolve the nationality crisis. The CNDP 
rebellion of 2006-2009, according to its then leader Laurent Nkundabatware, was borne out of the 
same problem (Participant Observations as a participant in the Goma Peace Conference; CNDP, 
2008). I represented the United Nations South Kivu office to the Goma Peace Conference of 
December 2007-January 2008. During the conference, the delegation representing the CNDP-Tutsi 




In this chapter I demonstrated that in the absence of historical legitimacy and in the midst of 
challenges to the state, power becomes the only guarantee of survival. This was not lost on the 
Congo’s leaders since independence. Dependent on its own resources, without any programme to 
diversify its economy, the pathological quest for power is seen as the best guarantee of power. In 
the absence of leadership amid manipulation, the competition over resources derails into ethnic 
conflicts and inter-ethnic war (as occurred in Ituri). The failure of leadership in the contested and 
challenged state makes the state vulnerable and prone to conflict.  
 
In chapter four, I situate the DRC in the conceptual literature of weak, failed and collapsed states 









State Capacity and External Intervention in the Congo under Mobutu and the Kabilas 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In chapter three, I discussed the importance of governance where the state must be able to deliver 
the goods of security and perform its administrative, distributive and regulatory functions 
(Brautigam, 1996). Nation states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political 
(public) goods to persons living within designated borders. They succeed or fail depending on their 
level of delivery/performance. Success or failure determines how strong or weak they are and the 
ways in which they can be distinguished from one another. The goods a state must deliver to prove 
its raison d’être include the security, social, economic, educational, medical and even the 
infrastructure needs of society. This is what state capacity is about. To be considered viable, a state 
must, in the words of Rothberg (1995), ensure security, prevent cross border invasions and loss of 
territory, deter domestic threats and attacks on the national order, and prevent crime and any related 
dangers to domestic human security. State capacity is determined by the extent to which 
regulatory, administrative, technical and extractive functions in the polity are successfully carried 
out (Brautigam in Ndulu et al, 1996, p.83). How can we characterize the Congolese State under 
Presidents Mobutu, Laurent Desiré Kabila and his son Joseph Kabila in light of the theory and 
literature? What is the relationship, if any, between state capacity and external intervention? This 
chapter examines state capacity in the DRC and proceeds with an analysis of the evidence in 
history and contemporary times, to show how the historical legitimacy argument and external 




4.2  Understanding State Collapse in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
Successive United Nations Mission mandates in the Congo have stated that their key objective was 
to enhance the Congolese state’s capacities through state authority restoration. In the Political 
Affairs Division of the UN Mission, we have monitored and reported on mandate implementation 
strategies and activities on the Restoration of the Justice System, Security Sector Reform, Army 
Mentoring, Consolidation of the Rule of Law and more importantly the all-embracing International 
Stabilisation Support Strategies in the eastern Congo between 2007 and 2009 (MONUSCO reports, 
2007-2009). This is out of the conviction that capacitating the Congolese state first through state 
authority restoration was fundamental to the reconstruction of the country. As evidenced by its 
history, the DRC state has not had the capacity to function since independence owing to misrule, 
internal conflict and external intervention. 
 
4.2.1 State capacity in the DRC 
 
Discussing state capacity in the Congo since independence conjures up different levels of 
evaluation used to explain the constantly changing character of the country through violent 
assassinations, rebellions, change of regimes, economic collapse, social crises, loss of control over 
territory, ethnic conflicts, and civil and regional wars. The extent and duration of incapacity (the 
entire period covered by this dissertation) is such that the Congo has never witnessed a peaceful 
transfer of power from one civilian government to the next. The 2006 elections, deemed to be 
successfully held, but not free and fair, occasioned bloody fighting between the two main 
contenders with several loss of lives. Jean Pierre Bemba, the MLC leader and candidate for the 
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coalition Union pour la Nation reluctantly accepted the results yet claimed systematic cheating 
which was rejected by the Supreme Court (The Political Affairs Division of the UN Mission in 
Congo, MONUC, December 2006). 
 
State capacity can exist at various levels. A state can be strong, weak, failing, failed and collapsed, 
as the case may be, or a combination of the above, as happened in the Congo, that is to say, being 
both strong and weak as was the case in the Zaire of Mobutu from the early 1990s. Rothberg 
contends that state capacity is about stability and predictability. Economic indicators such as GDP, 
human development, transparency in governance, press freedom, functioning infrastructure, 
communications, and rule of law, the existence of universities and medical centres in such states 
point to a functioning order, according to Rothberg. 
 
Weak states can usually be due to geographical or physical factors, constraints, internal political 
and social contradictions, ethnic, religious, linguistic and inter-communal tensions, even if the 
characteristics are not violent. They are also characterised by urban crime as people resort to other 
means since the state’s capacity to deploy goods adequately is diminished or diminishing. Physical 
infrastructure networks are deteriorated, schools and hospitals show signs of neglect, especially 
outside the main cities. Corruption is common and the rule of law is not adhered to.  Rothberg says 
whether states are ruled by despots, elected or not, they can be weak. They can also be consumed 
by internal violence and cease to deliver positive political goods to inhabitants. Such governments 
lose credibility and citizens begin doubting its legitimacy. With the foregoing in mind, how 




A failed state, according to Rothberg, refers to a situation characterised by civil wars, the inability 
to control peripheral regions, criminal violence, rampant corruption, dramatically declining 
economic growth and the loss of political legitimacy. Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, 
dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions. In failed states, ruling cadres oppress, extort 
and harass the majority of compatriots while privileging a narrowly based entity. Patrimonialism 
thrives under such situations and the authority of the state is not effective outside the urban centres 
and the leader’s home village. Government troops deploy on the rampage, battle armed revolts led 
by one or more rivals, two or more insurgencies. Civil unrest is common.  The rule of Mobutu and 
the Kabilas was more or less the same on this score (Personal Observation). The Congolese state 
‘permanently’ failed during the period studied. It collapsed at independence during the crisis in 
which the Prime Minister was killed in 1961 and in 1997 when Mobutu fled into exile. I have paid 
attention to state failure as the long-running affliction of the Congo. When the Congolese state 
collapsed in 1997, it was from the weight of decades of failure.  
 
When the joint provincial (UN-DRC) coordination committee met in December 2008 to provide 
strategic direction to the peace process (political process and Amani Leo military operations 
against rebels), it was confirmed that FARDC was the number one violator of human rights in the 
province as they continued to rob, kill, rape and pillage across the province with impunity. The 
army was part of the Congo’s problem and security sector reform was a crucial requirement in 
ending instability (Personal observation from evaluation missions, UN Mission’s South Kivu 
office, 2008).  
 
Engelbert (2000) has gone beyond mere naming to investigate and explain why this situation of 
incapacity and weakness afflicts the post-colonial African state. His definition of state capacity 
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pays attention to concepts such as social capital, ethnic heterogeneity and civic culture and 
emphasizes the importance of homogeneity, a common cultural and historical origin, a common 
consciousness and civic culture as well as willingness to accept the state and its institutions.  
 
For Engelbert, although the average African state has not collapsed, its capacity to provide order, 
and security, implement policies for growth, adopt and enforce laws is in doubt. In Africa, he said, 
there is a mismatch between state and society and institutions do not reflect the underlying systems 
of power. He said the weakness of most African states comes from heterogeneity which causes the 
adoption of policies that are inimical to growth and weakens the quality of institutions as resources 
are diverted towards the management of polarized social relations (ibid, p.56). Thus, the cost of 
maintenance of an existing order is inversely proportional to the perceived sense of legitimacy of 
the existing system (Quoting Douglas North 1981, p.73 in State Legitimacy and developmental 
capacity). This absence of unity, thanks to the state’s lack of historical legitimacy, means that the 
strategies of power employed by domestic elites are framed by the degree of institutional 
congruence, or historical legitimacy of the post-colonial state. Corruption, nepotism, ethnic politics 
and factionalism become the features of the patrimonial stage that emerges inevitably (ibid. 103-
104).90 The height of patronage was summarized in this narrative quoted from Nzongola-Ntalaja: 
 
‘In late as 1996, one minister who had reason to believe that he would be dropped 
from the government in a coming cabinet reshuffle came up with a brilliant idea. He 
took the prudent step of flying to Gbadolite91, to see the President Mobutu and his 
family. In his brief case he carried one million United States dollars as a gift to Bobi 
Ladawa, the president’s wife. When the cabinet reshuffle was announced, the 
minister not only retained his post, he was also promoted to the rank of deputy Prime 
Minister’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p.158). 
                                                 
 




Engelbert sees Africa’s development crisis as a crisis of state capacity which is absent because the 
state is contested, being unhistorical and lacking in social capital, summed as civic culture and 
common consciousness of the state, the common good, political awareness and reciprocal 
obligations and positive expectations which together ensure compliance among citizens with 
commonly agreed and accepted rules and policies. This relieves government of deploying 
resources for compliance - both forceful or through enticements (p.58).  
 
Analysis of the evidence from my interviews, it can be argued that the Congo has on several 
occasions in its history vacillated between weaknesses, failure and collapse with instances during 
which it straddled two or three conditions at the same time. During the independence crisis of 
1960-1961, the state collapsed after Lumumba’s assassination from a conspiracy that involved 
local political and outside actors. Although independent on 30 June 1960, the new state was weak 
as it was immediately besieged by political crisis, leaving it without the capacity to fully assert its 
authority or restore constitutional order. That government collapsed in blood. Mobutu, as soon as 
he imposed his new government through force, was faced in his turn by a crisis of legitimacy. He 
embarked on misguided policies – a cultural revolution, authenticité, nationalization and a one 
party-state – to rally people to his support. , However the “revolution” turned into three decades 
of patronage, massive public spending and corruption resulting in economic failure and state 
collapse too. By the time of his overthrow by a coalition of regional states and Congolese Tutsi 




Trefon (2004) best captures the collapse when he speaks of Congo’s NGOisation. He said informal 
structures had replaced the state which had disappeared and people innovated survival strategies. 
Electricity, water, educational, medical and all other services had collapsed by 1994. Under 
Laurent Desiré Kabila, the state was weak also because it had no army, or means to perform its 
functions. Once Kabila came to power, he began building a personality cult compounding his 
problems and enemies precipitating his downfall. He failed to transform the country’s situation for 
the better and left it weak and occupied. His misrule during his brief period has been discussed in 
Chapter Two.  
 
The period under his son Joseph Kabila until 2010 was marked by a near total lack of control over 
many parts of the country. The economy relied on external support and the country had no control 
over the national boundaries. By 2010, there were at least as many as twenty or more armed groups 
locally known as Mayi Mayi92 in the eastern Congo while the entire country was seething with the 
absence of social services, infrastructure, jobs and health services.  
 
4.2.2 The DRC – Between failure and collapse since independence 
 
From the evidence, the Congo was prevented from being a fully functional state throughout the 
period covered by this dissertation. The Congo between 1960 and 2010 had never satisfied any of 
                                                 
92 Mayi Mayi means water in Swahili, the lingua franca in the eastern Congo. During the rebellions of the 1960s, the 
Lumumbist/Mulelist rebels were believed to have magical powers that turned the bullets from Mobutu’s forces to 
water. The people of the region reinvented the phenomenon in the 1990s conflicts. The Mayi Mayi were local self 
defence forces that emerged as a consequence of state collapse, mainly to protect communities from Rwandan or anti-
government forces occupying the east of the country from 1998 to 2003. In South Kivu Province alone where I served 
as a Political Affairs Officer, I and colleagues have during political missions been in contact with at least more than 
ten armed groups as follows: Front des Republicains Federalistes, Mayi Mayi Yakutumba, Mayi Mayi Zabuloni, 
Mudundu 40, PARECO, FDLR, Mayi Mayi Shikito, Mayi Mayi Akilimali, Mayi Mayi Kifuafua, Mayi Mayi Kirikicho 
and Raia Mutomboki.  
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the criteria for state capacity in light of its troubled history. From the assassination of Lumumba 
to 2010 the country, for half a century, was a violent place, where citizens only knew dictatorship, 
repression, violence and misery in spite of being endowed with world-class minerals. Besides the 
usurpation of political power, the Congo experienced infrastructure collapse, lack of proper health 
care, an ineffective educational system, and hunger and despair for decades. Government in the 
Congo had never been transparent during the period and the repressive arm of the state had always 
stifled civil liberties and fanned inter-communal tensions pursuing whatever kept the country’s 
ruling elites in power.  
 
4.2.3 The challenge of state legitimacy  
 
Legitimacy is understood in this dissertation in two contexts; the historical legitimacy of a state 
and the political legitimacy of a regime. Engelbert (2000) stresses the importance of social capital 
which is the sum total of positive inputs from society and ranges from acceptance of the regime 
and a fundamental belief that its policies are directed towards the common good. A society that 
believes in the historical legitimacy of its government abides by, supports and defends its policies. 
Such ideal situations occur usually, though not always, in polities with a common history, attitudes, 
norms, value systems, language and heritage. Homogeneity for Engelbert is an absolute advantage 
as the African experience of heterogeneity has sadly demonstrated. 
 
At independence, third world states were bequeathed advanced political institutions (Alavi, 1974) 
and were expected to superimpose them on relatively agrarian, traditional and undeveloped 
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societies.93 The lack of historical legitimacy in post-colonial Africa is aptly explained by Jackson 
(1993) in his concept of quasi states. Clapham says Western industrial forms of administrative 
institutions ‘cannot be parachuted into third world states and expected to work in the same way as 
they do in societies with very different values, economies and patterns of historical 
development’(Clapham, 1985, p.46).  
 
The average African state was created outside the African historical and evolutionary processes, 
and bequeathed to a petty bourgeoisie that accepted the “instruments of sovereignty” without any 
thorough grasp of what was at stake. The crisis at independence had to a large extent been due to 
the competition for political power among the tribes/nations within the new Congo that had just 
recently been grouped into a new entity called the Republic.  
 
It is to be recalled that Belgium never prepared the colony for independence as evidenced by the 
Van Bilsen plea for an additional thirty years of colonization to prepare the country (see preceding 
chapter on the Van Bilsen Plan). It created no post-war indigenous leadership prepared to take 
over the mantle of leadership as occurred in British colonies. Belgian rule was based on 
authoritarian paternalism whereby Belgian colonial officials deployed territorial administrators 
across the country where they directly supervised the running of the colony with the assistance of 
appointed local chiefs. There was no focus on the future which would have prepared the colony’s 
people for independence. In British and French colonial Africa, it was different. In the West 
African British colonies, Africans, towards the end of colonial rule, served in the colony’s 
legislative councils and practiced their trades such as law and teaching which meant they were 
                                                 
93 The modern European state system evolved in a gradual but indigenous way since Westphalia and had undergone 
progressive evolution through historic upheavals and revolutions. 
122 
 
ready to partake in politics and take over their independent countries. In Afrique Occidentale 
Francaise (French West Africa) the policy of Assimilation ensured the appointment of 
parliamentarians to the French National Assembly in Paris.  
 
While the new Congolese republic yearned for leaders with vision to build a genuine Congolese 
nation, successive Congolese leaders focused on patronage, clientelism and corruption to survive 
the challenges of legitimacy and held on to power at the expense of rival political  actors.  
 
4.2.4 Illegitimate power and ethnic crises 
 
The usurpation of power has been a contributory factor to instability in the DRC since 
independence. Mobutu and Laurent Desire Kabila both seized power through the barrel of a gun 
and therefore led illegitimate regimes stricto senso. Both rulers never had the full support of the 
population except for Kabila’s brief honeymoon with his people which quickly dissipated before 
civil war/invasion erupted in 1998. Owing to the fragility of power and the inherent problems of 
cohesion, Congo’s leaders always relied on their kinsmen and regions to form a protective coterie 
around their power base. That Mobutu recruited from his own ethnic kinsmen from Equateur to 
serve in the armed forces and hold key strategic positions in government was almost normal in the 
Congolese context as Laurent Desire Kabila and his son and successor Joseph relied on Katangans 
for security and support.  
 
At demonstrated in this dissertation, ethnicity has been instrumentalised in the Congo during 
periods of political competition or used to disenfranchise or exclude others, in particular Tutsis or 
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Rwandophones. This has been the cause of crisis and rebellion and contributed to the collapse of 
the Mobutist state in 1997. 
 
4.2.5 The Tutsi question in the eastern Congo and its impact on national and regional stability 
 
The crisis of identity is integral to understanding instability in the eastern Congo. The Congolese 
Tutsi interest in rebellion in their own country arises partly from being rejected by their 
compatriots as being non-Congolese, or at least non-indigenous to the Congo (Personal Interview 
with Sebeneza, 2009). These perceptions have been confirmed in several reports by prominent 
Congolese Tutsis of South Kivu province such as Kabibi Kamanzi (2008), and General Pacifique 
Masunzu (2010). The sense of humiliation in being rejected as Congolese citizens explains their 
involvement in the wars against Kinshasa in 1996 and 1998 and their mistrust of institutions and 
tendency to even be supportive of Rwanda. Most Tutsi politicians did not necessarily support the 
Laurent Nkunda rebellion (2006-2009) but sympathised with his position that Tutsis feel rejected 
in Congo and took up arms to defend their birthright (Analysis of Personal Observations). 
 
The discrimination against the Tutsi in the DRC was unfortunately given new regional 
interpretations as the Tutsi-Hutu conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi dictated the pace of regional 
events. Developments in Burundi throughout the 1970s and 1980s and in Rwanda in 1990s 
impacted on the situation in the eastern Congo. The 1972 Massacre of Hutus in Burundi, the 
ensuing wars and the 1993 murder of democratically elected Hutu President of Burundi Melchior 
Ndadaye by Tutsi soldiers all contributed to the adverse view of Tutsis in the region in 1994. Then 
came the 1990 Rwanda Patriotic Front attack on Rwanda and the subsequent seizure of power. 
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The seismic effects these had on the eastern Congo have already been discussed. It only suffices 
to reiterate that fleeing Hutu genocidaies who escaped into the Congo contributed to the resentment 
of the local communities in the eastern Congo towards their Tutsi neighbours.  
 
While in the Congo from 2004 to 2010, I have frequently engaged interlocutors on the almost 
generalised view of Tutsis which ignores the entire regional context and history of conflict. I have 
made mention of the Hutu social revolution of 1959 in Rwanda and the subsequent hunting down 
and chasing away of Tutsis in exile. The Hutu-led government of Juvenal Habyarimana is known 
to have practiced ethnic identification whereby Hutus were separated from Tutsis in public and the 
latter exposed to measures to put them in check. After the Tutsi rebellion from Uganda seized 
power and the Hutu genocidaires94 fled into the eastern Congo, they substantially added to the 
regional tensions, 
 
I have been informed of the government of Congo’s support to the FDLR rebels up to 2009 
(Revelations in 2009 from same former child soldier cited above). He confirmed that the 
government in Kinshasa supplied arms to the FDLR in 2008-2009 through the Congolese Hutu 
militia group PARECO95. In January 2010, this was confirmed by another Congolese battalion 
commander in Mwenga in South Kivu (Personal Interview with Congolese officer in South Kivu). 
 
The Tutsi question was the subject of historic deliberations during the Sovereign National 
Conference of 1991-1994, the last debate that failed and led to the Tutsi rebellion which overthrew 
                                                 
94 Those accused of genocide 
95 Patriots Resistants Congolais, the Resistant Congolese Patriots, a Congolese Hutu armed group that fought 
against the Rwandan invasion on the DRC side. 
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Mobutu. Despite the Nationality Law of 2006, Congolese have up to 2010 continued to label Tutsis 
as Rwandans and generally refuse them nationality rights in the DRC. 
 
An understanding of this history and the Congo’s location along the ethnic fault lines separating 
Rwandophones of Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo is integral to understanding the problem of 
instability and incapacity in the Congolese state. The problem of Tutsi nationality has engaged 
successive governments since independence and the country has seen many conflicts and wars 
which have, in a sustained way, sapped the energies of the country (Analysis of Personal 
Observations). Crises in the Congo have the potential to draw in neighbouring states such as 
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi who are culturally and ethnically akin to certain groups in the 
eastern DRC. This was reflected in a report I prepared after attending a high-level meeting of 
Governors of South Kivu (the Congo) and Rusizi (Rwanda) provinces in 2008. The meeting was 
held as part of the joint verification mechanism on the repatriation of Rwandan FDLR rebels in 
the eastern Congo (Participant Observations).  
 
4.3 External Intervention in the Congo since independence 
 
African countries are appendages to the international capitalist system whose key actors and 
institutions maintain their stranglehold on them. The Congo is arguably a captured state, that is to 
say, one whose economy and institutions are subordinated by, and dictated to, in their operations 
as appendages. On the extent of the interest of external powers, the crisis of 1960-1961 is 
instructive. The initial turning point, when it all started, was the period in European history when 
the Congo was discovered to be rich in rubber and ivory, highly valued in Europe in the late 19th 
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Century (Hochschild, 2007)96. The scramble for the Congo and subsequent Belgian colonization 
of the Congo laid the foundations of control and dependence, making the country a supplier of 
vital raw materials to Belgium and the wider international market.  
 
Towards independence, the global capitalist powers were jittery about losing control, frightened 
by Patrice Lumumba’s nationalism.  Intervening to preserve their interests, Britain, France and 
Apartheid South Africa gave active support to Katangan secession as their ruling classes shared 
the Belgians’ fear of Lumumba’s commitment to genuine independence and radical social change. 
They conspired to remove him from power. Among other issues of thematic relevance, Professor 
Jean Tshonda Omasombo of the Royal Museum of Central Africa and the only African member 
of the 2001 Belgium-sanctioned inquiry into the exact circumstances of Lumumba’s assassination 
and the role played by Belgian political leaders in this event, a foremost Congo expert on the 
Lumumba inquest, believes on the basis of evidence that the death of Lumumba was planned and 
executed by the United States, Belgium and supported by Katangan business interests and his 
Congolese political rivals (Personal Interview with Omasombo, 2009).  Lumumba’s fall was the 
result of a vast conspiracy involving the US and Belgium on the one hand and his Congolese 
political enemies like Kasavubu Tshombe and Mobutu.  
 
I have already discussed the rebellions and invasions during Mobutu’s reign which were always 
defeated or foiled by United States, Belgian and French support. 
 
                                                 
96 Hochscild’s King Leopold’s Ghost provides a detailed explanation of the killings for rubber and how this decimated 
a large percentage of the Congolese population in the early 20th century. 
127 
 
Other forms of external intervention were the regional states’ actions in the Congo in 1997, 1998 
and between 1998 and 2003. Why did regional states invade and fight in the Congo? They did for 
other reasons than the mineral resources lure. Uganda, Rwanda, Angola were strengthening their 
power, securing their borders and profiting from the power vacuum in the eastern Congo left by 
the collapsed Congolese state. I reiterate that mineral resources were not the main reason for 
external intervention in the Congo from 1996 to 2003. The cold realities of power politics and 
national interest dictated the actions of intervening states in Congo are noteworthy. Angola’s fears 
of a weak Congo accessible to UNITA which was allied to Mobutu (Turner, 2007) and Uganda 
and Rwanda’s determination to both secure their borders against rebel groups such as The Lord’s 
Resistance Army, the ADF NALU and the FDLR and to punish Kabila for betraying them are 
useful insights to consider when discussing external intervention in the Congo. 
 
Additionally, realists believe the Congolese political and security vacuum had to be filled in 
adherence to the laws of nature which dictate that the vacuum left by the collapsed state be filled. 
(Turner 2007, p8) This rational actor theory (subaltern realism to quote Mohammed Ayoob) is 
worthy of note. It sees intervening states in the DRC as doing what nations have done throughout 
history under the circumstances occasioned by leadership failure and state collapse. 
 
4.4. The Impact of external intervention 
The impact of external intervention in the Congo since independence has been negative. To many 
Congolese people, it altered the course of their history with the imposition of the neo-colonial state 
after Lumumba’s death. The overthrow of Lumumba, the suppression of the Kwilu and eastern 
rebellions, the foiling of the Shaba invasions were all actions that, in the calculations of Belgium, 
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the United States and France, protected their own ideological interests, stemmed the spread of 
communism and kept the country’s resources safe for their companies and investments. It may 
however never be known in what direction Lumumba may have taken Zaire had he lived.  
 
As a result of external intervention, neo-colonial Zaire became a “captured” state whose 
leadership’s interests coincided with those of Western powers. The result was the crisis of political 
legitimacy that had undermined the country’s stability for decades. The Congo continued to suffer 
the impact of external intervention until 2010.  External intervention destabilized the region and 
Africa as a whole. Zaire under Mobutu played a key role in undermining progressive regimes in 
Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and the then Front Line states of Southern Africa. However, through 
external intervention in 1997, the Mobutist state was overthrown. I consider this invasion as the 
only positive external intervention the country has known since independence (Analysis from 
Personal Interviews and Participant Observation). 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I discussed state capacity and state collapse in the DRC and analysed the 
characteristics which, from the historical evidence, situates the DRC as having consistently been 
a weak and failed state that collapsed twice at periods identified in the research. I demonstrated 
how accumulated power and a mono-ethnic praetorian guard was the sole guarantee for security 
under both Mobutu and Joseph Kabila, a situation linked to the problem of absence of national 
cohesion. I then discussed internal instability in the country which is rich in mineral resources, 
competition for political and economic power and the manipulation of ethnicity in the process, 
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analyzing the citizenship crisis of the eastern Congo and its impact.  To conclude this chapter, I 
state that the Congo lacks capacity as a result of its historic inheritance. State collapse in the DRC 
is explained by a) extreme weakness from the lack of legitimacy and constant challenges to the 
state; b) exhaustion from the combined financial and political cost of strategies to ensure its 
continued existence; and c) a lack of autonomy as a result of foreign intervention, which is itself a 
function of the vacuum created by a lack of security and a lack of state viability. 
 
In the next chapter, I examine state failure from the perspective of dictatorship and resistance to 
democracy by Mobutu. I consider the role played by civil society in the struggle for multi-party 
democracy during Mobutu’s dictatorial rule paying particular attention to the Catholic Church, 
students, political parties/actors and the foreign-based opposition. I examined the internal and 
external factors that militated against democracy in Zaire and, in particular, the causes of the 
collapse of the Sovereign National Conference for Democracy setting the stage for violent 














The Role of Civil Society and Outside Forces in the Struggle for Stability and Democracy97  
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Civil society in Africa played key roles in the struggle for multiparty democracy in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. The 1980s were a period of military rule and one-party dictatorships and mass 
collective action was en vogue in such countries as Senegal, Kenya, Benin, Mali and even the 
Congo where political parties, the Catholic Church and students were foremost in the struggle. In 
this chapter, I discuss the role played by civil society in the struggle for democracy in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo since 1960 with an emphasis on the period from 1960 to 1997.98 
Why did the struggle for multi-party democracy fail in 1994? I demonstrate in this chapter that 
while Mobutu’s determination to cling on to power was instrumental, failure by the pro-democracy 
movement was a consequence of internal political and social contradictions that are best explained 
by the artificial nature of the state in the DRC. A lack of unity, ambition and greed all influenced 
by the fragile nature of the post-colonial state largely account for the failure of the movement 
during the period in question. 
 
                                                 
97 Civil society in South and North Kivu provinces were known to have produced some of the most vociferous activists 
against the regimes of President Mobutu. Many of the activists became MPs, party leaders, Governors, ministers and 
opinion leaders. South Kivu civil society activists were well represented at the Sun City talks in South Africa to end 
the regional war and their role was pivotal in the resistance against the Ugandan and Rwandan occupation of the 
eastern Congo between 1998 and 2003. The renowned investigative journalist Floribert Chebeya, who was murdered 
in 2010, hailed from South Kivu. Between 2006 and 2010, I had a series of meetings, and attended seminars with key 
civil society members of the province and this chapter on the struggle for democracy by civil society in the Congo is 
based upon my experience of exchanges with them. 
98 I mainly focus on the period of Mobutu’s rule because more than 80% of the time spent by civil society fighting 





5.2 Civil Society - A historical summary 
 
Although people who lived in the territory today called the Democratic Republic of Congo have 
organized themselves to resist foreign encroachment and domination since 1895, what is referred 
to as civil society truly emerged in the Congo in the late 1950s. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002, p.61) 
refers to it as the anti-colonial resistance which he distinguishes from the pro-democracy 
movement which took root after 1950. The impetus followed the end of the Second World War 
and the rise of the then two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) opposed to 
colonial rule. At a time of increased agitations across Africa, civil society emerged in the Congo 
during the final years of colonial rule led by evolués, tribal associations and trade unions99. 
Pressure groups emerged to demand improvements in the colonial system. From the mid-1950s, 
the Association des Bakongos (ABAKO), initially an ethnic Kongo pressure group in Kinshasa, 
and Conscience Africaine100, the discussion group of moderate catholic intellectuals, were the only 
groups known in the Belgian colony before 1956. Their world view was narrow and their 
objectives were limited to improvements in the colonial system. It was after Patrice Lumumba’s 
radical activism brought together supporters from varied walks of life and society that the 
agitations for change became radicalised and sped up the independence struggle (Personal 
Interview with Omasombo, 2012). 
                                                 
99 The evolués were the Africans with colonial and Western education who served the colonial administration as clerks 
or worked in other professions. Their status was a little higher than their illiterate kinsmen in the country.  Nzongola-
Ntalaja (2002) writing on the Congolese democracy movement in a historical context mentions Kimbanguist sect, 
evolues, lumpen proletariats, the Catholic intellectuals grouped together in Conscience Africaine, ABAKO, and later 
the other parties such as Lumumba’s MNC, Tshombe’s CONAKAT and Jason Sendwe’s BALUBAKAT (above) in 
and around Kinshasa,as the earliest groups that constituted civil society before independence.  
100 Catholic intellectuals brought up by missionaries in the colonial system, but who discussed current issues around 




Patrice Lumumba was born in Sankuru in north Kasai in 1925. After his basic education, Catholic 
missionary school and colonial postal services training, he stood out among the group of evolués 
by the standards of the time. Dynamic and speaking French and all the key languages of the Congo 
(Swahili, Tshiluba, Lingala) and his native Tetela, Lumumba became a star capable of conversing 
with all across the country, and following his study tour to Belgium in 1955, he began showing 
the leadership potential the country yearned for at the time (ibid). He strengthened his pan-African 
beliefs after attending the All-Africa People’s Conference in Nkrumah’s Ghana in 1958, the year 
he was arrested for anti-colonial disturbances. He was released to attend the round table conference 
on independence in Belgium where he arrived as a hero and distinguished leader of the pro-
independence struggle. He won the 1959 elections and became the first Prime Minister of the 
Congo on 30 June 1960 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). 
 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) dates the birth of the Congolese democracy movement to 1956 when 
Conscience Africaine members including Joseph Malula, Joseph Ileo and Joseph Ngalula rejected 
the Van Bilsen Plan101 of that year seeking to make independence a gradual affair. In 1956, the 
members of the Conscience Africaine released a document entitled Manifeste de la Conscience 
Africaine102 demanding the right of Africans to self-rule, although they accepted the Van Bilsen 
Plan as a ‘good starting point’, according to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002). Joseph Malula trained as a 
priest and was to later become the second African to attain the rank of a Roman Catholic Cardinal 
                                                 
101 The Van Bilson Plan, from the name of the Belgian academic from the Colonial University of Antwerp, was 
published in 1956 and recommended a thirty-year plan to prepare the colony of the Belgian Congo for independence. 
It was known as the thirty-year plan for the political emancipation of Belgian Africa and was a bombshell among 
Africans in evolué circles. The Van Bilsen report set the context and pace of agitations which continued into 
independence in 1960. 
102 African Consciousness Manifesto 
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in the 20th century (He was later active in the pro-democracy struggle in Kinshasa in the 1970s and 
1980s). Joseph Illeo was a member of the group and later joined the Mouvement National 
Congolais of Patrice Lumumba. He left Lumumba for Albert Kalonji’s MNC-Kalonji which the 
latter formed when he parted with Lumumba in 1959. Joseph Malula was among the original 
drafters of the manifesto.  
 
ABAKO, the BaKongo tribal Assiociation discussed earlier, was formed in 1950 and soon after 
led by Joseph Kasavubu103 who was to become the Congo’s first ceremonial president in 1960. 
ABAKO was the first pressure activist group whose actions resembled a civil society organization. 
It had its support base from various social groups in Kinshasa and Bas Kongo province. With a 
solid political base among members of the Kongo ethnic group in these areas, ABAKO through 
its actions set the pace for what later became the Congolese agitations for independence 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). 
 
In 1958 other new parties, cum pressure groups, emerged to broaden the space of political 
expression. It was from this impetus that the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) emerged in 
1958 under Patrice Lumumba. Other parties that emerged were the Centre de Regroupment 
Afaricain (CEREA) led by Anicet Kashamula in the Kivus, the Balubas of Katanga 
(BALUBAKAT) party formed by Jason Sendwe in north Katanga and the Confederation des 
Nationalistes Katangais (CONAKAT) created by Moise Tshombe in South Katanga. Of all the 
parties however, only Lumumba’s MNC was nationalist in outlook with nation-wide support. The 
rest were regionally-based parties (Personal Interview with Omasombo, 2012). 
                                                 
103 Joseph Kasavubu was the Democratic Republic of Congo’s first President in Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba’s 




Owing to the nature and fragility of the emerging state, these groupings became conflicting ethnic 
and regional organisations and soon undermined what should otherwise have been the basis of an 
historic, all-encompassing, national consciousness and liberation movement. The failure to project 
a united front was among the earliest indicators of the crises the country would face owing to the 
country’s lack of strong historical foundations. This point was confirmed in numerous exchanges 
prior to and during my fieldwork with the South Kivu Civil Society Coordination some of whose 
members gave their views on the Sovereign National Conference which failed to usher in a new 
democratic dispensation for Zaire (Analysis of Personal Interviews and Participant Observation). 
I had several meetings with civil society groupings as part of the UN mandate of strengthening the 
entity to support governance in a post-transition atmosphere. These views expressed above and in 
this chapter came from successive personal interviews conducted in South Kivu (Kaningini (2009), 
Mupira (2008), Ebenezer (2009) and Biringingwa (2009). Civil Society activists Didace Kaningini 
and Ignace Mupira later became Vice Governors of South Kivu Province; Enoch Ebenezer served 
in the transitional parliament after the 1998-2003 war and Cyprien Biringingwa was elected 
President of the Civil Society Coordination until 2010. 
 
After the independence crisis of the 1960s and the pro-Lumumba rebellions between 1964 and 
1968, the face of civil society in the Congo was of students of the Louvanium University in 
Kinshasa, the all influential Congolese Catholic Church,104 political parties, and actors who 
                                                 
104 The most influential institution in the DRC is the Catholic Church. More than 90% of Congolese self-identify as 
Christians and, of these, 50% are Roman Catholics. The Congo has the second largest congregation of Christians in 
Africa (Nigeria being the first) and has influenced the early emergence of what is today modern Nigeria through 
missionaries who brought western education and early social transformation. Before and after independence, the 
church played an important role as the sanctuary of hope and inspiration and has earned its legitimacy during 
colonial rule and after 1960 as being closest to the people who remain fervently attached to the church. Christianity 
came to the Congo region through the Kongo Empire and the Portuguese who converted a Kongo King in the early 
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supported Lumumba as the legitimate leader of the Congo. These included Kashamura’s CEREA, 
Gizenga Parti Solidarité Africain105 and Sendwe’s BALUBAKAT. After 1970 when Mobutu’s 
one-party state and his Cultural Revolution peaked in their influence over society, the church, 
students and political actors began to organize and question the activities of the state (Kasongo, 
1998). These groups saw in the regime a determination to cling on to power and to impose its will 
on society 
 
The church is historically remembered for its pastoral letters106 and criticism of Mobutu’s regime 
which continued up to 1991 when the Sovereign National Conference (SNC) was convened (see 
below). The 1990 SNC and its aftermath are considered historic for civil society for both the impact 
they had on its image and the way it set in motion the series of events leading to the inevitable 
collapse of the dictatorial Mobutu regime in 1997 (Analysis of Personal Interviews).  
 
The students’ struggle within civil society will also be given detailed attention below. The historic 
turning point in their struggle was the 1969 massacre of students by Mobutu’s forces because they 
demanded democracy and improvements in their living conditions in the universities (Lemarchand 
2009, Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, and Kasongo 1998). Opposition to Mobutu’s rule was also by 





                                                 
16th Century. Today, the church is the institution with the strongest moral force and plays a key role in its social and 
even political life, when necessary (Kasongo, 1998) 
105 African Solidarity Party 
106 The compilation of all the pastoral letters in favour of democracy addressed to Mobutu openly was done by Abbe 
Pierre Gaise of the Catholic University of Uele in Isiro in Oriental Province. After exchanges with him in 2005, I 
was provided with a copy. 
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5.3 The Catholic Church and the struggle for democracy in Zaire 
 
 
What kind of protest agent has the church been? What were the characteristics of the protest and 
its ideology? Kasongo (1998) identifies two schools of thought about the church’s role in Zaire’s 
history, first as a facilitator of colonialism and then as an opportunistic member of the resistance 
forces to Mobutu’s rule. As a part of the Belgian colonial empire, he says the Church exploited 
Africans by destroying their cultural basis, forcing them to accept Christianity, pacifying them to 
pave the way for commercial and social exploitative practices that were actualized by the state and 
corporations (p.75). He went further to say that the church’s message of Christianization was 
another expression for the westernization of Africans. After independence and following its 
gradual Africanisation, the church struggled briefly to preserve its role and influence, both as a 
savior and educator of western ideas and culture. As its influence as an arm of colonialism 
diminished, its post-independence role turned it in to a people’s institution combating social 
injustice and preaching equality, respect for human rights and values. This enhanced its voice as a 
respected institution.  Kasongo’s criticism of the church is that it preached social justice only after 
independence (ibid). 
 
Following the institutionalization of one-party rule through the MPR in 1970 and the suppression 
of all dissent, the Catholic Church in Zaire remained the only voice of hope in the country. As was 
to be expected, the first sign of tensions between Mobutu and the Catholic Church emerged. 
Implementing his authetencité revolution (see chapter two), Mobutu banned Christian names 
considered as foreign and decreed that young Christian missionaries take part in MPR youth 
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activities. Led by Cardinal Joseph Malula, and inspired by the Catholic Theology of Liberation,107 
Catholic bishops became the powerful voice of dissent against the Mobutu regime (Personal 
Interviews with Abbe Pierre Gaise, Isiro, Oriental Province, DRC, 2005). The Catholic Church, 
according to Father Gaise, released several pastoral letters on the condition that Zairean society 
under Mobutu, would reflect a quiet but dignified resistance.108 
 
During the Authenticity Revolution, Mobutu replaced the image of Jesus in the church with his 
own and the Virgin Mary with his mother’s, Mama Yemo. Christian names were dropped for 
African names, Christian holidays suppressed and the John XXIII Episcopal Seminary, renowned 
as a training ground for future Catholic priests, closed down (Kasongo 1998, p. 75).109 Authenticité 
was the official ideology of the state under Mobutu from 1967 to 1990. Mobutu declared 
Authenticité as Zaire’s national ideology in 1967. The essence of it was the return to authentic 
African values (retour à l’authenticité) which was mainly symbolised by a non-European dress 
code. It was an effort to forge a national identity that could take precedence over regionalism 
and tribalism while coping with the exigencies of modernization.  
 
                                                 
107 The Catholic Theology of Liberation was born in Latin America in the 1960s and inspired by the revolutionary 
struggle in defence of the poor in society in Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua. It was also inspired by the Vatican II 
(1962-1965) which introduced doctrinal changes to the faith as well as defined what the church’s relation should be 
with the modern world. After Vatican II, liberation theology spread in Latin America. 
108 Abbe Gaise handed me a volume on the activities of the Catholic Church in Zaire since the Vatican II. Copies of 
some of the pastoral letters are in Appendix 9. 
109 More than 90% of Congolese people are Christians and half of them are of the Roman Catholic sect of Christianity. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo hosts Africa’s largest numbers of Christians in any one country. This makes the 
Catholic Church influential and respected by the Vatican. The Seminary has since the 1960s trained several priests 
who later became Bishops and Cardinals. The Christian faith is well implanted across the country with parishes 
everywhere from the equatorial forests to the shores of Lakes Tanganyika and Kivu. Their involvement in the pro-
democracy struggle, albeit in a dignified way, was difficult for Mobutu to tolerate although he carefully avoided 
clashing with the Church.   
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Despite the clergy’s initial support for authenticity, the first pastoral letter by Monsignor Bakole 
of Kananga in Kasai West Province cautioned against ‘idolizing humans’ which in itself was 
revolutionary in the civil society struggle (ibid, p.76). This was followed by another petition for 
respect for the dignity of human life, signed by 47 Bishops under the leadership of the Council of 
Bishops Chairman Monsignor Lusambo Ndamwize.110 Up to the end of the 1970s, protests were 
mainly doctrinal. In the 1980s, with economic and social conditions worsening, the Church became 
more political and radical. It began to raise questions about the absolutist nature of the Mobutu 
regime (Analysis of Personal Interviews and documents). In numerous pastoral letters, the mal 
Zairois or Zaire’s condition was the theme with the lack of democracy and human rights at the 
centre of the discourse. In the course of my research, I have had several meetings with political 
and social actors (2009-2010) including Archbishop Xavier Maroy of Bukavu who believed that 
the Church remained a credible source of inspiration for Congolese people and draws its power 
from the people’s confidence (Personal Interviews held between 2009-2010) 
 
In early 1990, with the increased voices of popular movements, Catholic bishops wrote one of the 
strongest letters ever to Mobutu condemning the socio-economic situation in Zaire and demanding 
improvements. According to Kasongo, when the Sovereign National Conference convened in 
1991, people turned to the Catholic Church for leadership. Despite this, the National Conference 
under the leadership of Monsignor Monsengwo did not successfully push through the aspirations 
of the Congolese people. It tried to satisfy pro-democracy forces and Mobutu at the same time and 
it was this careful walk that was much criticized (Lemarchand, 2009) ending in the loss of what 
                                                 
110 Leon Lesambo Ndamwiswe was the Bishop of Inongo in Bandundu and the National Episcopal Conference of 
Congo elected him to serve the body from 1970 to 1975 as its chairman. By virtue of this position, he was influential 
in petition by the 47 Bishops calling on Mobutu to respect the dignity of human life. 
139 
 
many considered an historic opportunity to midwife democratic change in Zaire (Personal 
Interviews with Stearns, 2012, Omasombo 2012).  
 
By the time Mobutu succeeded in breaking up the Sovereign National Conference in 1994, the 
Church, although still with a sense of moral authority in the country, had lost some of its influence 
due to its disinclination to face Mobutu head on. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) who 
attended the conference as a delegate, the conference faced numerous obstacles in August 1992, 
one year after it commenced its deliberations. At one point, it arrived at a compromise to appoint 
the historic opposition leader Tshisekedi Prime Minister to lead a two-year transition. In a series 
of frustrations and counter frustrations, delegates criticized the Chairman Monsignor Monsengwo 
for disallowing the presentation of a commission report on assassinations by Mobutu’s regime 
while his agents infiltrated the conference to frustrate Etienne Tshisekedi’s assumption of office 
as Prime Minister. As if this was not enough, on the night of 12 to 13 August, agents supporting 
the state firebombed the UDPS headquarters to provoke his militants into a fight to be used as an 
excuse to declare a state of emergency and close down the conference. This ploy failed and a vote 
was allowed in which Tsisekedi won 71% of the votes (ibid). Humiliated by popular will, Mobutu 
directly ordered Monsignor Monsengwo to close down the nationally popular conference which 
he did on 6 December 1992. According to former South Kivu Governor, police soon descended 
on the venue chasing delegates away in various directions (Didace Kaningini 2009). 
 
Monsignor Monsengwo, now Cardinal Monsengwo, was elected to lead the Sovereign National 
Conference for three reasons. First, the Church has the highest following and commands the 
unquestioned loyalty of 90% of the entire population who are Christians (of these 50% are 
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Catholics). Second, the church was implicated, with dignity, in the pro-democracy struggle and 
was aware of the demands of society on the Mobutu government. Given its leadership and image, 
it was believed it could confer legitimacy to any outcomes. Third, most agreed that the Church 
would be neutral (Personal Interview with Father Pierre Gaise, Isiro, Oriental Province, 2004). 
Monsignor Monsengwo was the Catholic Archbishop of Kisangani when named by President 
Mobutu to preside over the Sovereign National Conference in 1991, a time of agitation for 
democracy when Bishops had successfully led through national conferences in Brazzaville and 
Benin.  
 
While I served in Kisangani in 2005 where Monsengwo led the church for years, the mood had 
still not changed against the Catholic prelate, albeit tempered by the respect for his person and the 
institution he led (Personal Interviews with Professor Otemikongo Mandefu and Jean Pierre 
Makakaro respectively Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator of the National Elections 
Commission in Oriental Province, 2005). 
 
5.4 The role of the political opposition  
 
According to Afoaku (1999), the political opposition to Mobutu that matured in the 1990s at the 
height of the pro-democracy struggle in Zaire and across Africa lacked vision and responsibility 
which were factors that contributed to the collapse of the Sovereign National Conference. The 
Conference (1991-1993) was Zaire’s highest level of civil society engagement in the struggle for 
democracy. The process that led to its collapse partly reflected a serious failure of leadership, a 




In April 1990, Zaire’s dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko addressed the nation and informed them of the 
return to multi-party democracy. The Sovereign National Conference began constituted by 2000 
delegates from the internal opposition, political exiles and actors as well as representatives of the 
Mobutu regime. Prior to 1990, Zairean civil society had relentlessly engaged the Mobutu regime 
which had been entrenched due to support during the Cold War from the United States, Belgium 
and France as well as Britain and Apartheid South Africa. In 1980, 13 ruling MPR deputies left 
the government and by 1982 had created in the Union pour la Democracy and Progres Social, 
UDPS111, which had since been led by Etienne Tshisekedi, a former Justice Minister and insider 
of Mobutu’s entourage (Kisangani, 2012). Given its pedigree in the struggle for multiparty 
democracy, it was not surprising that that the UDPS was recognized at the Sovereign National 
Conference and Tshisekedi given a key role in the deliberations. Etienne Tshisekedi is widely 
considered as the historic icon of the struggle for democracy against Mobutu. After he and the 12 
other MPs wrote a 50-page letter to Mobutu demanding political reforms in 1980, Etienne 
Tshisekedi emerged as the leader of the democracy movement (Kasongo, 1998; Lemarchand, 
2009). In the 1980s, he led several marches and confrontations with security forces and at the 
height of Mobutu’s power from the early 1980s, according to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002), 
Tshisekedi’s image as the first opponent of the regime increased. By the time of Mobutu’s 
overthrow, Tshisekedi’s title as the leading opposition figure was undisputed in Zaire. 
 
On why the Sovereign National Conference collapsed in 1993, Afoaku (1999) provides an in-depth 
account of the role played by the political opposition. In an apt critique, he says that Zaire’s 
                                                 
111 Union for Democracy and Social Progress 
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political opposition, through its failures, proved the Cold War policy that a strong man (i.e. 
Mobutu) was the key to stability and unity in a multi-ethnic and divided country such as Zaire. 
Once the conference opened, it was faced with the task of defining its mandate, selecting its 
membership and establishing a new national agenda. The opposition failed to take full advantage 
of the post-Cold War situation and the growing international isolation of the Mobutu regime to 
effectively strip him of his power.  
 
When the various political parties and broader civil society members emerged under the banner of 
the Sacred Union (an amalgam of opposition parties and social actors) to push for eventual 
democratic change, divisions emerged leading to the lack of a unified programme. According to 
the Biringingwa, (Personal Interview, 2010), the Union Sacrée112  was a house of strange political 
bedfellows and contradictions. They were preoccupied, not with Mobutu, but with securing 
political appointments under the auspisces of the decadent regime while at the same time 
beckoning the global community to support their cause (Kasongo, 1998). 
 
After the merging of the High Council of the Republic with Mobutu’s National Assembly to create 
the so-called Haut Conseil de la Republique – Parlement de Transition (Parliament of the 
Transition),113 Mobutu moved on to seek to control it. For the opposition and civil society, it was 
a period of hope amid crisis. 
 
                                                 
112 Sacred Union 
113 The High Council of the Republic – Parliament of the Transition was established by the 2000 delegates attending 
the historic national conference. They invested themselves with the authority to elect a Prime Minister as well as the 
instrument of democratic transition. Delegates came from all the 11 regions of the country and included political 
exiles, party leaders, civil society, the political opposition, intellectuals, trade unions and students. 
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According to Afoaku, the pattern of rivalry and political opportunism which developed in the 
Sacred Union did not reflect the basic values of civil society that are essential to the institution of 
democracy. Suffice it also to state that two of the most important actors, Etienne Tshisekedi and 
Nguz Karl-I-Bond, carried historical baggage that undermined confidence in their actions 
(Personal Observations). Tshisekedi was a historic figure of contradictions. As Justice Minister in 
the 1960s, he drafted the One-Party State Constitution (see appendix 11) as Chairman of the MPR’s 
political division. Allowed to play a key role at the conference given his historic opposition to 
Mobutu, he disappointed many by not hesitating to accept appointments within the framework of 
a Mobutu controlled transitional government. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) who was a 
delegate, he was dismissed by Mobutu in 1991, adding to the tensions within the conference, but 
his credibility was already undermined. In 1995 Tshisekedi voted with Mobutists to hold 
presidential and parliamentary elections in July 1997 and to dismiss Monsignor Monsengwo as 
Chairman of the HCR-PT. Underlying this was a thirst for power by Tshisekedi as he had thought 
the arrangement would endear him to Mobutists who would support his quest for the Prime 
Ministership (Personal Observations and analysis of Personal Interviews). 
 
Another actor, Nguz Karl-I-Bond shared a similar background as Mobutu’s. He was the leader of 
the Katanga-based Unions des Federalistes et Republicaines Independants (UFERI) and 
Tsisekedi’s main rival in the Union Sacree. The Union of Federalists and Independent 
Republicans, UFERI, was a Katangan political party founded by Nguz Karl-I-Bond after the 1990 
unbanning of political parties in Zaire. UFERI was a truly chauvinistic party which appealed for 
the ethnic cleansing of Katanga to rid the region of Lubas from Kasai. The party was during Nguz’s 




After a relationship with Moise Tshombe during the Katangan secession of the 1960s, Nguz joined 
Mobutu’s government becoming Foreign Minister from 1972 to 1974, and in 1977 and Prime 
Minister in 1979. Exiled between 1981 and 1985, he published a book on Mobutu’s dictatorial 
tendencies calling him the incarnation of evil only to accept a presidential pardon and an 
ambassadorial post to Washington in 1986, becoming Foreign Minister and Prime Minister 
subsequently (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). During the SNC when Mobutu dismissed Tshisekedi 
against the wishes of the majority of those attending the conference in the Union Sacree, Nguz 
accepted to replace him when contacted by Mobutu. Nguz was thus dismissed from the Union 
Sacree. Mobutu named him Minister of State and Defence Minister after which he retaliated by 
suspending (though this would not be definitive) the SNC with Mobutu’s blessing in 1992 (ibid). 
Throughout my exchanges with civil society leaders in the eastern Congo, the mistrust among 
politicians has always been at the core of their arguments (Personal Observation). Nzongola-
Ntalaja referred to Nguz’s susceptibility to Mobutu’s manipulative actions as unadulterated 
opportunism. 
 
By 1994, ten parties had left the Union Sacree. Tensions between Tshisekedi and Nguz coming 
from two key geopolitical regions led to ethnic clashes and state supported attacks by Nguz’s 
Lunda kinsmen against Tshisekedi’s fellow Lubas in Katanga resulting in massacres and mass 
expulsions (Lemarchand, 2009). This was exactly what Mobutu intended and had by 1995 broken 
the back of the opposition with money, appointments and coercion. At one point, they started 
fighting for appointments from Mobutu who delivered as long as necessary to destroy hope in 
democracy in Zaire (Personal Observation). As a reflection of the divisions among the Congolese 
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political class and the manner in which Mobutu played them against one another, he appointed 10 
transitional governments between 1991 and 1997! Public confidence was at its lowest when the 
Sacred Union’s Leon Kengo wa Dondo, leader of a moderate faction of the opposition, the Union 
for the Republic and Democracy (Union pour la Republique el la Democratie, URD), was 
appointed transitional Prime Minister by Mobutu. Kengo, of a Polish father and a Tutsi (Ruanda-
Urundi) mother and was a strong ally of Mobutu having grown up in Equateur Province where 
they both hailed from. He was a very close to Mobutu with whom they discussed state matters in 
confidence for several years. He served in several capacities in Justice, Budget, parastatals and 
three times as Prime Minister (1982-1986, 1988-1990 and in 1994). He was Mobutu’s longest 
serving and most trusted Prime Minister. When he formed the Union for the Republic and 
Democracy after 1990, many observers believed he would always end up rejoining Mobutu, which 
he did in 1994 (Personal and Participant Observations). 
 
Despite attempts by radical elements within the Sacred Union to challenge Kengo's appointment, 
the opposition had become too weak to fend off the latest blow to its legitimacy, with a growing 
number of its leaders scrambling for appointments in the central government (Personal 
Observations). During a seminar I moderated in 2009 on the role of civil society (students) in the 
struggle for democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the students from the Bukavu’s state 
university (Universite Officielle de Bukavu) agreed amongst themselves that the pro-democracy 
movement since independence had been afflicted by political ambition, greed and lack of 




The situation deteriorated further as three Tshisekedi ministers joined Kengo's cabinet, while the 
fourth was helping to draft Kengo's speeches (Kasongo, 1998). The Parti Democrate et Social 
Chretien split when one of its leaders, Gustave Malumba Mbangula, accepted the post of Deputy 
Prime Minister / Interior Minister. Both Kengo and Mbangula were from Equateur and his 
abandonment of Tshisekedi a Kasai politician speaks of opportunism as well as regionalism and 
ethnicity (Personal Observation). The Democratic Christian Party was formed after 1990 when 
political party activity was unbanned in Zaire. Jose Endundo and Gustave Malumba Mbangula 
were its leaders. The party split during the SNC when Mbangula left to serve in Kengo’s cabinet 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). 
 
Most deputies from the civil society ended their eleven-week parliamentary boycott, and their 
former leader, Bahati Lukwebo, accepted the Budget Ministry. By the time Mobutu dispersed the 
conference, only the trade unions stuck with the radical opposition. By late 1996, the Sacred Union 
was clearly in disarray and the struggle for democracy had lost momentum. Without the rebel 
invasion led by Laurent Desire Kabila supported by Rwanda and Uganda, Mobutu might not have 




5.5 The student struggle for democracy 
 
The student movement in the struggle for democracy is as old as the Congolese University. The 
first Catholic University of Louvanium (now the University of Kinsahsa) was established in 1954. 
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Lubumbashi University was established in 1956 and Kisangani University in 1963. Thus, two of 
Congo’s first three universities predated independence. On the university campuses, students have 
always been interested in pursuing issues that directly affect their welfare which are never 
completely disconnected from the struggle for the sound management of the country. In the 1960s, 
students demanded the democratization of governance in all universities and technical institutes, 
the decolonisation and Africanisation of the curriculum and better living conditions and studying 
conditions for all students (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, p.174). 
 
The first major student strike was at the University of Kinshasa in 1964. It was a struggle between 
the students’ democratic ideal and the reported authoritarianism of the establishment and the 
students accused the expatriate staff of acting in a patronizing, neocolonialist and racist manner. 
When Mobutu attempted to revamp the education system, the Union Generale des Etudiants du 
Congo (UGEC) and the Association Generale des Etudiants de Louvanium,114 initially formed 
after independence115 to advance the welfare of students, reacted. The students wanted to distance 
themselves from Mobutu and his political control in an era of fervent African nationalism, and 
only three years after Patrice Lumumba’s murder. Relations soured after Mobutu created the MPR 
and began to exert total control over society. Mobutu’s attempts to rewrite history by putting 
himself on the side of Patrice Lumumba provoked an angry backlash from students. For instance, 
on the occasion of US Vice President Hubert Humphrey’s visit to Kinshasa in 1964, Mobutu chose 
4 January, Heroes Day in Zaire, to visit Patrice Lumumba’s monument in the capital. Louvanium 
students of UGEC organized a demonstration against “the profanation” of the monument by those 
who killed Lumumba (Personal Interview with Omasombo, 2012). The demonstration was deeply 
                                                 
114 General Union of CONGOLESE Students and General Association of Louvanium University Students 
115 Exact date is not known 
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humiliating for Mobutu as it was in the presence of the US delegation. In February 1968, UGEC 
President Nkanza Dolumingu and other student leaders were arrested and student activism was 
banned by the MPR. Up to the 1969 massacre of students, Mobutu did not succeed in containing 
student dissent. He later opted for cooptation. Mobutu was always successful in co-opting his 
adversaries. As early as this time, some student leaders were won over with appointments. Student 
leader Dolumingu was banished for 12 years to his place of origin and later, after having been 
crushed morally, joined Mobutu’s government. (Nzongola-Ntalaja, p.177). Others were UGEC 
interim leader from 1962 and 1963, Joseph N’singa Udjuu, who served in top MPR positions as 
well as Prime Minister Henri Takizala, UGEC’s first President who served in cabinet and was also 
a Governor (Kasongo, 1998). A third was Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda who served as 
international affairs secretary from 1963 to 1966 and 30 years later was in Mobutu’s government 
as Foreign Minister (ibid). 
 
After banning student union activities, the students were convinced of Mobutu’s determination to 
consolidate state power. During the university crises of 1967 and 1968, over fees and the 
registration of the student organization, the government sided with the administration. Amid the 
confusion, students suspected that the administration wanted to use the strikes to expel student 
leaders. On 4 June 1969, students gathered to peacefully demonstrate in favour of social and 
academic improvements. They broke through police blockades and came face to face with the 
army who first used tear gas, then opened fire killing 60 students (Lemarchand, 2009).  
 
The effect of this massacre silenced dissent leaving the field of protest quiet until 1990 when the 
Cold War ended and multiparty politics re-emerged. While the voice of students, the church and 
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civil society was crucial to continuing protests, it was only the might of neighbouring armies that 
could end Mobutu’s rule, and this they did. This would not, however, have been possible without 
the historical momentum that had already been created. 
 
5.6 The role of external forces 
 
External forces played a crucial role in the struggle for democracy in Zaire and the eventual 
removal of Mobutu from power. From the invasions from Angola in 1977 and 1978 by the Front 
pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo discussed in this study to the post-Cold War situation and 
regional conflict dynamics, the fight for democracy in Zaire took many forms. After the 1969 
massacre of students, the main opposition to Mobutu came from outside the country. Another way 
of opposing Mobutu was through conferences and manifestoes by former allies or patriotic 
Congolese who yearned for change (Kasongo, 1998). 
 
The loudest voice against the Mobutu regime was Nguz Karl-I-Bond, a relative of Moise Tshombe 
from Katanga who served Mobutu as Foreign Minister in 1972 and Prime Minister in 1980 
(discussed above).  
 
Other forces included the Mouvement d’Action pour la Ressurection du Congo (MARC)116 formed 
by two former JMPR (MPR youth) members Kayonga Mobatelli and Ali Kalonga. According to 
Nzongola-Ntalaja, their failure stemmed from the penchant for attacks against Mobutu and his 
family rather than, for many, a deeper intellectual or ideological analysis of structures and 
                                                 
116 Action Movement for the Resurrection of the Congo, a minor party that fell by the wayside of the struggle. 
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institutional functioning, materialistic diagnosis of society’s ills with revolutionary prescriptions. 
Additionally, the MARC’s sensationalist opposition made them open to accept anyone and it soon 
became a forum for all. 
 
The Front du Liberation Nationale du Congo (FLNC)117 was perhaps the most action oriented as 
it made history when it launched the Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978  (Personal Interview with 
DRC 10 Military Region Commander General Tshikwej Nawej in Bukavu in 2007). It 
distinguished itself from all externally based groups because it waged an armed struggle. It should 
however be emphasized, as noted by Kisangani (2012), that whereas most externally based 
political groups were in the Belgium and other European countries (which did not show any intent 
of helping to overthrow Mobutu), the FLNC was based in and allowed by Angola to attack Zaire. 
Mobutu’s archenemy that was the MPLA government deeply craved Mobutu’s overthrow as 
punishment for his support for Angolan rebels UNITA. This personal observation is shared by 
Turner (2007). The FLNC was mainly composed of Congolese refugees and especially of younger 
remnants of Tshombe’s Gendarmes118 after the Katangan rebellion of the 1960s ended. To their 
ranks were added recently exiled victims of Mobutu’s repressive actions in Katanga in the 1970s 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). Earlier used by Tshombe in the fight against pro-Lumumba rebels when 
he served as a Prime Minister of Mobutu, they were abandoned to their fate after Tshombe’s fall. 
Leading this group was a Nathaniel Mbumba, a former Katangan Police Commissioner under 
                                                 
117 The Congolese National Liberation Front was formed by the former Katangese Gendarmes of Moise Tshombe 
around 1975 to return to Katanga and destabilize Mobutu’s regime. Angola supported the FLNC and knew of the 1977 
and 1978 invasions that were foiled with support from the United States and France. 
118 During Katanga’s failed secession from the Congo in 1960, its leader Moise Tshombe created a force that 
functioned as a militia and army and were referred to as Gendarmes who stood up to the government forces of Patrice 
Lumumba and the United Nations. Many became mercenaries in the region and some went to Angola where they 
fought for the MPLA. 
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Tshombe (ibid). As I have earlier discussed, the failure of FLNC was a result of external 
intervention by Belgium and the United States and France. 
 
5.6.1 End of the Cold War and the overthrow of Mobutu 
 
After the Cold War ended, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and 
Western Europe no longer felt threatened by the spread of international Communism (Fukuyama, 
1989) and therefore adjusted their foreign policy approach of ignoring or tolerating dictators who 
were allied to them. The new order preached democracy and human rights which, according to 
Afoaku (1999), led to the proliferation of pro-democracy groups in the Congo.  
 
Confidence and hope in developments from across Africa following the end of the Cold War were 
an important impetus to the movement for multi-party democracy in Mobutu’s Zaire after 1990. 
Demonstrations in Senegal in 1988-1989, national conferences in Benin (1990), Niger (1991), 
Congo-Brazzaville (1991) and Mali (1991), and the end of long reigning regimes in Menguistu’s 
Ethiopia (1991), Kaunda’s Zambia (1991) all corroborated this. The period was marked by 
sympathetic support for change and democracy from Western governments and NGO’s. 
Protagonists of African pro-democracy groups visited or took refuge in the United States, Belgium, 
and France and with this foreign support, they organized public symposia, marches and distributed 
messages to rally the diaspora and subsequently influenced events within Zaire in favour of 
change.119 Lemarchand (2009), Turner (2007) and Reed (2001) have discussed this in detail in 
                                                 
119 The impetus given to the pro-democracy movement was the logical consequence of the end of the Cold War ,as 
confirmed through the analysis of several interviews conducted for this study. 
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their work on the 1997 AFDL120 invasion that led to Mobutu’s overthrow. Zaire’s pro-democracy 
forces could however not transform the opportunities into successful change. Owing to their 
performance throughout the Sovereign National Conference, they could not convince the United 
States, Belgium and France to push Mobutu from power. According to Didace Kaningini, 
Mobutu’s regime was a hollow shell and all that was necessary was a sense of purpose during the 
Sovereign National Conference to remove Mobutu, but this failed and this did not happen 
(Personal Interview, 2009). 
 
It was the Rwandan genocide of 1994 that was to change the history of Zaire through a series of 
consequences resulting in a rebel coalition that removed Mobutu from power. It all started with 
the Rwandan genocide of 1994 when hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were killed by Hutu 
extremists supporting the collapsing Hutu regime, and who subsequently fled into neighbouring 
eastern Congo (just before Tutsi rebels of the Rwanda Patriotic Front seized power in Kigali). As 
discussed earlier, two years of tensions between the new Tutsi-led regime and Mobutu’s Zaire, 
which made no secret of its opposition to Kigali, matters came to a head when Mobutu allowed 
direct attacks into Rwanda from Zaire by Hutu rebels (Reed, 1998). When Rwanda and Uganda 
organized the invasion and overthrow of Mobutu in 1996, Angola gave support for the advancing 
Alliance of Democratic Forces Rebels happy at the occasion to exert revenge on Mobutu, UNITA’s 
godfather and Angola’s Cold War enemy for decades (Personal Observation).121  
                                                 
120 The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo led by Laurent Desire Kabila was a loose 
coalition of Congolese rebel groups put together with the support of Rwanda and Uganda to forcefully remove 
Mobutu from power. 
121 During the Cold War, Mobutu was an indispensable ally of the Western powers and multinational companies that 
supported UNITA which pitched him as Angola’s fervent enemy. Angola’s Marxist regime was in the vanguard 
struggle for African liberation in its earlier days under Agotinho Neto and Mobutu, a Cold War client state whose 
power was assured by his collaboration with policies against nationalist regimes. UNITA was a proxy instrument of 
South Africa and the West at the time and therefore an inevitable ally of Mobutu. For decades, Zaire’s territory was 






I have demonstrated the weakness of the civil society actors in the Congo owing to several factors, 
not least of which is the absence of cohesion emanating from the post-colonial state’s inheritance. 
Much of the problems that afflicted civil society in the Congo related to its fractured nature and its 
relatively young age and lack of experience, Mobutu’s repression during the Cold War and the 
greed of Congo’s political leaders.  I have demonstrated how the collective resolve and 
commitment by Congolese civil society, through their disparate but combined actions, constituted 
the pressures from the 1970s and 1980s leading to the Sovereign National Conference of 1991. 
Civil society in the DRC lacks a common identity and an awareness of itself. It does not yet have 
a sufficiently developed collective consciousness. Political parties are led by ambitious politicians 
whose interests do not include a vision to entrench the key elements of a functioning democracy. 
This, I argue, is made clear by the role political parties, leaders and politicians played to undermine 
and subsequently frustrate the aspirations of the Sovereign National Conference.  
 
In the next chapter, I discuss the issues and the alternatives with regard to the reconstruction of the 
state in the DRC today. 
 
 
                                                 
powers. Apartheid South Africa’s interest has always been to fight African nationalism which was opposed to 
European settlers in southern Africa and thus the reason why the regime in Pretoria destabilized Front Line States 
such as Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique in the 1970s and 1980s though the policy of Total Strategy. In 1997, the 
government in Luanda saw in the invasion by the AFDL an opportunity to destroy UNITA bases in Zaire and to take 









State Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo:  
 






State reconstruction can be defined conceptually as a process that rejuvenates institutional 
mechanisms to give effect to policy, to legitimize institutional power, and to establish social trust, 
effectively returning the state to the centre of social life (Khadiagala in Zartman ed., 1995, p.38). 
Reconstruction is indeed a priority in the DRC. The state should be restored and reinvented to be 
legitimate. Institutions could be restored through good governance and visionary leadership. The 
DRC needs to be restored fully to a functioning and effective state. The United Nations role 
currently122 supports efforts to restore state authority, to implement reforms of the security sector, 
support to properly regulate the country’s mineral resources sector and to ensure the security of its 
borders. It is supporting various humanitarian interventions, reform of the justice system and the 
rejuvenation of civil society, as an essential component of democratic governance.  
 
While these priorities are fully supported by the international community, the onus is on the DRC 
and its future leaders to pay attention to some of the key issues that I have raised in this study. 
These include the crises of legitimacy, governance, leadership, the curse of minerals and identity. 
I have identified the key issues that emerged from this study and discussed them. The resolution 
of these issues is fundamental to the restoration of the DRC as a strong and effective state, to 
                                                 
122 The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) 
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national reorganization and to stability. I have also identified, among a series of alternatives, the 
unitary and federal systems as institutional options and have opted for the latter with an emphasis 
upon decentralization. I claim that functionalist economic integration in the Great Lakes region 
can enhance stability. 
 
 
6.2 The Issues 
 
Part I:  
 
6.2.1  Legitimacy 
 
The issue of legitimacy in the DRC can be discussed by first putting historical legitimacy and 
political legitimacy in to their proper context. Historical legitimacy refers to the state’s generally 
accepted historical foundations while political legitimacy relates to how political power is acquired 
and maintained. Political legitimacy has been a problem in the DRC because both Mobutu and 
Laurent Desiré Kabila came to power through armed force and although Joseph Kabila was 
elected, in 2006, in was in controversial elections. This was the first democratic election in 46 
years. If the will of the people is considered as the basis for governmental authority and legitimacy, 
a lack of an elected government, controversial elections and the usurpation of power by armed 
force has been the DRC’s undoing. Seventeen civil wars, political assassinations, rebellions and 
violent challenges to state authority is the logical consequence of dictatorship, repression and 
restriction of the democratic space. A lack of legitimacy poses serious challenges to the state, 
engenders corruption and the mismanagement of resources, and facilitates conspiracies, ethnic 




Political appointments across the DRC are balanced to ensure ethnic representation (Analysis of 
Personal Observations). For example, it is a typical scenario in the DRC for the Governor in 
Lubumbashi to be Lunda, in Bukavu to be Bashi and in North Kivu to be Nande. Once appointed 
the office becomes a vehicle of patronage, nepotism and cronyism (Personal Observations). This 
arrangement also caters for the second biggest ethnic group to be the second in charge in each 
region, an ethnic balancing act that secures access to resources for the group. In many instances, 
the removal of one actor, regardless of his or her crime, has brought operations in the province 
literally to a halt until s/he was reinstated or replaced by a fellow kinsman from the same ethnic 
grouping. Thus, when the state is fragile and lacks historical legitimacy, informal networks and 
informal institutions and agreements come to dominate and define the political landscape. The 
problem of legitimacy is central to the African state as the key mechanism to ensure that conflicts 
will be abated.  
 
There is no historic continuity that links society and the formal institutions of the state. Formal 
institutions preside over an amalgam of divided groupings which pushes leaders to create networks 
of political support across ‘nations’ within the territory. They respond rationally and in accordance 
with expectations to the historical constraints they have inherited, and this leads to governance 
failures. 
 
Owing to the problems associated with historical legitimacy, regimes in Africa struggle and 
frequently collapse under the weight of excessive spending on potential spoilers and ethno-
regional challengers. This was clearly seen in Mobutu’s nationalization and patronage policies. It 
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was not surprising that Mobutu himself claimed that he was betrayed.123 Managing the state in the 
past 60 years has not worked. Dictatorship, party-state system, Afro-Marxist regimes, capitalist 
single party dictatorships, revolutionary regimes, military rule, have all come and gone but the 
situation in Africa has not improved. The problem is the state itself, which stands at the centre of 
all crises. It lacks legitimacy and it is challenged. These challenges take different forms but they 
are visible as crisis and conflict. 
 
6.2.2 Leadership  
 
Bennis (2003) says that leadership comes from a combination of factors, the most important of 
which is learning and experience from the external environment. Debunking the “myth” that 
leadership is genetically sanctioned, he says leaders are made (Bennis, 2003). Quoting Lao Tzu, 
Bennis says a leader is best at what s/he is when people barely know s/he exists, when his or her 
work is done, his or her aim is fulfilled, and people say we did it ourselves. This he claims is 
leadership at its best, a leadership that inspires. During crisis situations, and in the absence of 
strong state institutions, inspirational leadership is important. It is critical for people to believe in 
and trust their leader, to be ready to act on his or her behalf to execute and implement programmers. 
Although s/he leads, people take a prominant role and s/he leads from behind. Leading from behind 
is one paradox of leadership. 
 
Another paradox is that a leader listens to those s/he leads, takes inspiration from them and follows 
their aspirations. By listening, we gain respect from those with whom we interact, allowing us to 
                                                 
123 Public address in Kinshasa to Zairean citizens by President Mobutu on 24 April 1990, on the unbanning of 
political parties and the return to multiparty democracy. 
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be listened to when we most need it. Edmonson (1999) speaks of fourteen leadership paradoxes 
including listening when leading, strength in situations of vulnerability, unsatisfied even when 
achieving, strength in weakness, and the provision of service rather than domination. Edmondson’s 
categories of leadership, as fundamental to success, have been lacking in the DRC since 
independence. Rather than a leadership that has demonstrated the capacity to lead, the DRC’s 
leaders have dragged the country into crisis and instability as a consequence of their own ambition.  
 
6.2.3  Governance 
 
Good Governance refers to the ways in which national leaders and institutions function to manage 
public resources and promote long-term sustainable development that is in the public interest. For 
the United Nations, it is the ways in which public institutions conduct public affairs and manage 
public resources.124 According to the IMF (2009), promoting good governance in all its aspects 
includes ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, 
and tackling corruption as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper. 
So committed is the IMF to the principles of good governance that they have - over many years- 
constituted them as preconditions for aid to developing countries. For the United Nations (2009), 
good governance has eight characteristics. These are, namely, consensus, participation, the rule of 
law, accountability, efficient and effective management, transparency, responsiveness and 
inclusiveness. Agere (2000) identifies three sets of institutions in a country that can be reformed 
to promote good governance. These are the state, the private sector and civil society.  
 
                                                 
124 UNESCAP 2009. What is good governance? 
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That the DRC needs a governance agenda cannot be over emphasized. For thirty-two years, the 
country was ruled as a dictatorship under Mobutu. He stifled the press, basic freedoms and the 
most basic features of a democratic environment. Vibrant party or trade union activism was 
uncommon. Under the Kabilas the situation was more or less the same. The magnitude of the 
problem of governance failure was so ingrained in the DRC that it was common to hear of the 
cliché “starting from scratch” from even ordinary people during the United Nations-supported 
post-conflict transition from 2003 to 2006 (Participant Observation).  
 
Hyden (1992) says governance is the conscious management of regime structures with a view to 
enhancing the public realm. When in 1989 the World Bank spoke of a crisis of governance in 
Africa, it was concerned about the collapse of regime structures in the midst of the extensive 
personalization of power, the denial of fundamental human rights, widespread corruption and 
unelected, unaccountable governments (Hyden ed. 1992, p.5). Twenty three years since Hyden 
made these comments in 1992, the contemporary challenge is how to restore a civic public realm 
in the DRC based on the four pillars of governance. These are namely authority, reciprocity, trust 
and accountability.  
 
6.2.4  The curse of minerals  
 
No study on conflicts in the DRC could be complete without a consideration of the theme of the 
country’s mineral resources. The DRC is attractive to study because, in part, of its vast strategic 
resource base which creates the extensive external interest of both capital and foreign 
governments. Although minerals are usually considered a blessing for all countries endowed with 
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them, in the case of conflict-ridden countries in Africa, they are instead a curse. This is for three 
key reasons. First, there is usually violent competition for access to these resources and/or to the 
state which controls them. Second, in spite of an endowment of resources, these countries are 
poorer as they cannot, as a result of conflict and mismanagement, transform their potential wealth 
into development opportunities – the paradox of poverty amid plenty. Third, such countries 
frequently and excessively rely upon the extraction of the mineral respurces that they are endowed 
with to the detriment of developing other productive sectors of the economy. This perpetuates 
dependence, commonly referred to as the Dutch Disease.125 It affects the state when depletion sets 
in or when prices fluctuate, which they commonly do in the markets for raw materials. Moreover 
it creates a path dependency. This means such countries are never stable. 
 
I outlined in chapter one how advanced health facilities were in the Congo at independence. 
According to Kisangani (2012) the country was the most industrialised territory on the continent 
after Apartheid South Africa in 1960. However, half a century after independence, one of Africa’s 
richest countries in terms of strategic minerals is one of its poorest. Judged in these terms, the 
“curse of minerals” metaphor is appropriate. Well before the Belgian colonization of the Congo in 
                                                 
125 In economic development discourse, the Dutch Disease has come to refer to the phenomenon of focusing on 
natural resource extraction to the extent of neglecting or abandoning other sectors of the economy, such as 
agriculture, that are productive or that have the potential to be productive. In well-resourced African countries such 
as Angola, Nigeria and the DRC, too much attention to the flow of revenue and high and unplanned spending results 
in unplanned management at the expense of sound economic policies for future resilience and sustainable 
development. The lure into such a situation has been enhanced over the decades by the increased demand for oil and 
minerals, war and instability in the Middle East, the increase in oil prices, and the appreciation of the United States 
dollar, the international exchange currency. The term was first used by The Economist in an article entitled The 
Dutch Disease (p82-83) describing the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of 
the large Groningen natural gas field in 1959 (see http://en.wiki/Dutch_disease#cite_note-2). The following articles 
are important in their discussion of the problem namely 1) Booming Sector and de-industrialisation in a small open 
economy reported in the Economic Journal no. 92 (December 1992)  p.825-848 by Corden WM Neary JP and 2) 
Back to Basics-Dutch Disease:Too much wealth managed unwisely written by Ebrahim-Zadeh, Christine (March 
2003). In the article, Ebrahim-Zadeh states that although the Dutch disease is generally associated with a natural 
resource discovery, it can occur from any development that results in a large inflow of foreign currency, including a 
sharp surge in natural resources prices, foreign assistance and foreign direct investment. 
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the early 20th century, 10 million people died in King Leopold II’s late 19th century rubber loot of 
genocidal proportions (Hochschild, 1998).  
 
After independence, the Congo’s fame grew over its zinc, manganese, uranium, niobium, copper, 
cobalt, cadmium, cassiterite as well as its holding of 80% of the world’s known Coltan reserves 
(Lemarchand, 2009). This rendered the country a Cold War attraction. The United States and allied 
countries such as France, Belgium and the United Kingdom ensured that the country under Mobutu 
remained a captured State regardless of the negative consequences of Mobutu’s disastrous rule. 
Throughout the Cold War, the Congo provided strategic minerals to the US, Belgium and France, 
among other Western countries, while politicians within the country competed for control over 
resources and political power. The war of 1998-2002 when Rwanda and Uganda invaded the 
country precipitating the regional war that sucked in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola was not at 
first (when the first two countries attacked) motivated by the quest for minerals. However, all 
countries subsequently became embroiled in the mineral rush, thus prolonging Africa’s worst 
humanitarian tragedy ever. 
 
Since independence, the economy of the country has been based on rent from the exploitation and 
mining of minerals which encouraged the country’s political elites to loot the national treasury at 
the expense of sustainable human development. For instance, almost 40% of Congo’s national 
revenues accrued to Mobutu and his cronies in the late 1980s (Wrong, 2000). I have shown how 
several reports by the United Nations exposed the pillaging, looting and illegal export of the 
Congo’s mineral resources during the 1998-2003 war. This included the actions of foreign 
interests. According to Lemarchand (2009), ‘Western economic interests were deeply involved in 
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the conflict through direct or indirect roles in the illicit trade in mineral resources’ (Lemarchand 
2009, p.5). Lemarchand further names the Economic Section of the US embassy in Kigali as being 
very active at the beginning of the war in helping establish joint ventures to exploit coltan. 
 
The prolonged suffering of the Congolese people between 1998 and 2003 when the war raged was 
heightened because of illegal business networks, headquartered in foreign countries where the 
Congo’s mineral resources were cheaply sold and processed, that had stakes in the chaotic 
situation. During the war, it was not only the main warring groups that looted mineral resources. 
The Rwandan FDLR/Interahamwe also massively exploited coltan resources. In South Kivu, they 
mined in seven of the eight territories of the Province and in North Kivu in Masisi, Walikale and 
Rutshuru (see appendix 13). During the period from 1997 to 2010, armed groups in the DRC 
deviated from their original goals and focused on the wealth and riches in Itiri, Oriental Province, 
South and North Kivu and Katanga. The FDLR, Mayi Mayi, the ADF/NALU, the ex-RCD and the 
FARDC illegally exploited minerals in areas under their control where they also committed 
widespread atrocities (Personal Observations from my reports as a Political Officer in South Kivu 
Province between 2008 and 2010). .   
 
The crisis of independence was partly the result of a conspiracy for control over mineral-rich 
Katanga province. This Cold War conspiracy led to three decades of control, dictatorship and 
misrule while the Congo served the purposes of the United States, France, Belgium and other 
Western allies. During the 1997-2003 wars, minerals played the determinant role in prolonging the 
humanitarian tragedy that befell the Congo. The civil conflicts in Ituri and the seemingly unending 
challenges to the restoration of State by armed groups in North Kivu, South Kivu and Katanga 
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were influenced by the struggle for control over mineral rich zones. The unending conflicts in the 
Congo had by 2010 clearly become a function of the struggle over resources. 
 
Evidently, the presence of minerals should have been emancipator. But instead, as in most African 
countries, it has been a curse. Instead of being the impetus to social and economic transformation, 
mineral resources have intensified the struggle for State power, fuelled rebellions and increased 
foreign involvement and interference adding to chaos, instability and underdevelopment.  
 
6.2.5 The identity crisis in the eastern Congo 
 
On citizenship and the national question, I have chosen to focus primarily in this discussion on the 
Congo-Tutsi/Rwandophone crisis which is the predominant citizenship crisis in the DRC. 
Generally, Rwandophones in the east of the country are frequently accused of being more loyal to 
Rwanda, a perceived or real enemy of the country depending on whom one speaks to (Personal 
Interviews).  
 
Manasse Ruhimbika, founder of the Front des Republicains Federalistes, a Banyamulenge Tutsi 
Politico-Military organization created to resist what he called Rwandan manipulation of Congolese 
Tutsi (especially during the 1998-2002 war) maintains in his Les Banyamulenge (Congo-Zaire) 
entre deux guerres (2001) that the question of Tutsi recognition in the Congo lies at the heart of 
the crisis in the east of the country. He has made frequent reference to discrimination, humiliation 
and the closing of job opportunities to Tutsis in South Kivu and North Katanga where he lived and 
studied for years. In a personal interview with a Tutsi South Kivu regional Minister in Bukavu, it 
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was indicated to me that Tutsis were despised for their entrepreneurship, ownership of land and 
capital in eastern Congo and this perception and scapegoating was at the origin of the problem, but 
had been exacerbated by the Rwandan Tutsi-led invasion of the Congo between 1998 and 2003 
(Personal Interview with Kamanzi, 2007).  
 
In order to historically contextualize the problem it would be suffice to state that after decades of 
struggle by Tutsis for recognition, events in Burundi from 1993 and Rwanda after the 1994 
genocide changed the power dynamics of the region with far reaching consequences. I have already 
outlined how this last genocide of the 20th century changed the dynamics of power in the region, 
led to the invasion of the Congo and worsened a situation that was already out of control in the 
eastern Congo during the dying years of Mobutu’s regime. The Banyamulenge Tutsis of South 
Kivu Province in the eastern Congo led the Rwanda-backed rebellion of Laurent Desire Kabila in 
1997 in the hope of obtaining national recognition for Tutsis by the central government in 
Kinshasa.126 
 
The crisis of identity in the eastern Congo is integral to understanding unending instability in the 
area and must be treated as separate from Rwandan interests. While it is true that Rwanda has 
sought to influence and possibly use aggrieved Congolese Tutsis whose broader substantive 
citizenship rights have been threatened as Trojan Horses in schemes against the country127, 
Congolese Tutsis rebelliousness is fundamentally a result of frustration from rejection by their 
compatriots. It should also be noted that many Tutsi politicians did not necessarily support Tutsi 
                                                 
126 It will be recalled in the dissertation that during the Sovereign National Conference of 1991-1994, MPs had voted 
to expel Tutsis of South Kivu from the DRC. 
127 Examples being the RCD invasion of 1998 using aggrieved Tutsis denied of Congolese nationality and the 
attempt in 2001 to influence Tutsis of Minembwe in South Kivu to rally to the side of the Rwanda occupation. 
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General Laurent Nkunda’s rebellion in 2007-2009 and nor do they accept Rwandan designs even 
though they shared some understanding of Tutsi frustrations (Ebenezer 2009; Masunzu 2009, 
Ruhorimbere 2008 and Asoni 2009). Mamdani (2001) uses Huntington’s kin-country syndrome 
analysis to demonstrate this point. Most ordinary Tutsis however, simply want to live and carry 
out their daily chores in peace and nothing more. The educated or powerful Tutsi actors however 
have used the strong position of Rwanda as a regional military power to pressure the Congo in 
their struggle for acceptance or power. From my participant observation in the eastern Congo over 
a four-year period (2006-2010), it became clear that Tutsi leaders are split on the question of 
Rwanda. While some believe they should fully supportive of the Congo as Congolese citizens, 
others prefer leaving their options open as a form of pressure on the Congo (Participant 
Observations). According to Muller, after South and North Kivu delegates to the National 
Conference in 1995 demonstrated their determination to expel Tutsis from Congolese soil 
altogether, most Banyamulenge Tutsis arrived at only one conclusion - leave the country or fight 
for their birth right (Ruhimbika, Muller Manasse, 2001). 
 
The nationality question remains a core aspect and reason for instability in the eastern Congo. The 
purported resolution of the problem by the 2006 Constitution which confers nationality on them, 
is still only begrudgingly accepted by many Congolese people. Even when the new Constitution 
was promulgated, passions were still high as a constitutional framework was not a sufficient 
guarantee for acceptance. Many made reference to the distinction between Mamdani’s (2001) 
ethnic and civic citizenship as they sought to accept Tutsis as “acceptable constitutional citizens” 
(Philemon, 2009). More interesting is the willingness among Congolese people to allow dual 
citizenship for Congolese people that have immigrated from Belgium and other parts of the world 
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while simultaneously not allowing Tutsis to show social, political or even economic links to 
Rwanda (Ebenezer, 2009). In spite of the ban on dual citizenship by the Congolese Constitution, 
a moratorium is still in place owing to elite interests - many Congolese politicians with Belgian or 
other European nationality have realized that the clause against double nationality affects them 
much as it does Tutsis. During the period I served in South Kivu province as a Political Affairs 
Officer (2006-2010), there were continuous reports of authorities in Kinshasa wanting to apply the 
clause on citizenship only with regard to Tutsis and Rwanda (Participant Observations; United 
Nations South Kivu Reports 2007; Personal Interview with Mululu 2014).  
 
While many Tutsis in the eastern Congo refused to be manipulated by Rwanda, the widespread 
impression has continued to be that all Tutsis harboured pro-Rwanda loyalties. When the M23 
Tutsi rebellion in North Kivu against the DRC erupted in 2010, General Masunzu, Tutsi Congolese 
loyalist and commander of the 10 military region in South Kivu stood by the Congolese authorities 
as much as the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu province (Participant Observation). At 
the end of the transition which concluded the regional war involving Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe 
and Angola, it was envisaged that the elected government of Joseph Kabila would boldly address 
the questions regarding the citizenship status of Tutsis of the eastern Congo. Up to this time, most 
Tutsi officers of the Congolese integrated army refused to be deployed to the west of the country 
for fear of being attacked or killed (Personal Interview with Asoni, 2008; Stearns 2011). On 23 
March 2009, the government signed an accord with the then rebel of General Laurent Nkunda 
(Tutsi leader of the National Council for the Defence of the People) to end the rebellion and 
integrate Tutsi officers into the national army. Three years later, the Tutsi soldiers revolted and 
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formed the M23 (named after the March 23 agreement with the government) and resumed fighting 
against the government. 
 
The Congolese civil society chapter of the province acknowledged the position of the 
Banyamulenge leaders and fought to relay the message of refusal to bandwagon to the rebellion 
(Personal Interview with Mululu, 2014). Hitherto rebelling Tutsi officers such as Michel 
Rukunda128 even deployed troops to Bukavu’s airport to deter infiltration from North Kivu by the 
M23 rebels. During this time between 2009 and 2012, the South Kivu Governor Marcelin 
Chisambo129 and the Catholic Church under Maroy130 supported the Banyamulenge position 
(Personal Observation; South Kivu MONUSCO notes; Personal Interview with Mululu 2014).  
 
Although this was a significant development, Mululu agreed that the nationality question for Tutsis 
in the Congo remains a key issue that must be fully and finally and resolved to avert future 
conflicts. The generalized view of Tutsis as “non-Congolese” or disloyal to the state is a form of 
                                                 
128 Major Michel Rukunda is a Banyamulenge Tutsi commander and a leading actor in the South Kivu rebellion by 
Tutsi soldiers against the Kinshasa government’s efforts to extend state authority in the south of the province, 
(Minembwe and Kamombo areas). The origins of the rebellion can be traced from the 1998 Rwanda-backed 
invasion during which Kigali supported the mainly Tutsi-led Ressemblement Congolais pour la Democratie that was 
led by Azarias Ruberwa, a Tutsi himself. At the end of the war and the Rwandan withdrawal from the region, an 
uneasy cohabitation existed in the province between the Tutsi troops and the Congolese soldiers, determined to 
extend state authority, which led to frequent clashes and fighting. In 2004, Tutsi soldiers briefly seized Bukavu 
chasing the Congolese commander away. Remnants of the group and other deserting Tutsi soldiers later emerged in 
the Minembwe-Kamombo area as the Front Republicain Federalist demanding the establishment of a decentralized 
structure where Tutsis would be in charge of a territory. This has since been rejected by Kinshasa but the rebellion 
had continued until 2009 when they agreed to be integrated into the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique 
du Congo. (Participant Observation - I have reported on the FRF rebellion for more than two years during the period 
I served in South Kivu province). 
129 Marcellin Chisambo was the Governor of South Kivu province after the period served by Governor Leonce 
Muderhwa who left in 2010. He is a very close ally of President Joseph Kabila and is from South Kivu. 
130 The archbishop of Bukavu, Fracois Xavier Maroy, is known as a patient collaborator with the United Nations 
presence in the province. He is very accessible and exerts enormous moral authority in the province (participant 
Observation -. I have met him on behalf of my Head of Office on several occasions during periods of political 
tensions and crisis in the province). He has however periodically come under criticism for not controlling the 
statements of hardline priests opposed to concessions to Banyamulenge Tutsi demands. 
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negative othering, which causes exclusion, auto-exclusion and scapegoating and provides an 
opportunity for Rwanda to influence aggrieved Tutsis and interfere in the Congo. 
 
6.3   The Alternatives 
Part II 
6.3.1  Federalism or Unitarism for the DRC? 
 
To reflect over what system is best for the DRC as an alternative political system, I claim at the 
outset that the current unitary system has simply not worked. Since the promulgation of the 
Lualabourg Constitution of 1964, the Congolese authorities have to date continuously avoided any 
reforms that might lead to federalism. This is feared to be a prelude to secession by the regions 
that are substantially endowed with minerals (Personal Observation). This perception is not 
without cause. Historical experiences are perhaps responsible for this mindset. Having experienced 
secession crises in Katanga and Kasai in the 1960s, demands for administrative autonomy in Ituri 
in the 1990s, the arbitrary creation of the Minembwe territory for Banyamulenge Tutsis in 2002 
by the Rwandan occupation forces, and continued challenges to state authority in the Kivus and 
Bas Congo, the Congolese government (whilst arguably aware of the difficulty of running the huge 
country as a unitary state) are concerned about the potential of the country to break apart if 
federalism was introduced. The reluctance to implement decentralization, as enshrined in the 2006 
Constitution has its foundations in these historical experiences. There is however another 
dimension and explanation for the reluctance to adopt federalism: elite interests. In Katanga, for 
instance, the elite from the north of the province, both in the regional capital Lubumbashi and in 
Kinshasa, is fearful that decentralization or federalism will deprive them of financial and other 
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privileges and control over regional resources (Personal Interviews with Kinhasa-based elite 
between 2006 and 2010. These include the former Governor of South Kivu Province, Celestin 
Cibalonza). 
 
Examples abound of large countries that are well governed and that enshrine and protect regional 
rights and regional specificities amid policies that promote a commitment to national cohesion. 
What is obvious in the reluctance to pursue or explore a federalist path by the leadership of the 
government of the DRC is, in the words of Mululu (cited above), fear of losing control over the 
country through regional control of strategic resources and administration (Personal Interview with 
Mululu, 2014). In a discussion with students from the University of Kisangani during a seminar 
organized by the United Nations Mission regional office, participants from different disciplines 
and regions (such as Ituri, Kindu, Bukavu and even Kinshasa) said that they firmly believed that 
the DRC must always remain a unitary state to be best shielded from the threats of secession that 
could be precipitated by discussions on a federal option. (Participant Observations, Bukavu, South 
Kivu Province, DRC, July 2006). In Kasai Oriental earlier in 2005, I engaged members of the 
Congolese regional electoral commission about what system was best for the country. The 
response from all was direct: a unitary Congo, and always (Participant Observations). 
 
I agree with Mululu’s assertion that the design of the DRC should be one that takes into 
consideration the country’s history of attempted secessions, while at the same time respecting the 
country’s size and regional, national and cultural complexities. Many Congolese people are agreed 
that the country is too big to be unitary. Of the country’s eleven provinces, Equateur, Katanga and 
Oriental provinces are each larger than France. Equateur is mostly dense forests and its capital 
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Mbandaka is very distant from isolated areas. The same situation applies in the two other 
provinces, yet the 2006 Constitution, splitting the country into 26 provincettes,131 is still not 
implemented (Personal Observation).  
 
The decentralized system enshrined in the 2006 constitution was virtually a federal system without 
claiming it as such, which could have been an appropriate institutional system for the DRC as a 
consequence of its diversity. However, this could not have been implemented without genuine 
guarantees to nationalists and unitarists. What I thus propose for the DRC is neither unitarism nor 
federalism but, as enshrined in the 2006 Constitution, a strong presidential system with 
decentralization to allow both centre and periphery to develop while in a relationship that 
guarantees all powers. The earlier experiment during Mobutu’s rule to implement decentralization 
in stages beginning with the old Kivu province (now South Kivu, North Kivu and Kindu provinces) 
should be continued across the country. The breakup of the old Kivu Province has enhanced the 
development of Butembo and Beni, hitherto distant and neglected from the old Kivu Provincial 
capital of Bukavu (Personal Observation). These areas were able to profit over the past two decades 
from managing their own affairs and became regional business hubs. The 2006 constitution, if 
fully implemented, will lead to genuine decentralization within a strong state. 
 
                                                 
131 According to the 2006 Constitution, the country was to implement a decentralized structure with 26 smaller 
regions or provinces called provincettes in French. Of the entire country, the relatively small provinces of Bas 
Congo, Kindu, North Kivu and South Kivu would remain. The following large provinces would be split accordingly: 
Oriental Province would be broken up into Tshopo, Haut Uele, Bas Uele and Ituri, Katanga into Tanganyika, Haut 
Lomani, Lomani, Haut Katanga, Luluaba; Bandundu into Kwilu, Kwango and Mai Ndome; Equateur into North 
Ubangi, Sud Ubangi Mongala, Tshuapa and Equateur, South Kasai into Kasai Oriental, Lomani and Sankuru and 
West Kasai into Kasai-Luebo and Kasai Central-Kananga. The delay in implementing this constitutional provision 
to create 26 smaller provinces was out of concern that retroceding 40% of all revenues collected in each new 
province to that region when the central government was just emerging from a bitter an destructive war was unwise. 




6.3.2  Regional integration and stability- the need for collective security 
In this section, I will argue that regional integration is important to address the problem of conflict 
and instability in the eastern Congo and the wider region. At the end of the First World War, the 
key global actors (the allies and victors – the United States and the United Kingdom) convened at 
the Versailles conference to reorganize the international system and prevent future conflicts and 
established the League of Nations in the first major action to ensure world peace. After the Second 
World War the European powers set out to build the foundations of intra-European cooperation 
which later became the Common Market incorporating the states of Western Europe and later 
evolved into the European Union (Thompson, 1957; Peacock 1982) now incorporating many 
Eastern European states. During the 20th century, several attempts at integration have helped to 
prevent conflict around the world, through economic corporation and efforts at economic 
integration. I argue that regional economic integration aids stability as it acts as a catalyst for 
cooperation between states, rather than conflict. What is integration? How can it be useful in aiding 
stability in the Great Lakes region of Africa? 
 
Chime (1978) defines integration as a process of cohesion between two or more social units 
whereby these units come to constitute a political whole which can, in some cases, be described as 
a community. Economic integration relates to the harmonization of economic policies between 
and among states with the abolition of tariff walls or restrictions as a step to full and political 
integration. In the Great Lakes region of Africa integration efforts, as a panacea to the perennial 
crises, are being pursued through the Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs 
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(CEPGL)132. Integration as a process being pursued is “functional”, that is to say a gradual process 
of inter-state cooperation leading to common economic policies, unfettered trade and economic 
development. It is hoped that through economic integration, states of the region will cooperate out 
of interest in socio-economic development. Functionalist integration or functionalism for Mitrany 
(1975) is when organisations and institutions (only) at various levels work and cooperate across 
borders through a dynamic process that promotes interest integration. Mitrany’s statement that 
society will develop from our living it, not by policing it, comes to mind. Since the state always 
carries the historical baggage of competition, war, mistrust and interest, the theory leaves 
integration to private persons who, through their entrepreneurship, develop links and business 
opportunities that would favour stability and integration in integration. The CPGL displays a neo-
functionalist process. Neo-functionalism is an approach to integration which is a modification of 
functionalism to bring in the state as the primary actor that implements cross-state economic and 
social links leading to integration. Apart from these two approaches to integration, there is also the 
pluralist approach which advocates that integration is most possible when as many societal groups 
and institutions as possible (for instance, civil societies, internet companies, milk processing 
factories, banks, etc.) from both sides cooperate and seek to work towards common goals and 
mutual benefits (Chime, 1978).  To this I will add federalism as the most common, and its many 
                                                 
132 During the period in which I worked as a Political Affairs Officer in the eastern Congo, I have frequently been 
involved in meetings or receiving visiting CEPGL officials in South Kivu. Its members or officials attended the Goma 
Conference on Peace and Security in early 2008 which was an important prelude to Amani Leo military operations to 
rid the east of the Congo of Rwandan Hutu rebels, a main cause of tensions between the Congo and Rwanda. The 
CEPGL, like ECOWAS in West Africa (although less important in terms of GDP and jurisdiction) is a Great Lakes 
regional organization that was created in Gisenyi, Rwanda, in 1976 to ensure security and stability through the 
development and promotion of trade and economic cooperation as well as to facilitate the movement of people in the 




quasi-federal variants, which helps to keep a huge and diverse country together by empowering its 
component parts, often under a centre and authority. 
 
The Economic Community of Countries of the Great Lakes Region was created in 1976 to enhance 
economic integration and to support the free movement of goods and persons among the countries 
of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its headquarters is in Gisenyi in 
Rwanda. Given the conflicts that have rocked the region from the 1990s to the early 21st century, 
the CPGL was not successful in terms of supporting economic integration, which could have 
prevented, or at least mitigated, conflict in the region in the first place. From the Burundi crisis 
from 1993 to the 1994 genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda and to the Congo wars of 1996-2003, 
the CEPGL, a potential tool to bring about economic integration, did not succeed as a project, as 
all three countries were embroiled in conflict for the majority of their post-independence existence.  
 
6.3.3  What integrative strategy for the Great Lakes region? 
 
Africa’s experiences teaches us that gradualism is a more preferable option in the drive towards 
integration. The emergence of the Organisation of African Unity, and later the African Union133, 
is testimony to this (OAU Charter in Appendix). The African Union’s formation was preceded by 
                                                 
133 The Organization of African Unity is a pan-African continental organization formed on the 25 May 1963. Its 
charter aimed to promote the unity and solidarity of African states, to coordinate and intensify cooperation to 
promote better lives for the peoples of Africa, to promote international cooperation with due respect and regard to 
the United Nations Charter, ensure the total liberation of the African continent from colonial rule, defend the 
independence and sovereignty of African countries. The OAU was a compromise solution to the rift between 
independent African states of the radical Casablanca group namely Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea and 
Mali, and the moderate Monrovia group of moderate African states such as Liberia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria 
and Ethiopia. The former agitated for instant unification of Africa while the latter preferred gradualism. This has 




debate and the option of gradual evolution towards integration was accepted as the only realistic 
way to avoid disunity Whereas the then progressive states of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, 
Algeria under Ben Bella, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Mali under Modibo Keita and 
Morocco under King Mohammed V’s Prime Minister Abdullah Ibrahim advocated federalism, the 
so-called conservative states of Senegal, Liberia, Nigeria and Ivory Coast called for gradualism, 
that is to say, a functionalist or neo-functionalist approach to integration. The emergence of the 
OAU was a compromise, but in essence the triumph of the neo-functionalist approach. States of 
the Organisation continue to promote regional and continental integration through supranational 
institutions, cross country collaboration and trade and regional coordination.  
 
I argue that regional economic cooperation can contribute to stability in the DRC and the Great 
Lakes region of Africa more broadly. The neo-functionalist approach to integration could engage 
the governments of the region in economic cooperation arrangements as they share a sense of 
common destiny and development.  
 
Just as prolonged crisis in the DRC often involves or invokes interference from Rwanda, Uganda 
and Burundi, common economic interests will make conflict among them less likely. Owing to 
what Engelbert (2000) refers to as a historical lack of legitimacy, the phenomenon of Mamdani’s 
(2001) kin-country syndrome makes countries of the region (Uganda, Rwanda, eastern Congo and 
Burundi) interrelated and only through embracing the working peace (Mitrany, 1975) in the Great 
Lakes region of Africa can continued peace be best guaranteed. The importance of cultural and 
cross-national linkages as an important impetus to integration is highlight by Mamdani (2001) 
when he argues that states of the Great Lakes region must avoid insisting on their sovereignties to 
the extent of neglecting cultural and social links which are natural and whose bonds are stronger. 
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According to Mamdani, the post-colonial historical developments in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda 
and the eastern DRC cannot be treated as if these states exist, in what Mamdani (2001) calls, 
‘knowledge boundaries’ (in When Victims Become Killers : Decolonising Area Studies, p. xii) . 
The historicity of crisis has proven that the boundaries separating countries in the region will 
always remain what they are - artificial.  
 
I further claim that, although economic governance is important for integration, democracy is vital 
and should be the point of departure for integration. Addressing the International Great Lakes 
region of Africa conference in 2006, Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila said in Nairobi that the Pact 
on Security, Stability and Development not only addresses issues related to peace and security, but 
also gives equal importance to democracy, good governance, economic development, regional 
integration and humanitarian issues, all of which will help consolidate peace and stability 
(Participant Observation - MONUC/UN South Kivu notes, 2007).  He also said that peace and 
security will not be consolidated unless democracy, good governance, and regional integration 
succeed (ibid). In this regard, much work is needed in Rwanda where the need for inclusiveness is 
important for regime legitimacy and in Burundi and the DRC where accountability and rule of law 
are clearly absent. 
 
6.3.4   Conclusion 
 
I have identified the key issues that have emerged from this research and discussed them with a 
view to affirming that the resolution of these issues or the context of failure, instability and conflict 
they explain are fundamental to the full restoration of the DRC state. These issues are legitimacy, 
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governance, identity, leadership and the curse of minerals. I have also identified among the 
alternatives the unitary and federal systems and opted for the former with decentralisation 
emphasized. I conclude with support for functionalist economic integration in the Great Lakes 
region which can enhance stability in the region.  When countries occupying a given geographical 
area see their mutual interests in economic development and social progress, they cooperate. When 
they aspire to enhance their economic opportunities, they shun conflict as the Europeans have 
learned. I have explained this through Mitrany’s working peace concept which well captures the 
essence of functionalist integration.  
 





























Political science is the study of power and politics is the exercise of authority by actors within the 
state. In post-colonial Africa, two key factors represent the paradox of the state. First, the state has 
overwhelming power. Second, the state is fragile due to its lack of historical legitimacy. In this 
dissertation, I explored conflict and instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1960 to 
2010 and focused upon leadership failure, state collapse and external intervention. Through the 
use of data from primary sources and the interrogation of extant literature I have established that 
conflict and instability, reflected in political crises, civil wars, and external interventions, are 
fundamentally explained through the state’s lack of legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy is the basis 
for all crises in the DRC. That the state was contested at independence was inevitable. Through a 
political economy analysis the struggle for power (ironically to seize control of that contested 
entity) has been a factor of instability since independence. 
 
My approach to this study of conflict and instability in the DRC integrates historical legitimacy 
theory, political economy analysis and subaltern realism. I claim that historically illegitimate states 
cannot be cohesive because of the incongruence between the state and society. Moreover, civil 
order that should have resulted from legitimacy cannot be guaranteed as the state is at best 
grudgingly tolerated. As such, the competition for state power is violent because it is the only locus 
of power and only avenue to wealth and privilege in the absence of functioning and accountable 
institutions. I demonstrated that the average European state is more or less historical and legitimate 
having evolved through epochal turning points such as revolutions, constitutional evolutions and 
conflicts while the new states in Africa have no links whatsoever to the continent’s pre-colonial 
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past. The nation building processes in Europe from kingdoms to totalitarianism to democracy 
occurred in phases and has today resulted in the relatively cohesive nations as we know many of 
them. That this is lacking in the DRC, and most African states, is the point around which themes 
on instability in this dissertation are discussed. I further discussed conflict and instability as a 
manifestation of the struggle for power and resources and external intervention as emanating from 
the core interests of intervening states during opportune moments of state failure or collapse. I 
outlined external intervention as both a cause and as a consequence of instability. 
 
In my first substantive chapter I examined primary historical information from the crisis of 
independence and the collapse of the new state at independence, through President Mobutu’s 
misrule to the period of the Kabilas, outlining the political, economic, social, ethnic, ideological 
factors of crisis. In the first part of the chapter, I discussed the crisis of legitimacy in 1960, the 
rebellions against Mobutu and external interventions in a Cold War context revealing the weak 
character of the ahistorical state and the attendant negative ramifications of ethnicity, secessions 
and corruption. The Congolese state’s lack of legitimacy in part explains its weakness at 
independence and political economy analysis captured the essence of political and ethnic conflict. 
The crisis between Lumumba and Kasavubu and Tshombe and Kalonji’s secessions were a 
“pathological” quest for power, because power was everything in a game where no one accepted 
the post-colonial state’s authority except those whom presided over it. If Tshombe or Kalonji had 
won the 1960 elections, they might never have attempted secession or collaborated by default with 
the United States, Belgium and France to overthrow the state. I examined the misguided policies 




I then examined the brief rule of Laurent Desiré Kabila, his quest to monopolise power and 
surround himself with cronies, his misguided policies leading to regional intervention and the 
second Congo war which I analysed from the stand point of subaltern realism, and best captures 
the essence of the actions by emerging fragile states in evolution seeking security and influence. 
The period after Kabila’s assassination is analysed as one that is fraught with corruption as Joseph 
Kabila struggled to ensure stability in the country without the necessary social capital that comes 
with historical legitimacy. During this period, the contested state’s survival was maintained 
through compromise, which meant lax controls over government resources amid helplessness in 
restoring state authority in peripheral areas. 
 
In pursuit of my investigations, I examined how power was used by Mobutu, Laurent Desire Kabila 
and the circumstantially weak Joseph Kabila, all of whom devised mechanisms to protect it. 
Mobutu and Joseph Kabila established praetorian guards. Mobutu used party and patronage to 
ensure loyalty and further politicised ethnicity as defences to his power. Mobutu’s reliance on an 
ethnic and Ngbandi dominated army and Joseph Kabila’s mistrust of a newly integrated army of 
former enemies, and his creation of a republican guard comprising his Katangan kinsmen, further 
proved that the contested state has not been an instrument of development but a prize to win and 
protect at all costs. Since the Sun City inspired accords came about as a result of a military 
stalemate in a power struggle, the transition revealed itself as the highest point in the division of 
the spoils of the state as the Lutundula Commission report of 2005 showed. For a country afflicted 
by the “Dutch disease” and where the easy flow of copper and diamond revenues from Gecamines 
and MIBA went straight into the coffers of the state, the consequences for reconstruction and state 
authority restoration were disasterous. With the absence of effective institutions in the Congo for 
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decades, and the over centralization of the state as the main distributor of resources, positions and 
privileges, politics has always been both attractive and dangerous. Hence, it’s violent and 
ethnicised character and the role of mineral resources in fuelling conflicts and instability. 
 
I referred, in my analysis, to two key guiding documents - the Lutundula Commission Report 
(2005) and the United Nations Panel of Experts report on the illegal forms of exploitation of natural 
and mineral resources from the Democratic Republic of Congo (2001) - to elucidate these 
assertions. I concluded that governance and leadership failure were consequences of the struggle 
for, and misuse of, power in the quest for space in an intensely contested political field. The focus 
on retaining power was so much of an issue that it sapped what could otherwise have energized 
the state. 
 
I provided a strong theoretical basis for the DRC’s status as a failed and collapsed state showing 
that the problem of capacity has always made external intervention inevitable.134 I demonstrated 
that when a state lacks capacity and fails in performing its critical functions of ensuring security 
(internal and external) or catering for the social and economic needs of society, it loses its raison 
d’etre. The lack of capacity, due to the failure of Belgian decolonization and the absence of a 
national focus and leadership to truly nationalize a set of alien institution which comprised the 
state, were perfect conditions for centrifugal regional elites in Bas Kongo, Equateur, Kasai, 
Katanga and the Kivus to challenge the state following their frustrating experiences in the 1960 
elections.  
 
                                                 
134 I have recalled in the dissertation that neighbouring Angola fought a powerful rebellion aided from outside from 
1975 to 2002 but did not collapse in the same manner that the Congo had experienced. 
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After the crisis of the 1960s, forms of control by Mobutu, and later the Kabilas, drained the state 
of revenues and capacity. I referred to North’s view that the cost of maintenance of an existing 
order is inversely proportional to the perceived sense of legitimacy of the existing system.  
Corruption, nepotism, ethnic politics and factionalism have characterized patrimonial regimes in 
the DRC since independence. I cited Engelbert’s contention that Africa’s development crisis is a 
crisis of state capacity which is absent because the state is contested, being ahistorical and lacking 
social capital. The challenge of legitimacy thus undermined state capacity since the regimes of 
Mobutu, Laurent Desiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila spent time and resources dealing with political 
or military challenges. Where they could not fight to preserve the state, they used patronage and 
the allocation of resources in its place. Instead of delivering security and sustainable development 
to society, the state engaged in popular acceptance politics which depleted resources in the process. 
I again cited external intervention as a cause and a consequence of weakness and collapse using 
the United States, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom for the former and the 1998-2003 
invasion by regional states for the latter. I discussed the role of natural resources while affirming 
that the 1998-2003 war was not caused by the lust for resources but rather the stalemate in a bitter 
confrontation among states, which derailed into resource exploitation.  
 
In the absence of democracy (in a dictatorship that was Mobutu’s Zaire and one that was 
intransigent towards reform), civil society was the only force that was quasi-active enough to 
salvage the country and restore democracy. Civil society did, however, fail to live up expectations. 
I explored the role of civil society, and in particular the role of the Catholic Church, students and 
political actors. Drawing on primary data for the Supreme National Conference, I demonstrated 
that while Mobutu successfully undermined the struggle for democracy, it was the failure of 
politicians, their lust for power and greed that destroyed the cohesion of the conference, through 
182 
 
the method of surprise defections and reconciliations with Mobutu. The fragility of the Congolese 
state became apparent at the conference when Lubas and Lunda in Katanga clashed over the 
appointment of Nguz Karl-I-Bond as a rival to transitional parliament Prime Minister Etienne 
Tshsekedi. The manner in which the conference collapsed was reminiscent of the fragility of the 
state and how it has always been high jacked to advantage by politicians. Civil society is however 
credited with the impetus of protests that led to rebellion and Mobutu’s overthrow, although this 
did not lead to the return of democracy immediately. 
 
In the end, I argue that civil society in the DRC, as in many parts of Africa, is not firmly anchored 
in an evolved and historic form of interactions that respond to demands from state-society 
relations. Civil society in the Congo is relatively recent, ethnically influenced, spontaneous, 
fractured and hampered by rivalries. Political actors are not immune to the problem, as the 
Supreme National Conference (on the multi-party democracy experience) has shown.  
 
In the final chapter, I explored how theoretical constructs, explain the key conflict issues in the 
DRC, namely failed governance, ethnic conflicts, xenophobia and a crisis of citizenship, 
corruption and patronage, political crises, the exploitation of mineral resources, and rebellions and 
invasions. Importantly, I demonstrated that the essence of conflict and instability in the Congo is 
best captured through an analysis of the African state’s lack of historical legitimacy. I emphasized 
the equally important role of political economy analysis as well as explained invasions of the DRC 
and other foreign intervention as a function of the realist calculations of intervening states in favour 
of their own survival or acting in a historically rational ways. I have underlined that the Congo’s 
mineral resources did not directly precipitate the 1998-2003 wars, but rather that the massive 
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looting of the country’s resources resulted from the stalemate that followed the intervention of 
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in defence of the Kinshasa government. In the conclusion, I have 
discussed federalism and unitarism as systems of organization and put forward the case for 
decentralization within a unitary system. This is because, as earlier explained, the history of 
secessions in the country, the country’s size and the relatively young age of the state dictate the 
caution of its leaders. In fact, this view is widespread among politicians and intellectuals who all 
cite the conflicts and instability as having emanated from the centrifugal tendencies that I have 
discussed. 
 
It is my conclusion that addressing the problem of State legitimacy is critical in resolving conflict 
and instability in the DRC. Ethnic conflicts, inter-elite political conflicts, nationality crises and 
rule by fiat and through patronage are largely to do with the lack of historical legitimacy of the 
post-colonial State that was Zaire. Recreating pre-colonial entities is impossible and not 
necessarily desirable, just as delinking the periphery is almost impractical. It is however important 
to note that the new nations grouped together in the post-colonial state must be encouraged to 
accept the post-colonial reality in the forging of a new nation-state through genuine and guaranteed 
decentralization that recognizes diversity, increases confidence in the state, or briefly put, unifies 
a diverse country. The formula for this is necessarily the subject of a further research agenda, and 
another thesis, but it is most important that this process begins with visionary leadership. Sub-
Saharan Africa and the DRC’s circumstances and difficulties begin with the illegitimate nature of 
the DRC State. The solution to the problems of conflict and instability must begin there. The 
problems of corruption, greed, regionalism, citizenship and national unity and cohesion and lack 
of regard for institution building have to do with lack of commitment to shared principles caused 
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by the absence of an empirical state with a strong historical basis. The challenge for leaders is to 
make the DRC state acceptable. People must accept it, believe in it, support and defend it and from 
this ‘political kingdom’ will develop the state. The acceptance of a legitimate State is the best 
social capital for effective governance. Governance is easier when the state is legitimate or 
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Political Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo 






l / ·. l 






OFCONGO TIC REPUBLIC ~~ 
DEMOCRA , - • I • ••• " .... , 
..... No_ K .. 8EC1SGII 
O~UNIT, MOMIC 
iJ -~-1.... "'···.-. ·~~--- . . 
.~ ·- T I ····~. , • • ,' ••• .,, ,. ·, .• -~ , I - •• , . -~-...,.,, r . .- r·- • I . ""\ --+---- /' i ·, ' · - ' ' 
--- . /... ..,~-.'.:...o,':~~- ~ ... :?•-· ,... - , .- ~-1 ',-
, "°";..~ • '1 •"""° I l~ IR\i I • , I r 
i-- 'i"·" .-- • 1 - , .,,. -·-·-t-- I - ,· . . ,._ ' • ' ! ~ • :- - --- -· i . .:. ... 

















t.P :f'., E' 
i }.t: GM.f11"t4 
~ .. _,,,... . --
·' "--· 
--· ~··"" 
..--· ......... ~. 
;.; , ;t: Jti" 
'i.~ : IPh.h.: _ 
i>. '.~· C·O ' 
I<!, ' SO< 





















I e,N.J ~n<i 11nc 
Tin req1on 
( O,flf1~1 b~lt 
Energy 
























Pu ll il 
Mr~Nll. ..... 





,<.1 n..i9,1 ~ 
tt :,~oogu 
Mbantl.J~~ o 




!') .. t 01 ·- , 




,- I ~'i o.V }~l lklh Jnd agr,..:liUu: ~ 
,·.-.--- - ..  " i - 1 h HJ~) , , 
0 
.Mb,m1,i · 




i ,. r(~ -, .,. ,i.-.; ct .• , e,,111 t•,·1 t i i'; .- H i 'wn! M! 
;,• i·, ·i1· ,, ,rOOO UC"•i ,Ol1 'i 1f1,f . 
I rd11m .. ,, r,, 0 
0 MlrnJi f11!,1'iA __ i 




00 km ,ambia 
..,.Jdor. 


















Speech by Patrice Lumumba on the Independence of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
30 June 1960 
Patrice Lumumba 
SPEECH AT THE CEREMONY OF THE 
PROCLAMATION OF THE CONGO'S 
INDEPENDENCE 
June 30, 1960 
Source: Patrice Lumumba, The Truth about a Monstrous 
Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
Written: by Patrice 
Transcribed: by Thomas Schmidt. 
Men and women of the Congo, 
Victorious independence fighters, 
I salute you in the name of the Congolese Government. 
Crime of the Colonialists, 
1961, pp. 44-47. 
Lumumba; 
I ask all of you, my friends, who tirelessly fought in our ranks, to mark this June 30, 1960, as an 
illustrious date that will be ever engraved in your hearts, a date whose meaning you will proudly 
explain to your children, so that they in turn might relate to their grandchildren and great-
grandchildren the glorious history of our struggle for freedom. 
Although this independence of the Congo is being proclaimed today by agreement with Belgium, 
an amicable country, with which we are on equal terms, no Congolese will ever forget that 
independence was won in struggle, a persevering and inspired struggle carried on from day to 
day, a struggle, in which we were undaunted by privation or suffering and stinted neither 
strength nor blood. 
It was filled with tears, fire and blood. We are deeply proud of our struggle, because it was just 
and noble and indispensable in putting an end to the humiliating bondage forced upon us. 
That was our lot for the eighty years of colonial rule and our wounds are too fresh and much too 
painful to be forgotten. 
We have experienced forced labour in exchange for pay that did not allow us to satisfy our 
hunger, to clothe ourselves, to have decent lodgings or to bring up our children as dearly loved 
ones. 
Morning, noon and night we were subjected to jeers, insults and blows because we were 
"Negroes". Who will ever forget that the black was addressed as 1'tu", not because he was a 
friend, but because the polite "vous" was reserved for the white man? 
We have seen our lands seized in the name of ostensibly just l~ws, which gave recognition only 
to the right of might. 
We have not forgotten that the law was never the same for the white and the black, that it was 
lenient to the ones, and cruel and inhuman to the others. 
We have experienced the atrocious sufferings, being persecuted for political convictions and 
religious beliefs, and exiled from our native land: our lot was worse than death itse1£ 
We have not forgotten that in the cities the mansions were for the whites and the tumbledown 
huts for the blacks; that a black was not admitted to the cinemas, restaurants and shops set aside 
for "Europeans"; that a black travelled in the holds, under the feet of the whites in their luxury 
cabins. 
Who will ever forget the shootings which killed so many of our brothers, or the cells into which 
were mercilessly thrown those who no longer wished to submit to the regime of injustice, 
oppression and exploitation used by the colonialists as a tool of their domination? 
All that, my brothers, brought us untold suffering. 
But we, who were elected by the votes of your representatives, representatives of the people, to 
guide our native land, we, who have suffered in body and soul from the colonial oppression, we 
tell you that henceforth all that is finished with. 
The Republic of the Congo has been proclaimed and our beloved country's future is now in the 
hands of its own people. 
Brothers, let us commence together a new struggle, a sublime struggle that will lead our country 
to peace, prosperity and greatness. 
Together we shall establish social justice and ensure for every man a fair remuneration for his 
labour. 
We shall show the world what the black man can do when working in liberty, and we shall make 
the Congo the pride of Africa. 
We shall see to it that the lands of our native country truly benefit its children. 
We shall revise all the old laws and make them into new ones that will be just and noble. 
We shall stop the persecution of free thought. We shall see to it that all citizens enjoy to the 
fullest extent the basic freedoms provided for by the Declaration of Human Rights. 
We shall eradicate all discrimination, whatever its origin, and we shall ensure for everyone a 
station in life befitting his human dignity and worthy of his labour and his loyalty to the country. 
We shall institute in the country a peace resting not on guns and bayonets but on concord and 
goodwill. 
And in all this, my dear compatriots, we can rely not only on our own enormous forces and 
immense wealth, but also on the assistance of the numerous foreign states, whose co-operation 
we shall accept when it is not aimed at imposing upon us an alien policy, but is given in a spirit 
of friendship. 
Even Belgium, which has finally learned the lesson of history and need no longer try to oppose 
out independence, is prepared to give us its aid and friendship; for that end an agreement has just 
been signed between our two equal and independent countries. I am sure that this co-operation 
will benefit both countries. For our part, we shall, while remaining vigilant, try to observe the 
engagements we have freely made. 
Thus, both in the internal and the external spheres, the new Congo being created by my 
government will be rich, free and prosperous. But to attain our goal without delay, I ask all of 
you, legislators and citizens of the Congo, to give us all the help you can. 
I ask you all to sink your tribal quarrels: they weaken us and may cause us to be despised abroad. 
I ask you all not to shrink from any sacrifice for the sake of ensuring the success of our grand 
undertaking. 
Finally, I ask you unconditionally to respect the life and property of fellow-citizens and 
foreigners who have settled in our country; if the conduct of these foreigners leaves much to be 
desired, our Justice will promptly expel them from the territory of the republic; if, on the 
contrary, their conduct is good, they must be left in peace, for they, too, are working for our 
country's prosperity. 
The Congo's independence is a decisive step towards the liberation of the whole African 
continent. 
Our government, a government of national and popular unity, will serve its country. 
I call on all Congolese citizens, men, women and children, to set themselves resolutely to the 
task of creating a national economy and ensuring our economic independence. 
Eternal glory to the fighters for national liberation! 
Long live independence and African unity! 
Long live the independent and sovereign Congo! 
Appendix vi 
Excerpt from the Lusaka Accords on the Oemocratic Republic of Congo 
. ~ 
Accord de cessez-le-feu en Republique democratique du Congo 
PREAMBULE 
Nous, les Parties a cet Accord, 
Considerant !'article 52 de la Charte de l'Organisafion des 
Nations Unies relatif aux arrangements regionaux 
concernant les questions relatives au maintien de la paix et 
de la securite internationales dans le cadre d'une action 
regionale appropriee; 
Reaffirmant les dispositions de !'article 3 de la Charte de 
!'Organisation de l'Unite Africaine (OUA) qui, entre autres, 
garantissent a taus les Etats membres le droit a leur 
soUY.ec.ainete. et.a leur integrite..territoriale; 
Reaffirmant en outre la resolution AHG/16/1 adoptee par la 
Conference des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de l'OUA 
en 1964 au Caire (Egypte) sur l'integrite territoriale et 
rinviolabilite des frontieres nationales telles qu'heritees a 
l'independance; · 
Rappelant le Communique du Sammet de Pretoria tel que 
contenu dans l'Annexe 2 du document NEC/AMB/COMM (L) 
de l'Organe central de l'OUA reaffirmant que tous les 
groupes ethniques et nationalites dont les personnes et !e 
territoire constituaient ce qui est devenu Congo 
(presentement RDC) a l'independance doivent beneficier de 
l'egalite des droits et de la protection aux termes de la loi en 
tant que citoyens; 
Determinee a assurer le respect, par toutes les Parties 
signataires du present Accord, des Conventions de Geneve 
de 1949 et des Protocoles additionnels de 1977 ainsi que de 
la Convention sur la prevention et la repression du crime de 
genocide de 1948, tel que reitere lors du Sammet regional 
d'Entebbe du 25 mars 1998; 
Determinees en outre a mettre fin immediat!:lment a toute 
aide a~x forces negatives determinees a destabiliser les 
pays voi1ins, cesser immediatement toute collaboration avec 
ces forces ou de leur accorder un sanctuaire; 
Soulignant la necessite de veiller au respect des principes de 
ban voisinage et de non-ingerence dans les affaires 
interieures des autres pays; 
Preoccupees par le conflit en Republique Democratique du 
Congo et ses consequences negatives sur le pays ainsi que 
sur d'autres pays de la region des Grands Lacs; 
Reiterant l'appel lance lors du deuxieme sommet de Victoria 
Falls tenu du 7 au 8 septembre 1998, pour la cessation 
immediate des hostilites, tel que contenu dans le 
communique commun du Sammet; 
Conscientes du fait que la resolution des problemes de 
securite de la Republique Democratique du Congo et des 
pays voisins est essentielle et devrait contribuer au 
processus de paix; 
Rappelant le mandat, contenu dans le Communique 
commun de Victoria Falls ll, confie aux Ministres de 12 
Defense et a d'autres fonctionnaires, d'elaborer, en etroite 
collaboration avec l'OUA et J'ONU, les modalites demise en 
ceuvre d'un cessez-le-feu immediat et de creer un 
mecanisme pour assurer le suivi du respect des dispositior.s 
du Cessez-le--feu; 
Rappelant la Resolution 1234 du 9 avril ~ 999 ainsi que les 
autres resolutions et decisions du Conseil de Securite des 
Nations Unies sur la Republique Democratique du' Congo, 
prises-clepuis le 2 aout 1998; 
Rappelant en outre les efforts de paix deployes pour la 
resolution du conflit en RDC lors des Sommets de Victoria 
Falls I et II, Pretoria, Durban, Port-Louis, Nairobi, Windhoek, 
Dodoma ainsi que lors des reunions des Ministres de Lusaka 
et de Gaborone; 
Rappelant en outre l'Accord de paix signe le 18 avril 1999 a 
Sirte (LIBYE); 
Reconnaissant que le conflit en RDC a une dimension a la 
fois interne et externe qui trouvera sa solution dans le cadre 
des negociations politiques inter-congolaises et de 
!'engagement des Parties a la mise en ceuvre de cet Accord; 
Prenant acte de !'engagement du Gouvernement congolais, 
du RCD, du MLC ainsi que de toutes les organisations 
politiques et civiles congolaises a organiser un dialogue 
national sans exclusive, visant a aboutir a la reconciliation 
nationale et a l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre politique en 
RDC; 
CONVENONS DE CE QUl SUIT : 
ARTICLE 1 
DU CESSEZ-LE-FEU 
1. Les Parties conviennent d'un cessez-le-feu entre toutes !eurs forces en 
Republique Democratique du Congo. 
2. Le Cessez-le-feu signifie: 
a. la cessation des hostilites entre toutes les forces des 
Parties en Republique Democratique du Congo, comme 
prevu dans cet Accord de Cessez-le-feu (ci-apres appele 
« !'accord »); 
b. la cessation effective des hostilites, des mouvements et 
renforts mmtaires ainsi que des actes hostiles, y compris la 
propagande hostile ; 
c. la cessation des hostilites aans un delai de 24 heures 
apres la signature de !'Accord de Cessez-le-feu. 
3. Le Cessez-le-feu implique la cessation de: 
a. toute attaque aerienne, terrestre et maritime ainsi que tout 
acte de sabotage ; 
b. toute tentative d'occupation de nouvelles positions sur le 
terrain et de mouvement des forces et des equipements 
militaires d'un endroit a l'autre sans accord prealable des 
1;>arties; 
c. tous les actes de violence centre les populations civiles 
par le respect et la protection des droits humains. Ces actes 
de violence incluent les executions sommaires, la torture, le 
harcelement, la detention et !'execution des civils bases sur 
leur origine ethnique, le recrutement et !'utilisation des 
enfants soldats, la violence sexuelle, le bombardement et le 
massacre de populations civiles, la propaganda et l'incitation 
a la haine ethnique et tribale, l'armement des civils, la 
detention et !'execution des prisonniers d'opinion, les 
coupures d'eau et d'electricite, la formation et l'utilisation des 
terroristes ; 
d. toute autre action qui peut entraver !'evolution normale du 
processus de cessez-le-feu ; 
e. tout ravitaillement en munitions et en armes des magasins 
de guerre au front ; 
ARTICLE II 
DES PREOCUPATIONS EN MATIERE DE SECURITE 
4. Des l'entree en vigueur de cet Accord, res Signataires s'engagent a trouver 
immediatement des solutions aux preoccupations de securite de la 
Republique Democratique du Congo et des pays voisins. 
ARTICLE Ill 
DES PRINCIPES DE L'ACCORD 
5. Les dispositions du paragraphe 3 (e) n'excluent pas le ravitaillement en 
nourriture, habillement et services medicaux destines aux forces militaires 
sur le terrain. 
6. Le Cessez-le-feu garantira la fibre circulation des personnes et des biens 
sur !'ensemble du territoire national de la Republique Democratique du 
Congo. 
7. Des l'entree en vigueur de cet Accord, res Parties libereront les personnes 
detenues ou prises en otage et leur accorderont la liberte de se reinstaller 
dans toute province de la Republique Democratique du Congo ou dans tout 
autre pays ou leur securite pourra etre garantie. 
8. Les Parties a cet Accord s'engagent a echanger les prisonniers de guerre 
et a liberer toutes autres personnes detenues en raison de la guerre. 
9. Les Parties permettront l'acces immediat et sans reserve au Comite 
International de la Croix Rouge (CICR)/Croissant Rouge (CR) afrn de 
permettre les arrangements pour la liberation des prisonniers de guerre et 
autres personnes dete!lues en raison de la guerre ainsi que !'evacuation et 
l'inhumation des marts et le soin des blesses. 
10. Les Parties faciliteront l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire grace a 
l'ouverture de couloirs d'aide humanitaire et la creation de condit ions 
favorables a la fourniture de l'aide d'urgence aux personnes deplacees, aux 
refugies et autres personnes concernees. · · 
11. a. Le Conseil de securite des Nations 
Unies, agissant conformement aux 
dispositions du chapitre VII de Ja Charte des 
Nations Unies et en collaboration avec 
l'OUA, sera ijppele a constituer, faciliter et 
deployer une force de maintien de la paix en 
RDC afin d'assurer la mise en <Buvre de cet 
Accord, et prenant acte de la situation 
particuliere de la RDC, lui confiera le mandat 
de poursuivre tous les groupes armes en 
RDC. A cet egard, le Conseil de securite des 
Nations Unies definira le mandat de la force 
de maintien de la paix. 
b. Les parties constitueront une Commission 
Militaire Mixte qui sera chargee d'executer, 
immediatement apres l'entree en vigueur de 
cet Accord en collaboration avec le groupe 
d'observateurs de l'ONU et de l'OUA, les 
operations de maintien de la paix jusqu'au 
moment du deploiement de la Mission de 
maintien de la paix des Nations Unies et de 
l'OUA. Sa composition et son mandat seront 
conformes aux dispositions du chapitre 7 de 
!'Annexe « A » de cet Accord. 
12. Le retrait definitif de toutes les forces etrangeres du territoire national de 
la Republique Democratique du Congo sera effectue conformement au 
Calendrier figurant a !'Annexe B du present Accord et au programme de 
retrait qui sera arrete par res Nations Unies, l'OUA et la Commission Militaire 
Mixte. 
13. La pose des mines, quef qu'en soit le type, est interdite. 
14. Le desengagement des forces sera immediat dans les zones ou elles 
sont en contact direct. 
15. Rien dans cet Accord ne devra, en aucune maniere, nuire a la 
souverainete ni a l'integrite territoriale de fa Republique Democratique du 
Congo. 
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16. Les Parties reaffirment que tousles groupes ethniques et nationalites 
dont les personnes et le territoire constituaient ce qui est devenu Congo 
{presentement RDC) a l'independance doivent beneficier de l'egalite des 
droits et.de la protection aux termes de la loi en tar:it que citoyens. 
17. Les Parties a cet Accord devront prendre toutes les mesu(es necessaires 
a la normalisation de la situation le long des frontieres internationales de la 
Republique Democratique du Congo, y compris le controle du trafic illicite 
des armes et l'infiltraticn des groupes armes. 
18. Aux termes de cet Accord et a J'issue des negociations politiques inter-
congolaises, l'autorite administrative de l'Etat sera retablie sur !'ensemble du 
territoire national de la Republique Democratique du Congo. 
19. Des l'entree en vigueur de cet Accord, le Gouvemement de la 
Republique Democratique du Congo, !'opposition armee, a savoir le 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie et le Mouvement pour la 
Liberation du Congo, et !'opposition politique s'engagent a entrer dans un 
dialogue national ouvert. Ces negociations politiques inter-congo!aises, 
associant egalement les Forces Vives de la Nation, meneront a un nouvel 
ordre politique et a la reconciliation nationale en Republique Democratique 
du Congo. Les negociations politiques inter-congolaises seront mf;!nees sous 
l'autorite d'un facilitateur neutre, accepte par toutes les Parties congolaises. 
Les Parties s'engagent a soutenir ce dialogue et veilleront a ce que les 
negociations politiques inter-congolaises s'effectuent conformement aux 
dispositions du chapitre 5 de l'Annexe A 
20. Aux termes de cet Accord et a l'issue du dialogue national, ii y aura un 
mecanisme pour la formation d'une armee nationale, restructuree et integree, 
incluant les forces des Parties congolaises signataires du present Accord, sur 
base des negociations entre le Gouvernement de la Republique 
Democratique du Congo, le Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie et 
le Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo. 
21. Les Parties affirment la necessite de trouver des solutions aux 
preoccupations de securite de la Republique Democratique du Congo et des 
pays voisins. 
22. Un mecanisme sera mis en place pour desarmer les milices et les 
groupes armes, y compris les forces genocidaires. Dans ce cor,texte, toutes 
res Parties, s'engagent a localiser, identifier, desarmer et assembler tous les 
membres des groupes armes en RDC. Les pays d'origine des membres des 
QRJupes armes s'engagent a prendre l.outes les mesures necessaires pour 
faciliter Jeur rapatriement. Ces mesures peuvent comprendre l'amnistie, dans 
les pays ou cette mesure a ete jugee avantageuse. Toutefois, cette mesure 
ne s'appliquera pas dans le cas des suspects du crime de Genocide. Les 
Parties assument pleinement la responsabilite de veiller ace que les groupes 
armes operant avec leurs troupes ou sur les territoires qu'elles contrOlent se 
conferment aux termes du present Accord en general aux processus menant 
au demantelement de ces groupes en particulier. 
23. Les Parties veilleront a !'application des termes de cet Accord et des 
Annexes « A » et « B » qui font partie integrante de celui-ci. 
24. Les definitions des termes communs utilises dans cet Accord sont a 
l'Annexe « C ». 
25. Cet accord entrera en vigueur 24 heures apres sa signature. 
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26. Cet Accord pourra etre amende avec l'accord de toutes les Parties ; tout 
amendement devra etre fait par ecrit et signe par toutes les Parties de la 
meme maniere que cet Accord. 
En foi de quoi les representants dument autorises des Parties signent cet 
Accord dans les langues franc;:aise, anglaise, et portugaise, etant entendu 
que tous les textes font foi. 
L'accord a ete signe par des representants 
de La Republique d'Angola, 
de la Republique Democratique du Congo, 
de la Republique de Namibia, 
de la Republique du Rwanda, 
de la Republique de l'Ouganda, 
et de la Republique du Zimbabwe. 
Sont temoins : 
des representants de la Republique de Zambie, 
de !'Organisation de l'Unite Africaine, 
de l'Organisation des Nations Unies 
et de la Communaute pour le developpement de l'Afrique australe. 
ANNEXE « A » 
MODALITES DEMISE EN CEUVRE 
' 
DE L'ACCORD DE CESSEZ-LE-FEU EN 
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRA TIQUE DU CONGO 
CHAPITRE 1 
DE LA CESSATION DES HOSTILJTES 
1.1 Les Parties annonceront la cessation des hostilites devant entrer en 
vigueur 24 heures apres la signature de l'Accord de Cessez-le-feu. La 
cessation des hostilites sera diffusee par les Parties par l'intermediaire de 
leurs chaines de commandement et elle sera simultanement communiquee a 
la population civile par la presse ecrite ainsi que par la radio et la television. 
Appendix vii 




~GOCIA TIO NS POLITIOUES 
SUR LE PROCESSUS DE PAIX ET SUR 
LA TRANSITION EN RDC 
ACCORD GLOBAL ET INCLUSIF SUR LA TRANSITION 
REPUBLIOUE DEMOCRATIOUE DU CONGO 
Signe a Pretoria (Republique d' Afrique du Sud) 
le 16 Decembre 2002 
1 
Preambule 
Nous, Composantes et Entites du Dialogue inter•congolais, Parties au present Accord: 
le Gouvernement de la Republique Democratique du Con~ le Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), le Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC), 
· )'Opposition · · politique, Jes Forces vives, le Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Democratie/Mouvement de Liberation (RCD/ML), le Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Democratie/ National (RCD/N), les Mar-Mai; 
Conscients de nos responsabilites devant le Peuple Congolais, tAfiique et la 
Communaute intemationale; 
Considerant l'Accoid pour un cessez-le-feu en Republique Democratique du Congo signe 
a LUSAKA Jes 10, 3 O et 31 juillet l 999~ 
Considerant les Resolutions pertinentes du Conseil de securite des Nations Unies 
relatives au conflit en R.epublique Democratique du Congo; 
Considerant Jes Resolutions du Dialogue inter-congolais tenu a Sun-City (Afrique du 
Sud) du 25 fevrier 2002 au 12 avril 2002; 
Prenant a temoin son Excellence Monsieur Ketumile MASIRE. Facilitateur neutre du 
Dialogue inter-congolais; Son Ex:cellence Monsieur Kofi ANNAN, Secretaire general de 
!'Organisation des Nations Unies, represente par Son Excellence Monsieur Moustapha 
NIASSE, Envoye special du Secretaire.general des Nations Unies pour le Dialogue inter4 
congolais, Son Excellence Monsieur Thabo MBEKI. President de la Republique 
d'Amque du Sud et President en exercice de l'Union Africaine; 
Concluons le present Accord global et inclusif sur la transition en Republique 
Democratique du Congo, en convenant de ce qui suit: 
I - De la cessation des hostilites 
1. Les Parties au present Accord et ayant des forces combattantes, a savoir le 
Gouvemement de la RDC, le RCD, le MLC, le RCD~ML, le RCD-N, et Jes Mar-
Mar renouvellent leur engagement, conformement a I 'accord de Lusaka, au Plan 
de desengagement de Kampala et au Sous-Plan de Harare, et aux resolutions 
pertinentes du Conseil de securite, de cesser Jes hostilites et de rechercher une 
solution pacifique et equitable a la crise que traverse le Pays. 
2. Les Parties au present Accord et ayant des forces combattantes acceptent de 
s'engager dans le processus de fonnation d'une armee nationale, restructuree et 
integree conformement a la Resolution adoptee le 10 avriI 2002 adoptee par la 








integree conformement a la Resolution adoptee le 1 0 avril 2002 adoptee par la 
Pleniere du Dialogue inter-congolais (DIC) de S1.m-City. 
3. Les Composantes et Entites au DIC Parties au presen1 Accord (les Parties), a 
savoir le Gouvernemcnt de la RDC, le RCD, le MLC, !'Opposition politique, les 
Forces vives, le RCD-ML. le RCD-N et les Mai-Mai, acceptent de conjuguer 
leurs efforts dans la mise en application des Resolutions du Conseil de securite 
des Nations Unies ,pour le retrait de toutes les troupes etrangeres du territoire de la 
RDC et du desarm.ement des groupes armes et des milices, et de sauvegarder la 
souverainete et l'integrite territoriale de la RDC. 
4. Les Parties acceptent de conjuguer leurs efforts en vue d'aboutir a la 
reconciliation nationale. A cet effet, ellcs decident de mettre en place un 
Gouvemement d'union nationale qui permettra d'organiser des elections libres et 
democratiques dans Jes meilleurs delais. 
5. Les Parties acceptcnt de prendre toutes les mesures necessaires a la securisation 
des populations et des dirigeants de la transition tant a Kinshasa que sur 
l'ensemble du territoire national. A cet effet seront arretees des dispositions visant 
a garantir la securite des populations, des Institutions, de leurs animateurs et des 
principaux cadres dirigeants des Parties au present Accord et ayant des forces 
combattantes. 
II -Des obiectifs de la transition 
Les objectifs principaux de la transition sont: 
1. la reunification, la pacificatio~ la reconstruction du Pays, la restauration de 
l' integrite territoriale, et le retablissement de l'autorite de l'Etat sur 
l 'ensemble du territoire national; 
2. la reconciliation nationale; 
3. la formation d'une armee nationale, restructuree etintegree; 
4. !'organisation d'elections libres et transparentes a tousles niveaux permettant 
la mise en place d'un regime constitutionnel democra.tique; 
5. Ia mise en place des structures devant aboutir a un nouvel ordre politique. 
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diff'erentes sensibilites au sein des forces politiques et sociales. En paniculier, ii 
faudrait prevoir une representation fl!ppropriee des femmes a tous Jes niveaux de 
responsabilite. 
2. En vue d'assurer ta stabilite des Institutions de Ja transi.tion, le President. Jes Vice-
Presidents. le 1-resid;)nt de I' AssembJee nationale et le President du Senat res tent 
en fonction pendant toute Ja duree de la transition, sauf en cas de demission, 
deces, empechement definitif. condamnation pour haute trahison. detoumement 
des deniers publics, concussion, ou corruption.· 
3. Les Parties reaffirment leur adhesion a Ia Declaration universelle des droits de 
l'homme, au Pacie international des droits civils et politiques de 1966, au Pacte 
international des droits economiques et socio..culturels de 1966, a la Chane 
africaine des droi~ de l'homme et des. peuples de 1981, et aux conventions 
intemationales dfunent ratifiees. Dans cette perspective. elles prennent 
l 'engagement de lutter pendant la pen.ode de la transition pour un systeme 
respectueux des valeurs de la democratic, des droits de l'homme et des libertes 
fondamentales. 
4. Les Institutions de la transition reposeront sur le principe de la separation des 
pouvoirs entre 1' executit: le legislatif et le judiciaire. 
5. Les Institutions de la tnmsition fonctionneront selon Jes principes de la 
consensualite, de l'inclusivite et de la non-con.flictualite. 
6. La repartition des responsabitites au sein des Institutions de la transition et a 
di1ferents niveaux. de l'Etat se mit sur la base du principe de l'inclusivite et du 
partage equitable entre les Composantes et Entites au Dialogue inter•congolais 
selon des criteres de competence. de credibilite, d'honorabilite et dans un esprit de 
reconciliation · nationale. Les modalites de mise en application du principe de 
l'inclusivite sont prevues a !'Annexe du p~esent Accord inclusif. 
7. La repartition entre les dilferentes Parties des postes au sein du Gouvemement de 
Ja transition, et en particulier au sein des commissions gouvernementales, devra 
etre aussi juste que possible-en..teanes de.nombre, de poids des ministeres et des 
postes gouvemementaux. Un equilibre devra etre recherche entre les commissions 
elles-memes. La repartition des postes a~ sein de chaque commission se fera par 
les Parties signataires dans un ordre de priorite garantissant un equilibre general 
entre les Parties. 
8. Afin de realiser la reconciliation nationale, l'amnistie sera accordee pour les faits 
de guerre, Jes infractions politiques et d'opinion, a !'exception des crimes de 
guerre, des crimes de genocide et des crimes contre l'humanite. A cet effet, 
r Assemblee nationale de transition adoptera une loi d'amnisitie confonnement 
aux principes universels et a la legislation intemationale. A titre- provisoire, et 
jusqu'a !'adoption et la promulgation de la Joi d'amnistie, l'amnistie sera 
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promulguee par Decret-toi presidentiet. Le principe de l'amnistie sera consacre 
dans la Constitution de la transition. 
IV - De la duree de la transition , · 
La periode de transition prend effet a compter de l'investiture du Gouvemement de la 
transition. L'election du nouveau President marque la fin de la periode de transition. 
L·eJection du President a lieu apres Jes elections legislatives. Les elections se tiennent 
dans Jes 24 mois qui suivent le debut de la periode de· transition. En raison de 
problemes specifiquetnent lies a I 'organisation des elections, ~ette periode peut etre 
prolongee de 6 mois, renouvelable une seule fois pour une duree de 6 mois, si les 
circonstances l'exigent, sur proposition de la Commission electoraJe independante et 
par une decision conjointe et dument motivee de l' Assemblee nationale et du Senat. 
V - Des Institutions de la transition 
Pendant la periode de la transition, ii est cree un Executif de la transition, un Parlement 
de la transition compose d'une Assembtee nationale et d'un Senat, un pouvoir judiciaire 
constitue notamment des Cours et Tribunaux existants, et des Institutions d'appui a la 
democratie, dans les conditions determinees dans la Constitution de la transition. 
Les Institutions de Ia transition sont 
- Le President de la Republique, 
- Le Gouvemement, 
• L" Assemblee nationale, 
-Le Senat, 
• Les cours et les tribunaux. 
· En plus des Institutions ci-dessus, sont creees les Institutions d'appui a la democratie 
suivantes : · 
- La Commission electorate independante, 
- L'Observatoire national des droits de l'homme, 
- La Haute autorite des medias, 
- La Commission veritc et reconciliation, 
-~ Commission de l'ethique et de la lutte contre la corruption. 
1 - Le Pouvoir executit 
A . Le President 
a. Le President de la Republique est le Chef de l'Etat. Il represente la Nation. 11 
veille au respect de Ja Constitution de Ia transition. Le President de la Republique 
est le Co.Dlll)andant supreme des Forces Annees. Il preside Je Conseil superieur de 
Ja Defense. Il convoque et preside le Conseil des Mmistres une fois tous les 
quinze jours, Le President de la Republique demeure en fonction pour toute la 
duree de Ia transition. 
b. Le President de Ia Republique exerce les fonctions et pouvoirs suivants: 
b/1. n promulgue les lois. 
b/2. 11 nomme et revoque, sur proposition des Composantes et Entites. les 
Ministres et les Vice-Ministres. 
b/3 . . n accredite les Ambassadeurs et les Envoyes extraordinaires aupres des 
puissances etrangeres et des organisations intemationales. Les Ambassadeurs et 
Jes Envoyes extraordinaires sont accredites aupres de lui. 
b/4. Confonnement aux dispositions du present Accord et de ses Annexes, i1 
nomme: 
(i) Les hauts fonctionnaires de l 'Etat; 
(ii) Les officiel'S de 1' Annee et de la Police apres deliberation en Conseil 
Superieur de_ la Defense; 
(iii) Les Gouvemeul'S et Vice-Gouvemeurs de Province; 
(iv) Le Gouverneur et les Vice-Gouvemeurs de1a Banque centrale; 
(v) Les Ambassadeurs et les Envoyes extraordinaires; 
(vi) Les membres d ~ Conseil superieur de la Magistrature; 
(vii) Les mandataires de l'Etat dans les entreprises'publiques et para-
etatiques. 
b/5. Sur proposition du Conseil superieur de la Magistrature. ii nomme et revoque 
les magistrats du Siege et du Parquet apres en avoir informe le Gouvemement. 
b/6. ll conf'ere Jes grades des Ordres nationaux et les decorations confonnement a 
la Joi. 
b/7. II a le droit de grace et peut remettre, commuer et rcduire Jes peines apres en 
avoir infonne le Gouvernement · 
b/8. II declare Ja guerre. l'etat de siege et d'urgence sur decision du Conseil des 
Ministres apres avis confonne des deu,c Chambres du Parlement. 
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c,. _ Les fonctions de President de la Repub!ique prennent fin par demission, deces, 
empechement definiti( condamnation pour haute trahison, detournement de 
deniers publics. concussion ou corruption. En cas de cessation de functions, .la 
Composante a laquelle appartient le President de Ia Republique presente son 
rempla~nt a rAssemhiee nationale pour enterinement. endeans sept jours. Le 
Vice-President qui releve de la Composante Gouvemement assurera I 'interim. Les 
conditions de mise en oeuvre de cette disposition seront detenninees dans la 
Constitution de la transition. 
B. La Presidenst 
d. La Presidence est composee du President et des quatre Vice-Presidents. 
e. Le President assure, avec les Vice-Presidents, un leadership necessaire et 
exemplaire dans l'interet de l'unite nationale en RDC. · 
f. Le President de la Republique tr.lite avec les Vice-Presidents de toutes les 
matieres relatives a la gestion du Gouvemement, ainsi que des matieres 
mentionnees aux points A/b/b4 (i) et (v). 
g. Les reunions entre Je President et Jes Vice-Presidents se tiennent regulierement, 
au moins une fois toutes Jes deux: serna.ines, et dans taus les cas avant chaque 
Conseil des Ministres. Les reunions entre le President et les Vice-Presidents 
peuvent aussi etre convoquees par le President de la Republique a la demande 
d'un Vice•President. En cas d'absence du President de la Republique, celui-ci 
designe a tour de role le Vice-President qui presidera Jes reunions. 
C. Les Vice;,!Wsidents 
, h. · Il est cree quatre pastes de Vice•Presidents. Les Vice-Presidents seront issus des 
Composantes Gouvemement, RCD, MLC et Opposition politique. Chaque Vice-
President sera en charge d'une des quatre commissions 
gouvemement.ales suivantes: 
• Commission politique (Composante RCD); 
- Commission economique et financiere (Composante MLC); 
- Commission pour la reconstruction et le developpement ( Composante 
Gouvemement); 
- Commission sociale et culturelle (Composante Opposition politique). 
1. Les Vice-Presidents exercent les fonctions et pouvoirs suivants: 
ill. Ils convoquent et president les reunions de leur commission. 
i/2. Ds presentent Jes rapports de leur commission au Conseil des Ministres. 
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i/3. Ils coordonnent-et supervisent Ia mise en application des decisions du Conseil 
des Ministres en rappon avec leur commission respective. 
i/4. Ils proposent au. President de la Republique les grades dans les Ordres 
nationaux et Jes decorations, conformement a la loi. 
J. Lesfonctions de Vice-President prennent fin par demission, deces, empechement 
defitinif. condamnation pour haute trahison, detoumement de deniers publics, 
concussion ou corruption. En cas de cessation de fonctions, la Composante dont 
est issu le Vice--President conceme presente son rempla~nt a I' Assemblee 
nationale pour enterinement L'interim ainsi que les conditions de mise en 
application de cettc disposition seront determines dans la Constitution de la 
transition. · 
D. Le Gouvemement 
k. Le Gouvemement est compose du President de la Republique, des Vice-
Presidents, des Ministres et Vice-ministres. Les portefeuilles ministeriels sont 
repartis entre Jes Composantes et Entites du DIC dans les conditions et selon les 
criteres determines dans l'Annexe I du present Accord. 
I. Le Gouvemement definit et conduit la politique de la Nation conformement aux 
Resolutions du DIC. 
m. Le Gouvemement est pleinement responsable de la gestion de l'Etat et repond de 
celle•ci devant J' Assemblee nationale dans Jes conditions definies par Ia 
Constitution de Ia transition. Toutefois, pendant toute la duree de la transition, 
r A$semblee nationafe ne peut voter une motion de censure contre !'ensemble du 
Gouvemement. 
n. Les reunions du Gouvemement, O't Conseil des Ministres, ·seront presidees par le 
President de la Republique. et en son absence. ou s 'ii en decide ainsi. par un des 
Vice-President, et ce i tour de r6le. 
o. Le Gouvemement doit Etre consulte par le President de la Republique sur les 
matieres mentionnees aux points A/b/b4 (i) et (v) ci-dessus. 
p. Durant -leurs fonctions. Jes membres du Gouvemement ne peuvent, ni par eux-
m!mes ni par personne interposee, rien acheter ou louer qui appartienne au 
domaine de l'Etat. Ds sont tenus, des le jour de Jeur entree en fonction et a 
l'expi.ration de celle-ci, de faire sur l'honneur une declaration ecrite de tous leurs 
biens a J' Assemblee nationale. · 
q. Les fonctions des Ministres et Vice-ministres prennent fin par demission, 
revocation. deces, ernpechement definitif, condamnation pour haute trahison, 
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detoumement de deniers publics, concussion ou corruption. En cas de vacance, la 
Composante OU· l'Entite du DlC ciont est issu le Ministre OU Vice-ministre 
conceme presente son rempla~ant au President de la Republique. Les conditions 
de misc en application de cette disposition scront detenninees dans la Constitution 
de la transition. 
r. Un S-ecretariat general du Gouvemement assiste le President et Jes Vice-
Presidents dans la coordination de l' action gouvemementale. Il prepare les 
reunions, travau-x----et teus ·les- dossiers devant faire I' objet de disalssioo.s entre le 
President ct Jes Vice-Presidents, et au niveau du Conseil des Ministres. 
s. L'Executif de .la transition fonctionne d'une maniere solidaire, confonnement a 
!'esprit d'lm Gouvemement d'union nationale et sur Ia base d'un programme 
commun de Gouvcmement fonde sur Jes Resolutions adoptees au DIC. 
· 2 • Le Pouyolr l§gislatif 
. Le Parlement de la transition est compose de deux Chambres; J'Assemblee nationale et le 
Scnat. 
a. UAssemblee nationale est !'institution legislative pendant la periode de la 
transition. Elle exerce les pouvoirs et fonctions detennines dans la Constitution de 
la transition qui est partie integrante du present Accord. 
b. VAssemblee nationale comprend 500 membres. Les membres de ttAssemblee 
nationale portent le titre de Depute. L • ige minimal pour etre depute est de 2S ans 
revolus a la date de designation. Les depLttes ont droit i une indemnite mensuelle 
et equitable qui ]eur assure I •independance et une sortie honorable au tennc de 
leur mandat • 
. 
c. Les deputes seront designes par leurs Composantes et Entites du DIC dans les 
conditions determinees dans le document annexe au present Accord. Toutes les 
Composantes et Entites doivcnt assurer une representation provinciale equilibree 
dans leur groupe. 
d. Le Bureau de l'Assemblee nationale sera compose d'un President, de trois Vice-
Presidents, d'un Rapporteur et de trois Rapporteurs-adjoints. Chacun d'eux sera 
issu d'une C-omposante ou diune Entite differente. 
e. Le Senat jouera le role de mediateur en cas de con.flit entre les Institutions. Il 
elabo~ l'avant-projet de Constitution devant regir le Pays apres la transition. n 
exercera Ia fonction legislative concurremment avec l'Assemblee nationa1e en 
matiere de nationalite, de decentralisation, de processus electoral, et en ce qui 
conceme fes Institutions d'appui a la democratic. 
• 
f. Le Sepat comprend 120 membres. Les membres du Senat portent le titre de 
Senate~r t 'age minimal pour etre Senateur est de 40 ans revoius :. la date de 
designation. Les Senateurs ont droit a une indemnite mensuelle et equitable qui 
leur assure·l'independance et une sortie honorable au terme de leur mandat. 
g~ Les Senateurs sont designes par Ieurs Composantes et Enrites du DIC dans Jes 
conditions determinees dans le document annexe au present Accord inclusif. Le 
Senat est constitue de maniere a assurer la representation de toutes Jes Provinces. 
h. Le Bureau du Senat sera compose d 'un President, de trois Vice-Presidents, d'un 
Rapporteur et de trois Rapporteurs-adjoints, comme prevu dans le present 
Accord. Chacun d'eux sera issu d'une Composante ou d'une Entite differente. 
1. Les fonctions de President de I' Assemblee nationa1e et de President du Senat 
prennent fin par demission, deces, empechement definitif, ou condamnation pour 
haute trahison, detoumement des deniers publics, concussion ou corruption . 
3- Le Pouvoir jildiciaire 
a. Les Parties. rcaffirment la neeessite d'avoir un pouvoir judiciaire independant Le 
Conseil superieur de la magistrature est la juridiction disciplinaire des magistrats. 
:~ n veiUc sur la carriere des magistrats et la sauvegarde de leur independance. 
b. L'organisation du pouvoir judiciaire sera determinee dans la Constitution de la 
transition et dans une Joi. 
c. Le premier President de la Cour supreme de justice, le Procureur general de la 
Republique et l'Audi~eur general des Forces annees seront designes et mis en 
place aussitot apres la signature du present Acc9rd global et inclusit dans le 
respect des equilibres nationaux, selon un· mecanisme qui sera '1efini par les 
Parties. • 
4- Les Institutions d'appui i la democratie 
a. Il ec;t cree les Institutions d'appui a la democratic suivantes: 
.. 
La Commission electorale independante; 
La Haute autorite des medias; 
La Commission verite et reconciliation; 
L'Observatoire national des droits de l'homme; 
La Commission de l'ethique et de 1a lutte contre )a corruption. 
b. L'organisation, le fonctionnement et les pouvoirs des Institutions d'appui a la 
democratie seront determines par la Joi. 
c. Les fonctions de Presidents des Institutions d'appui a la democratie revient a la 
Compo;;ante Forces vives. Les Presidents des Institutions d'appui a la democratie 
ont rang de Ministre. Les Institutions d'appui a Ja· democratie fonctionnent 
independamment du Gouvemement de la transition. Les fonctions de Presidents 
des Institutions d'appui a la democratie prennent fin par demission. deces, 
empechement defi.nitit: ou coadamnat-ion pour haute trahisen, detournemeat de 
deniers publics, concussion ou corruption. En cas de cessation de fonctions, la 
Composante, a laquelle appartient un President de l'une des Institutions presente 
son rempla;ant a l 'Assemblee nationale pour enterin.ement, endeans sept jours. 
VI- De l'armee 
a. A l'issue du Dialogue inter-congolais, il y aura un mecanisme pour la fonnation 
d·une Annee Nationale, restructuree et integree incluant Jes Forces Annees du 
gouvemement de la Republique Democratique du Congo, les Forces Annees du 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratic et les Forces Annees du 
Mouvement de Liberation du Congo, conformement au point 20 !'article 3 des 
principes de l'accord de Lusaka 
b. Dans un souci. de paix. d'unite et de reconciliation nationales, le mecanisme 
precite devra inclure le RCD-ML, le RCD-N et Jes Mai-Mru, selon des modalites 
a definir par les institutions politiques de la transition issues du Dialogue inter-
congolais. 
c. Une reunion des Etats-Majors F AC, RCD. MLC, RCD-N, RCD-1.vlL et Mai-Mai 
sera convoquee avant l'installation du gouvemement de la transition. Elle 
procedera a r elaboration du mecanisme militaire charge de la formation des 
autres Etats-Majors jusqu'au niveau des regions mil~taires .. 
d. Il ·est cree un Conseil superieur de la Defense. Le Conseil superieur de la Defense 
est preside par le President de Ja Republique et, en cas d'absence, par le Vice-
President ayant la Defense dans ses attributions. 
e. Le Conseil Superieur de la Defense est compose comme suit 
Le President de la Republique; 
Les quatre Vice-Presidents; 
Le Ministre.de la Defense; . 
Le Ministre de l'Interieur. de la Decentralisation et de la Securite; 
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres; 
Le Chef d'Etat-Major General de I' Annee (ses adjoints peuvent y etre 
invites); 
Le Chef d'Etat-Major des Forces aeriennes, le Chef d'Etat-Major des 
Forces te-.rrestres et le Chef d'Etat-Major des Forces naval es. 
f. Le Conseil superieur de la Defense donne un avis conform.e sur la proclamation 
de r'etat de-siege, la proclamation de l'etat d'urgence et la declaration de guerre. 
g. La. loi sur rarmee et Ia Defense nationale determine les attributions et le 
fonctionnement du Conseil superieur de la Defense. 
h. Le Conseil superieur de la Defense donne un avis notamment sur les rnatieres 
suivantes : 
La formation d'une annee national~ restructuree et integree; 
Le desarmement des groupes armes; 
La supervision du retrait des troupes etrangeres; 
L'elaboration de la politique de defense. 
1. Les conditions de mise en application des dispositions relatives a l'armee seront 
determinees par la loi. 
VIl - Dispositions finales 
a. La Constitution de la transition est elaboree sur la base du present Accord inclusif sur 
Ia transition en RDC et en fait partie integrante. 
b. Les Parties acceptent comme ayant force obligatoire les Annexes ci-apres, qui font 
partie integrante du prc$sent Accord. 
c. Les Parties convieMent decreer un mecanisme demise en.oeuvre du present 
Accord. · 
d. Le present Accord global et inclusif entre en vigueur a la date de son adoption par le 
DIC. La Constitution de la transition, qui sera adoptee par le DIC, entre en vigueur a 
la date de sa promulgation par le President de la Republique. 
e. Les Parties s'engagent a executer le present Accord de bonne foi, a respecter ses 
dispositions, a prendre part a toutes les Institutions, structures et commissions qui 
seront creees confonnement a ses dispositions. Elles s'engagent a tout mettre en 
oeuvre pour veiller au respect et a rapplication du present Accord. 
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VIII - ANNEXES 
Annexe I: De la repartition des responsabilites 
Annexe II: Des entreprises publiques 
Annes.e m: De la Commission de suivi de !'Accord 
Annexe IV: De la garantie intemationale 
Annexe V: Des questions securitaires 
ANNEXE I; De la repartition des responsabilites 
A. Gouvernement 
I.La participation des Composantes et Entites du DIC au Gouvemement de la transition 
est fondee sur le mode de leur participation au DIC de Sun•City. 
2. Le Gouvemement de la transition sera compose des Ministeres suivants: 
Interieur, Decentralisation et Securite; 
Affaires Etrangeres et Cooperation Internationale; 
Cooperation Regionale; 
Defense Nationale, Demobilisation et Anciens Combattants; 
Condition Feminine et Famille; 
Justice; 
Droits Humains; 














Poste, Telephone et Telecommunications; 
Recherche Scientifique; 
Travaux Publics et Inftastructures; 
Trantports; 






Enseignement Superieur et Universitaire; 
Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire; 
Travail et Prevoyanee Sociale; 
Affaires Sociales; 
Jeunesse et Spons; 
SoHdarite et Afraires Humanitaires. 
3. Le Gouvemement de la transition comprendra egalement Jes Vice-Ministres charges 
des portefeuilles suivants; 
Affaires Etrangeres; 
lnterieur; 
Jntegration de l'Armee; 
Cooperation Internationale; 
Defense; 
Anciens Combattants et DemobiJisation; 
Securite et Onfre Public; 
Justice; 









Travaux Publics et Infrastructures; 
F onction Publique; 
Transports; 
Sante; 
Enseignement Superieur et Universitaire; 
Enseignement Prirnaire, Secondaire et Professionnel; 
Affilires Sociales; 
Travail et Prevoyance Sociale. 
1.11 
4. II sera Rttrabue 7 Ministeres et 4 postes de Vice-Ministres a chacu11e des Composantes 
suivantes: Gouvemement, RCD, MLC et Opposition politique (Voir tableaux ci· 
dessous). 
5. II sera attribue 2 Ministeres et 3 postes de Vice-Ministres a la Composante Forces 
vives (en plus de la Presidence des 5 Institutions d1appui a Ia democratic). (Voir tableaux 
ci-dessous). · 
6. II sera attribue 2 Ministeres et 2 postes de Vice-Ministres a chacune des Entites 
suivantes: RCD-ML, RCD-N, et Mai-Mai. (V oir tableaux ci-dessous ). 

Tableau 2: Des Vice-Ministres 
1111mlssion Gouvem. RCD MLC Oppolidon SoekteeMle RCD-ML ROD-N Mal-Mal 
noUtlou 
mmission 1. Aft'alres 1. Coop. I. lntmeur 1. Danobilisation 1. Justice I. Prcsscet 
litiquc Etrangeres Intcmati ·2. Defense ctAnc:ials Infmnation 
2. Intqration onale Combattants 
del'Annee 2. Securitcet 
OnnPublic 
mmission 3. Mines 3. Budgct 3. Finances 1. Plan 3. Comrnett.C 
momique 4. Travaux 4. Portefeuille 2. Fonction 4. Agriculture 
:mancierc Publics ct Publics 
Infrastructures 
,mmission 3. Encrgie l. Trans-
urla ports 
:onstruc 
11 et le 
~elopt 
imrnission 4.Enscignemcnt 4. Sante 2. Ensc:ignemcnt · 2. Affaircs 2. Travail ct 
:ialc et Primairc. Supaicurct Sociales Prevoyance 




B. Assemblee nationale 
l. La participation des Composantes et Entites du DIC a l'Assemblee nationale est 
fondee sur le mode de leur participation au DIC de Sun-City. L'Assemblee est composee 
de la maniere ci-apres: 
Composantes/Entites N,ombres de deputes 
RCD 94 
MLC 94 
Gouvemement 94 . 
Opposition politique 94 





2. Le Bureau de l'Assemblee nationale est compose de la maniere ci-apres: 
- President: MLC; 
- Premier Vice-President: Gouvemement; 
- Deuxieme Vice-President RCD; 
- Troisieme Vice-President Opposition politique 
- Rapponeur. Mai-Mar; 
- Premier Rapporteur adjoint Forces vives. 
- Deuxieme Rapporteur adjoint RCD-N 
- Troisieme Rapporteur adjoint: RCD-ML 
C. __ senat 
I. La participation des Composantes et Entites du DIC au Senat est fondee sur le 
mode de Jeur participation au DIC de Sun-City. Le Senat est composee de la maniere ci-
apres: 




Oooosition oolitique 22 
Forces vives 22 





; • . .. 
2. Le Bureau du Senat est compose de la maniere ci-apres: 
- P~sidcnt Forces vives; 
• Premier Vice-President: RCD; 
- Deuxieme Vice-President: Opposition politiq1.:,e; 
- Troisieme Vice-President: Gouvemement; 
- Rapporteur. RCD-ML; 
- Premier Rapporteur adjoint: RCD-N; 
- Deuxieme Rapportcm adjoint. MLC; 
- Troisieme Rapporteur adjoint: Mai-Mai. 
D. Administration provinclale 
1. Les Gouverneurs et Vice-Oouvemeurs en fonction restent en place jusqu 'a 1a 
nomination· des nouveaux Gouvemeurs et Vice-Oouvemeurs par le Gouvernement 
d'Union Nationale. 
E. Diplomatie 
1. Le Gouvemement de la transition procedera i la nomination des Ambassadeurs au 
couts du premier semestre en tenant compte de la proportionnalite des sensibilites 
po1iti.< · ··es au sein du Gouvemement • 
. .... 
2. Il sera tenu compte, dans les no~inations, des Ambassadeurs de carriere. 
ANNEXE II: Des entre2rlses publiques 
1. Le Gouvemement d'Union nationale procedera a la mise en place des 
gestionnaires des entreprises publiques et d 'economie mixte, en prenant en 
compte les criteres de moralite, de competence et d'experience. En attendant, les 
gestionnaircs en place restent en fonction . 
. . 
ANNEXE Ill: De la Commission de suivi de I' Ac:cord 
1. 11 est cree unc Commission de suivi pour la mise en oeuvre du present Accord, ci-aprc:s 
denommee Commission de suivi de l'Accord. 
2. La Commission de suivi de l'Accord est presidee par le President de la Republique 
Democratique du Congo, Son Excellence le General-Major Joseph Kabila. 
... 
3. La Commission de suivi de !'Accord est composee de deux Hauts-Representants par 
Compornnte et d•un Haut-Representant par Entire, non-compris le President de la 
Commission lui-meme. 
4. La Commission de suivi de l1Accord exercera Jes functions suivantes: 
a. Assurer le suivi de l'application effective des dispositions du present Accord. 
b. VeilJer a l1interpretatiO'l correcte du present Accord. 
c. Concilier les points de vue et aider a resoudre les desaccords pouvant surgir 
entre les signataires. 
S. La Commission de suivi de l'Accord est creee des l'eritree en vigueur du present 
Accord. Sa mission prend tin apres la presentation de son rapport au Gouvernement de la 
transition, au plus taro un mois apres la mise en place dudit Gouvemement 
ANNEXE IV: De la garantie intemationale 
1. II est prevu un Comite intemational visant a garantir la bonne mise en oeuvre du 
present Accord et a soutenir le programme de la transition en RDC. conformement aux 
presentes dispositions; 
2. Le Comite international apportera son soutien actif a Ja securisation des institutions de 
la transition issues du DIC et a rapplication effective des dispositions du Chapitre 8.2.2 
de l'Annexe A de l'Accord de Lusaka, en ce qui conceme notamment,. la neutralisation et 
le rapatriement des groupes armes operant sur le territoire de Ia RDC. 
3. Le Comite international arbitrera et tranchera tout desaccord pouvant survenir entre les 
Parties au present Accord. 
4. Le Comite international assistera la Commission de su1v1 de l'Accord dans 
l'accomplissement de son mandat 
ANNEXE V: Des questions securitaires 
1. La securite des dirigeants politiques i. Kinshasa-s-era reglee comme suit: 
a Chaque dirigeant politique aura 5 a 15 gardes du corps pour assurer sa securite 
personneUe. 
b. Aucune force armee congolaise supplementaire ne pourra etre acheminee a 
Kinshasa afin d1eviter toute possibilite de confrontation armee. 
c. La reunion des Etats-Majors FAC, RCD,MLC, RCD-N, RCD-Mr.:et Mai-Mai 
pourra proposer des mesures de securite additionnelles pour certains dirigeants 
selon Jes besoins. 
'){\ 
2. Les mesµres de securite interimaires suivantes seront mises en place: 
a. Une force de police integree sera chargee d'assurer la securite du 
Gouvemement et de Ia population. 
b. · La Communaute intemationale apportera son soutien actif a la securisation des 
institutions de la transition. 
Signe a Pretoria le 16 Decembre 2002 
:::::> pages de signature des parties 
au present Accord et des Temoins (5 pages) 
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Pour le Rassemblement Conaolais pour la Democratie/National (RCD-N) : 




Son Excellence M. Thabo-Mbeki, 
President de la R6publique d' Afrique 
du Sud et Pr&ident en exercice de 
l'Union Africaine: 
Son Excellence M. Moustapha Niasse, 
Envoye special du Secretaire general 
des Nations Unies pour le Dialogue 
Intercongolais, representant Son 
Excellence M. Kofi Annan, Secretaire 
g<!n&al de l'ONU fL. • 
Appendix viii 
Pastoral Letters of the Catholic Church in Zaire During Mobutu's Rule 
DOCl:'Mf.~n Dl1 (HRJSn.\~1*£ AJtiU('..W.,. 8· 
CMIN M ~'\ff,.ft F~ .\hW~o ~at<'",;J'f: 
C'.4,E.K 
Le dlscours socio-politique de rEgHse 
catholique du Congo (1956-1998) 
Tonie 1: .~ 
Textes de Ja Conference EpJst:opale 
ie.1.es ~ssembhise1 ~ pw - . 
ufrlt de SAINT MOULIM sJ. at '°9e, GAISE WGanzt o.p. 
FACULTES CATHOUQUES DE KINSHASA 
1998 
Appendix ix 
Excerpt from the Lualabourg Constitution 
II ne jouit des droits reserves aux Congolais par la presente Constitution que dans la mesure 
fixee par la loi nationale. 
Titre Ill. De la repartition des competences entre la Republique et 
les provinces. 
Article 47. 
La repartition des competences entre la Republique et les provinces est fixee par la presente 
Constitution. 
Les matieres sont de la competence exclusive de la Republique, de la competence concurrente 
de la Republique et des provinces, ou de la competence exclusive des provtnees. 
Article 48. 
Sans prejudice des autres dispositions de la presente Constitution. les matieres suivantes sont 
de la competence exclusive de la Republique : 
1 ° Les affa1res etrangeres comprenant les relations diplomatiques ainsi que les traites et 
accords 1nternationaux ; 
2° La reglementation du commerce exterieur ; 
3° La nat1onalite, le statut et la police des etrangers ; 
4° L'extradition, !'immigration. !'emigration et la delivrance des passeports et des visas; 
5° La surete exterieure; 
6° La defense nationale ; 
7° La police de la capitale; 
8° La fonction publique nationale ; 
9° Les finances publiques de la Republique ; 
10° L'etablissement des impots sur le revenu, des impOts sur res societes et des impOts 
personnels conformement a l'article 144; 
11 ° La dette publique de la Republique ; 
12° Les emprunts exterieurs pour les besoins de !a Republique ou des provinces ; 
13q Les emprunts interieurs pour les besoins de la Republique ; 
14°:La monnaie, l'em1ssion de la monnaie et le pouvoir liberatoire de la monnaie ; 
15° Les poids at mesure ; 
16° Les douanes et les droits d'importation et d'exportation ; 
17° Le code de commerce, y compris les assurances ; 
18° La reglementation concernant les banques et les operations bancaires : 
19° Le controle des changes ; 
20° La propriete litteraire, artistique et industrielle et les brevets; 
21° Les postes·et Jes telecommunications, y compris !es telephones et telegraphes, la 
radiodiffusion et la television ; 
22° La navigation maritime et interieure, les lignes aeriennes, les chemins de fer, les routes et 
autres voies de communication, naturelles ou artificielles qui relient deux ou plusieurs provinces 
ou le territoire de la Republique a un territoire etranger ou qu'une loi nationale a declare d'interet 
national bien qu'elles soient entierement s1tuees sur le territoire d'une province ; 
23° Les universites et autres etablissements d'enseignement scientif1que ou professionnel 
superieur crees ou subventionnes par le Gouvernement central ou par les gouvernements 
provinciaux et qu'une loi nationale a declares d'interet national ; 
24° L'etablissement des normes d'enseignement applicable dans tout le territoire de la 
Republique; 
25° Le code penal, le regime penitentiaire; 
26° La procedure suivie devant les cours et tribunaux; 
27° L'acquisition des biens pour Jes besoins de la Republique, sans prejudice des dispositions 
de !'article 43 ; 
28° Les professions juridiques et medicales ; 
29° La legislation du travail comprenant notamment les lois regissant les relations entre 
employeurs et travailleurs, la securite des travailleurs, les regles relatives a la securite sociale 
et, en particulier, le regles relatives aux assurances sociales et au chomage obligatoire ; 
30c La legislation economique comprenant notamment les leis concernant les mines, mineraux 
et huiles minerales, l'industrie, les sources d'energ1e et la conservation des ressources 
naturelles; 
31 ° La legislation sur les arts et metiers ; 
32° La legislation medicale et l'art de guerir, la medecine preventive, notamment !'hygiene, la 
sa/ubrite publique et la protection materielle et infantile, la legislation sur la profession de 
pharmacien, sur le commerce pharmaceutique, sur !'immigration et ire transit, les reglements 
sanitaires bilateraux et internationaux, la legislation sur !'hygiene du travail, la repartition des 
medecins; 
33° L'elaboration des programmes agricoles et forestiers d'interet national et la coordination des 
programmes d'interet provincial; res offices des produits agricoles et les organismes assimiles 
ainsi que la repartition du personnel de cadre conformement aux dispositions du statut general 
des agents de !'administration publique; la legislation generale sur les regimes agricoles et 
forestiers, sur la chasse et la peche, sur la conservation de la nature (faune et flore), sur la 
capture, sur l'elevage, sur les denrees alimentaires d'origine animale et sur l'art veterinaire; 
34 ° Le patrimoine historique, les monuments publics et les pares declares d'interet national ; 
35° Les services de la meteorologie et la coordination technique des services de la geodesie, de 
la cartographie et de l'hydrographie. 
Article 49. 
Sans prejudice des autres dispositions de la presente Constitution, les matieres suivantes sont 
de la competence concurrente de la Republique et des provinces : 
1 ° La mise en reuvre et la sauvegarde des droits fondamentaux consacres dans la presente 
Constitution ; 
2° Le droit civil et le droit coutumier; 
3° Les statistiques et le recensement ; 
4 ° La securite interieure ; 
5° L'administration des cours et tribunaux, les maisons d'arret et les prisons pour peines ; 
6° La vie culturelle; 
7° L'etablissement des impots, y compns les droits d'accise et de consommation, a ]'exclusion 
des impOts vises a !'article 48 ; 
8° !'execution des mesures sur la police des etrangers; 
9° La recherche scientifique ainsi que les institutions de recherche scientifique : 
10° Les institutions medicales et philanthropiques, l'engagement du personnel medical et 
agricole de cadre. 
Article 50. 
Sans prejudice des autres dispositions de la presente Constitution, toutes les matieres autres 
que celles qui sont enumerees aux articles 48 et 49 sont de la competence exclusive des 
provinces et notamment res matieres suivantes : 
1 ° Les institutions politiques et administratives provinciales ; 
2° La fonction publique provinciale ; 
3° La loi electorale provinciale; 
4 ° Les finances publiques provmciales ; 
5° La dette publique provinc1ale ; 
6° Les emprunts interieurs pour les besoins des provinces ; 
7° L'octroi de concession et de baux sur les terres, mines, mineraux, huiles minerales, 
ressources hydrauliques, fon~ts et autres biens nationaux ; 
8° Les travaux publics d'interet local; 
9° La police provinciale, 
10° L'enseignement autre que celui qui est vise a !'article 48 ; 
11 ° Les institutions locales ; 
12° L'acquisition des biens pour res besoins des provinces sans prejudice des dispositions de 
!'article 43 ; 
13° L'etablissement des peines d'amende ou de prison pour assurer le respect des lois 
provinciales; 
14° les communications interieures des provinces ; 
15° Les taxes et droits locaux ; 
16° Le placement des travail!eurs et la fixation des salaires minima dans le respect de la 
legislation nationale ; la discipline du personnel de !'inspection du travail conformement au statut 
des agents de !'administration publique ; la surveillance des services et des agents de 
l'organisme national de :..ecurite sociale conformement au statut de ces agents ; 
17° L'affectation du personnel medical conformement au statut des agents de !'administration 
publique, l'etablissement des programmes d'assainissement et de campagne de Jutte contre Jes 
maladies endemo .. epidemiques conformement au planning national, !'organisation des services 
d'hygiene et de prophylaxie provinciale, !'application et le contrOle de la legislation medicale et 
pharmaceutique nationale, ainsi que !'organisation des services pharmaceutiques, la medec;ne 
curative, les entreprises medicales philanthropiques et missionnaires ainsi que les laboratoires 
medicaux; 
18° L'elaboration des programmes agricoles et forestiers et leur execution conformement aux 
normes generales du planning national. L'affectation du personnel agricole de cadre 
conformement aux dispositions du statut general des agents de !'administration publique ; 
!'application de la legislation nationale en matiere agricole, forestiere, en elevage, en chasse et 
peche, a la conservation de la nature et a la capture, sans prejudice des dispositions de !'article 
48 (33°); 
19° Le patrimoine historique, les monuments publics et les pares autres que ceux vises a 
!'article 48 (34 °) ; 
20° Le controle administratif des services de la geodesie, de la cartographie et de l'hydrographie. 
Article 51. 
Une assemblee provinciale ne peut legiferer sur les matieres de la 
competence exclusive du Partement. Reciproquement, le Parlement ne peut legiferer sur les 
matieres de la competence exclusive d'une 
assemblee provinciale. 
Toutefo1s, le Parlement peut, par une loi, habiliter une assemblee provinciale a legiferer sur des 
matieres de sa competence exclusive. Lorsque le Parlement met fin a la delegation de pouvoir 
ainsi donnee a J'assemblee, les dispositions des lois provinciales promulguees en des matieres 
de la competence exclusive du Parlement, en vertu de cette delegation de pouvoir, demeurent 
cependant en vigueur dans la province interessee JUsqu'a ce qu'une loi nationale ait regle ces 
matieres. 
Pareillement, une assemblee provinciale peut, par une fol, habiliter le Parlement a legiferer sur 
des matieres de sa competence exclusive. Lorsque l'assemblee met fin a la delegation de 
pouvoir amsi donnee au Parlement, les dispositions des lois nationales promulguees en des 
matieres de la competence exclusive des assemblees, en vertu de cette delegation de pouvoir, 
demeurent cependant en vigueur dans la province interessee jusqu'a ce qu'une loi provinciale 
les ait reglees. 
Dans les matieres relevant de la competence concurrente de la Republique et des provinces, 
toute loi provinciale incompatible avec les lois et reglements d'execution nat1onaux est nulle, ou 
abrogee de plein droit, dans la mesure ou ii y a incompatibilite. 
Droit national prime droit provincial. 
Article 52. 
Sauf dispositions contraires de la legislation n-ationale, les gouvernements provinciaux 
executent, par l'intermediaire de leurs 
services, les lois et les reglements nation~ux. 
Titre IV. Des institutions nationales. 
Article 53. 
Les principales institutions nationales sont : 
1 ° Le President de la Republique ; 
2° Le Gouvernement, dirige par un Premier ministre; 
3° Le Parlement, compose de deux Chambres; 
4° La Cour constitutionnelle ; 
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Constitution du 1 er aoOt 1964 
Preambu/e. 
Titre I. Dispositions generales. 
Titre II. Des-droits fondamentaux. 
Titre Ill. De la repartition des competences entre la Republique et les provinces. 
Titre IV. Des institutions nationales. 
Titre V. Des institutions provinciales. 
Titre VJ. Du p01;1voir judiGiaire. 
Titre VII. Des organismes auxiliaires. 
Titre VIII. Des finances publiques. 
Titre IX. Del'administraticin. 
Titre X. Des forces de l'ordre. 
Titre XI. De la Cour constitutionne/le. 
Titre XII. Des incompatibilites. 
Titre XIII. De la revision constitutionnelle. 
Titre XIV. Dispositions transitoires. 
Titre XV. Dispositions fiscales. 
La Commission constitutionneile ayant siege a Luluabourg du 10 Janvier au 11 avril 1964, a 
propose; 
Le peuple congolais, par le referendum constitutionnel organise du 25 juin au .1 O juillet 1964, a 
adopte; 
Le President de la Republique promulgue la Constitution dont la teneut suit: 
Preambule. 
Proclamant notr.e adhesion a la Declaration universelle des droits de l'homme ; 
Soucieux de sauvegarder les valeurs qui nous sent propres et de garantir a la famille, base 
riaturelle de toute societe huf""laine, une protection particuliere des pouvoirs publics de maniere a 
en assurer la cohesion et la stabilite; 
Affirmant notre determination de consolider notre unite nationale dans le respect de nos 
particularites regionales, en vue de promouvoir, dans la voie de la.justice, notre bien-~tre 
materiel, notre epanouissement moral et spirituel , 
Nous, Peuple congolais, 
Conscient de nos responsabilites devant Dieu, la nation, l'Afrique et le Monde : 
Declarons solennellement adopter la presente Constitution. 
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PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO 
EXPOSE D£S MOTIFS 
Depuis .son..imiependance, le 30-Juin 1.960,. la RepubJique-Democratique oo. 
Congo est confr-ontee a des crises politiques recurr-entes dont l'une des causes 
fondamentaies est la contestation de la legitimite des Institutions et de leurs animateurs. 
Cette. contestation a pris un relief particulier avec les guerres qui ont dechire le pays de 
1996 a 20.03. 
En vue .de mettre fin a cette crise chronique de legitimite et de donner au 
pays toutes les chances de se reconstruire, les delegues de la classe politique et de la 
Societe civile, forces vives de la Nation, reunis en Dialogue intercongolais, ont convenu, 
dans !'Accord Global et lnclusif signe a Pretoria en Afrique du Sud le 17 decembre 2002, 
de mettre en place Lin nouvel ordre politique, fonde sur une nouvelle Constitution 
democratique sur base de laquelle le peuple congolais puisse choisir souverainement ses 
dirigeants, au terme des elections libres, pluralistes, democratiques, transparentes et 
credibles. 
A l'effet de materialiser la volonte politique ainsi exprimee par les 
participants au Dialogue intercongolais, le Senat, issu de !'Accord Global et lnclusif preclte, 
a depose, conformement a !'article 104 de !a Constitution de la transition, un avant-projet 
de la nouvelle Constitution a l'Assemblee nationale qui /'a adopte sous forme de projet de 
Constitution soumis au referendum populaire. 
La Constitution ainsi approuvee s'articule pour l'essentiel autour des idees 
forces ci-apres : 
1. DE L'ETAT ET DE LA S0UVERA1NET£ 
Dans le but d'une part, de consolider !'unite nationale mise a ma! par des 
guerres successives et, d'autre part, de creer des centres d'impulsion et de 
developpement a la base, le constituant a structure administrativement l'Etat congolais 
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en 25 provinces plus la ville de Kinshasa dotees de la personnalite juridique et 
exer~ant des competences de prox!mite enumerees dans la presente Constitution. 
En sus de ces competences, les provinces · en exercent · d'autres 
concurremment avec le pouvoir central et se partageht les recettes nationales avec ce 
dernier respectivement a raison de 40 et de 60 %. 
· En cas de conflit de competence entre le pouvoir central et les 
provinces, la Cour constitutionnelle e~t la .seule autorite habilitee.a res departager .. 
Au demeurant, les provinces sont administrees par un Gouvernement 
provincial et une Assemblee provinciale. Elles comprennent, chacune, des entites 
territoriales decentralisees qui soot la ville, la commune, le secteur et la chefferie. 
Par ailleurs, la presente Constitution reaffirme le principe democratique 
selon lequel tout pouvoir emane du peuple en tant que souverain primalre. 
Ce peuple s'exprime dans le pluralisme politique garanti par la 
Constitution qui erige, en infraction de haute trahison, !'institution d'un parti unique. 
En ce qui concerne la nationalite, le con~titliant niaintient le principe de 
l'unicite et de l'exclusivite de la nationalite congolaise. . 
2. DES OROITS HUMAINS, DES LIBERTES FONDAMENTALES ET DES 
DEVOIRS DU CITOYEN ET DE L'ETAT 
Le constituant tient a reaffirmer l'attachenient de la Republique 
Democratique <:lu Congo aux Droits humains.et aux libertes fondamentales tels que 
proclames par les instruments juridiques internationaux auxquels elle a adhere. Aussi, 
a-t~il integre ces droits et libertes dans. le corps meme de la Constitution. 
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A cet egard, repondant aux signes du temps, l'actuelle Constitution 
introduit une innovation de taille en formalisant la parite homme-femme. 
:· 3. DE L'ORGANISATION ET DE L'EXERCICE DU POUVOIR. 
Les nouvelles Institutions de la Republique Democratique du Congo sont : 
le President de la Republique ; 
le Parlement ; 
le Gouvernement ; 
les Cours et Tribunaux. 
Les preoccupations majeures qui president a !'organisation de ces 
Institutions sont les suivantes: 
1. assurer le fonctionnement harmonieux des Institutions de l'Etat ; 
2. eviter les conflits ; 
3. instaurer un Etat de droit ; 
4. centrer toute tentative de derive dictatoriale ; 
5. garantir la bonne gouvernance ; 
6. !utter contre l'impunite ; 
7. assurer l'altemance democratique. 
C'est pourquoi, non seulement le mandat du President de la Republique n'est renouvelable 
qu'une -seule fois; mais aussi, ii exerce ses prerogatives d~ garant de la Constitution, de 
l'independance nationale, de l'integrite territoriale, de la souverainete nationale, du respect 
des accords et traites internationaux ainsi que celles de regulateur et d'arbitre du 
fonctionnement normal des Institutions de la Republique avec !'implication du 
Gouvemement sous le controle du Parlement. 
Les actes reglementaires qu'il signe dans les matieres relevant du Gouvemement ou 
sous gestion ministerielle sont couverts par le contreseing du Premier ministre qui en 
endosse la responsabilite devant l'Assemblee nationale. 
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Bien plus, !es affaiiesetrangeres, la defense et la securite, autrefois domaines reserves du 
Chef de l'Etat, sont devenues des domaines de collaboration. 
"., .. 
Cependant, le Gouvernement, sous !'impulsion· du Premier ministre, 
demeure le maitre de la conduite de la politique de la Nation qu'il definit en 
. CORcertatkm avec: le .EresideatdeJaRep1-1b!ique. 
· II est comptable de son action devant I' Assemblee nationale qui peut le sanctionner 
collectivement par !'adoption d'une motion de censure. L'Assemblee nationale peut, en 
outre, . rnettre en cause ·la responsabilite individuelle · des membres du Gouvernernent 
par une motion de defiance. 
Reunis en Congres, I' Assemblee nationale et le Sen at ont la 
competence de deferer le President de la Republique et le Premier ministre devant la 
Cour constitutionnelle, notamment pour haute trahison et delit d'initie. 
Par ailleurs, tout en jouissant du monopole du pouvoir legislatif et du 
contrOle du Gouvernement, les parlementaires ne sont pas au-dessus de la loi ; leurs 
immunites peuvent Atre levees et l'Assemblee nationale peut etre dissoute par le 
President de la Republique en cas de crise persistante avec le Gouvernement. 
La presente Constitution reaffirme l'independance du pouvoir judiciaire 
dont les mernbres sont geres par le Conseil superieur de la magistrature desormais 
compose des seuls magistrats. 
Pour plus d'efficacite, de specialite et de celertte dans le traitement des 
dossiers, les Cours et Tribunaux ont ete eclates en trois ordres juridictionnels : 
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Les juridictions de l'ordre judiciaire placees sous le contrOle de la Cour 
de cassation ; 
celles de l'ordre administratif coiffees par le Conseil d'Etat et 
la Gour constitutionnelle. 
Des dispositions pertinentes de la Constitution determinant la sphere 
d'action exclusive du pouvoir central et des provinces ainsi que ia zone concurrente 
entre les deux echelons du pouvoir d'Etat. 
Pour assurer une bonne harmonie entre les provinces elles-memes 
d'une part, et le pouvoir central d'autre part, ii est institue une Conference des 
Gouverneurs presidee par le Chef de l'Etat et dont le r61e est de servir de conseil aux 
deux echelons de l'Etat. 
De meme, le devoir de solidarite entre les differentes composantes de 
la Nation exige !'institution de la Caisse nationale de perequation placee sous la tutelle 
du Gouvernement. 
Compte tenu de l'ampleur et de la complexite des problemes de 
developpement economique et social auxquels la Republique Democratique du Congo 
est confrontee, le constituant cree le Conseil economique et social, dont la mission est 
de donner · des avis consultatifs en la matiere au· President de la Republique, au 
Parlement et au Gouvernement. 
Pour garantir la democratie en Republique Democratique du Congo, la· 
presente Constitution retient deux institutions d'appui a la democratie, a savoir la 
Commission electorale nationale independante chargee de !'organisation du processus 
electoral de fai,on permanente et le Conseil superieur de l'audiovisuel et de la 
communication dont la mission est d'assurer la liberte et la protection de la presse 
ainsi que de taus les moyens de communication des masses dans le respect de la loi. 
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4. DE .LA REVISION CONSTITUTIONNELLE 
Pour preserver les principes democratiques contenus dans la presente . . 
Constitution contre les aleas de la vie politique et les revisions intempestives, les 
dispositions relatives a la forme republicaine de !'Etat, atf principe du suffrage 
UAi~ a la. fmme.-r:epresentatwe--du Gouvemement, au. AOmbte-et -a : la -dur-ee .des 
mandats du President de la Republique, a l'independance du pouvoir judiciaire, au 
pluralisme politique et syndical ne peuvent faire l'objet d'aucune revision 
constituti.onneHe. 
Telles sont les lignes maitresses qui caracterisent la presente 
Constitution. 
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United Nations 
• Security Council Distr.: General 
ll April 2001 
Original: English 
Letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-G.eneral 
to the President of the Security Council 
I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 2 June 2000 
(S/PRST/2000/20) in which the Security Council requested me to establish a Panel 
of Expens on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The 
Council also requested that the expert panel, once established, submit to the 
Council, through me, its final report at the end of the mandate. 
Further to my letter dated 2 April 2001, I have the honour· to transmit to you 
the report of the Panel. submitted to me by the Chairperson of the Panel. I should be 
grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security 
Council. · 
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan 
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144. RCD-Goma has designed a fiscal system based 
mainly on the mining sector. About six different forms 
of tax exist in this sector, and they are applied on 
approximat~ly eight different types of minerals, 
including the most important (coltan, gold and 
diamonds). From RCD official statistics the Panel 
notes that in 1999 on average 60 kg of gold was 
extracted every month from the area controlled by 
RCD. That is about 720 kg a year. In 2000, the 
extraction was higher, up to I 00 kg a month. With 
regard to coltan, 27 tons were extracted every month in 
1999, while 29 tons were produced every montit in 
iooo. Given the number of comptoirs (l 9 for coltan), 
and the six types of tax, the Panel concludes that 
substantial revenues through tax collection are 
available to RCD. It is however dHffcult to estimate the 
figures, although some insiders have ·told the Panel that 
the financial situation has been improving since late 
2000, and the prospects for a balanced budget are 
better than two years ago. Information obtained from 
documents.and individuals suggests that. in addition to 
taxes levied and shares it' holds in SOMIGL. RCD-
Goma has given a monopoly· of coltan to SOMIGL, in 
exchange for which it receives $1 million monthly. 
145. lllastratioa of the commercial activities of 
RCD. A preponderance of information obtained from 
documents and individuals regarding the activities of 
RCD-Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, and 
elsewhere during the current hostilities 
overwhelmingly suggesta that RCD-Goma and others 
are marketing the natural resources of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo - gold, diamonds and 
timber - through Dar es Salaam. Gold and diamonds 
belonging to RCD-Ooma are shipped through their 
f'mancial and logistical network, via Dar es Salaam, for 
saJe on the international market. In order to facilitate 
the movement of the commodities an~ to give the 
appearance of legitimacy; RCD-Goma obtains 
documents to ·. hide or coier their owner~hip. The 
documents covering the shipments of gold and 
diamonds arc completed forms of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Tho forms indicate issuance 
from a government organization, complete with the 
required stamps and signatures indicating approval and 
issuance in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. RCD-Goma 's 
representatives in Dares Salaam coordinate the receipt, 
forwarding and sale of gold and diamond shipments. 
The gold shipments transit through Dar es Salaam 
international airport for sale to buyers in Sri Lanka and 
32 
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elsewhere. The diamond shipments are held at the 
Bank of Tanzania before being forwarded to Belgium 
the Netherlands and South Africa. ' 
146. The gold and diamonds are being sold by RCD-
Goma in exchange for cash or bartered for armaments 
and medicines to support continuation of the current 
hostilities. RCD-Goma1.s .~p.i:tsentath,·es in Dar es 
Salaam also arrange for the purchase of foodstuffs and 
~ther logistical needs for the war effort. In addition, 
timber resources from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo are being shipped through Dar es Salaam to 
Greece and Belgium. In the case of Greece, the timber 
transaction is _ bein& partially arranged by an 
import/export business located in Goma. The 
shipments .of gold, diamonds and timber are also 
processed in Dar ,es Sa1aam in cooperation with RCD 
representatives by a company believed to be a covert 
business entitY created for the purpose of facilitating 
support for the financial and logistical operations of 
RCD-Goma. It is important ~o note that the activities 
described above represent ~ RCD-Goma operation and 
are exclusive of operations handled by the Government 
of Rwanda, via Kigali. 
147. The Panel concludes on this point that the major 
rebel lfOUps arc gradually becoming autonomous 
(MLC/FLC and RCD-Go.ma) in terms of supply of 
military equipment. They are capable of raising 
sub~ntial amounts of cash, enough to buy the light 
eq~1pment they use. Equally they have put in place 
their own network and contacts. which would allow 
the.m to pu_rchase their own equipment when necessary. 
Tots grow10g autonomy has manifested itself recently 
as RCD-Goma has requested that money usually given 
to the Congo desk by diamond dealers be shared 
equally between both entities. Equally, RCD-Goma has 
initiated some military attacks on RCD-ML positions 
in order to occupy mineral-rich areas as shown earlier. 
As the need for an autonomou, supply of weapons 
grows, so does the need to find additional resources 
and therefore clashes for the control of mineral-rich 
areas will be recurrent; so goes the vicious circle of 
war and exploitation of natural resources on the side of 
the rebellion. 
Democratic RepubUc of tbe Coago 
148. The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo has relied on its minerals and mining 
industries to finance the war. Between 1998 and early 
200 l, the strategy for financing the war was based on 
··--·-··----- ----.. - ··----.--~· .... ·- ··---·-- · .. - ·- .. -··-·-- ·-----....... -.... _ , _ ____ .. ___________ , ,,_ 
three, pillars, namely (a) search for cash through the 
attribution of monopolies; (b) direct and indirect 
uptake of funds from parastatals and other private 
companies; and (c) creation of joint ventures between 
parastatals and foreign companies in countries allied 
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
149. Search for cash. The late President '1Sed 
different schemes to raise funds. He instituted the tax 
parafiscale (see para. 41) and also implemented 
schemes such as the creation of a monopoly for the 
commercialization of -diamonds. 
I SO. Mouopoly on diamonds granted to 
International Diamond Industries (IDI). According 
to government sources, the objective of this monopoly 
was twofold: tll'St, to have fist and fresh money that 
could be used for the purchase of needed arms, and 
address some of the pending problems with the allies. 
Second, to have access to Israeli military equipment 
and intelligence given the special ties that the Director 
of International Diamond Industries, Dan Gertlcr, has 
with some generals in the Israeli ariny. 
I 5 I. This deal turned out to be a nightmare for the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and a disaster for the local diamond trade as well as an 
embarrassment for the Republic of the Congo, which is 
currently flirting with illicit diamonds. According to 
different sources. IDI paid only $3 million instead of 
. $20 million and never supplied military equipment. 
152. President Joseph Kabila has expressed 
willingness to liberalize the diamond trade in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and IMF and the 
World Bank are very supportive of this move. IOI is, 
however. threatening to sue the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The ID( deal also 
turns out to be a disaster for the local diamond trade. 
As the monopoly was granted to IOI, most diamond 
dealers operating in the Government-controlled area 
crossed to Brazzaville to sell their diamonds. It is 
estimated that during the first ·three months of the 
monopoly, $60 million worth of diamonds from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo were sold on the 
international market. and the Republic of the Congo 
was mentioned as the country of origin. This 
smuggling of diamonds deprived the already ailing 
economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 
substantial sums of money and the treasury of 
substantial tax revenues. This case shows that the 
desperate need for quick cash to finance the defence of 
its territory has instead brought other problems to the 
Government and has paradoxically deprived the 
treasury of substantial.revenue. 
153. Uptaking money from parastatals. Another way 
of financing the war has been the direct and indirect 
uptake of money from parastatals and other private 
companies. mainly the Societ6 miniere de Bakwanga 
and the . Generale des carrieres et des mines 
(Gecamines). The Government bas claimed from 
MIBA since August 1998 on average two fifths of their 
earnings. The Panel was told that in some cases ~ 
fifths, the equivalent of $4 million per sale, was sent to 
the President's office. The Panel has also confirmation 
that' oil companies gave important sums of money as 
taxe.s par:ajiscalu to the Govemmeot. In mo,t use~ 
this cash in Congolese francs was delivered to Victor 
Mpoyo, who then reported to the late President Kabila. 
This money was used for the salary and bonuses of 
Congolese soldiers in the battlefield. According to 
some Congolese officials. the taxes p41'aflscales . were 
never·used for the purchase of weapons. 
154. MIBA receives from tho Government . the 
equivalent of two fifths of its sales of diamonds in 
Congolese francs changed at the official rate, which is 
only one quarter of the black market rate. It is believed 
that about 75 Congolese francs for each dollar changed 
is unaccounted for and possibly · used for defence 
needs.6 
155. The contribution of Gecamines to the war effort 
appears to be on two levels. On the one hand, one third 
of the company's profit was taken directly by the 
Government in 1999 and in 2000. On the other, the 
Government contributed indirectly to the expenses of 
the Zimbabwe Defence, Forces between May 1999 and 
October 2000. 
A special cue: Zimbabwe 
156. Zimbabwe has f"manced its involvement in the 
conflict in two different ways: (a) by using the defence 
budget - the bulk of Zimbabwe's military expenses 
seem to be covered by the regular budget; (b) by 
indirect financina of the war through direct payment by 
some Congolese entities, mainly companies. According 
to two very reliable sources, during the tenure of Billy 
Rautenbach money from Gecamines paid bonuses to 
the Zimbabwean soldiers. These payments might be 








Security Council · Distr.: General 
23 October 2003 
Original: English 
Letter dated 23 October 2003 from the Secretary-General 
addressed-to-the President oftbe Security Council 
I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1457 (2003) of 
241anuary 2003, by which the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts 
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of. six months. The Council 
requested the Panel to s~bmit to it a final report at the end of its mandate. I also 
refer to resolution 1499 (2003) of 13 August 2003, by which the Council 
0
further 
extended the mandate of the panel until 31 October 2003. 
I have the honour to transmit to you the final report of the Panel, which was 
submitted to me by its Chairman, Mahmoud Kassem. I should be grateful if you 
would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council. 
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan 




41. Uganda indicated that the establishment of the Porter Commission and 
Uganda's positive role and participation in the peace process in the Great Lakes 
region constituted the most significant step that that country had taken towards 
curbing illegal exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda 
underlined that the withdrawal of its forces from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo may be considered as its most significant step, but declined to volunteer 
reco:nmendations, as it has neither the mandate nor the expertise to do so. 
Zimbabwe noted that it was "in no position to take any measures ... as neither itself 
nor its nationals were or are involved in any illegal deals in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo". As for Zambia, no ac!ditional significant measures over and 
above the existing administrative and security border controls have been taken. 
42. In terms of confidence and capacity-bui-lding measures, Uganda underscored 
the need to enhance conflict resolution in the region and re-establish effective 
·government institutions, in particular effective control of trade and revenue, in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
V. Exploitation, arms flow and conflict 
14 
43. Since the Panel's last report of 16 October 2002, a number of significant 
developments have taken place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following 
the withdrawal of foreign forces, the Congolese parties signed in December 2002 
the Global and Inclusive Agreement, which provided for the establishment in July 
2003 of the Government of National Unity. The new Congolese Parliament 
convened for the first time on 22 August. At the same time, that period also 
witnessed intensified fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
notably in the lturi district. 
44. Illegal exploitation remains one of the main sources of funding for groups 
involved in perpetuating conflict, especially in the eastern and northeastern regions 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Over the last year, such exploitation has 
been characterized by intense competition among the various political and military 
actors as they have sought to maintain, and in some instances expand, their control 
over territory. 
45. In that connection, the power vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the 
Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) and later by the Ugandan People's Defence Forces 
· (UPDF), spurred. the proliferation of militias. Those militias have vied for control 
over :;trategic zones where lucrative resources are located, and which were formerly 
held by the foreign forces. The Panel is of the opinion that the deteriorating security 
situation in ·the eastern Democratic Republic of the . Congo, which resulted from 
intensifying armed confrontations among the militias, has had a direct impact on the 
level and nature of resource exploitation, compared to previous years. Overall, the 
transition of control from foreign forces to the armed groups has led to a te111porary 
reduction in the volume of illegally exploited resources. 
46. Fact-finding and field inquiries into the actual situation on the ground were 
hampered by the fighting in the most bitterly contested areas. The Panel, 
nonetheless, understands, based on information from a variety of sources, that 
during the current period, much of the resource exploitation has concentrated on 
gold and diamonds. Those ir.inerals have a high revenue yield per unit weight, are 
e_asily transported and can be used in lieu of hard currency in transactions. Sites for 
artisanal mining of those precious minerals remain active in many regions: Ituri, 
other parts of Oriental province, North and South Kivu and Maniema. Combined 
with moneys raised at customs border posts, political and military actor.s have been 
able to fund their military activities, including the supply of arms, as illustrated in 
the diagram below. 
Exploitation 
Conflict Arms Trafficking 
47. The Panel's fact-finding indicates that those relationships, which were 
analysed in detail in its earlier reports , continue to be as important as ever. In 
breaking that cycle, it is very difficult to stem or halt illegal exploitation without 
also tackling the issue of arms trafficking. Accordingly, the focus of the Panel's 
fieldwork and fact-finding has been on the patterns and trends in arms trafficking 
and the groups involved, including an analysis of their strategies and plans. The 
Panel has gathered detailed information and documents showing how those groups 
have been, and are adjusting to recent political developments, especially the 
establishment of the Government of National Unity. It is clear that they arc 
developing strategies to b.uild and extend their political and economic control in 
various parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular the east and 
north-east. The details on exploitation and arms trafficking have been made 
available to the President and members of the Security Council. The Panel's 
information and documentation· could be useful for an arms monitoring mechanism, 
should the Security Council decide to establish one. 
VI. Next steps 
48. While it has intensified during the recent conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, the ·exploitation of natural resources that does not benefit the majority 
of the Congolese people is not a new phene-menon. It did not start with the 
establishment of the Panel three years ago, nor will it end with the conclusion of its 
mandate. In the absence of a strong, central and democratically elected Government 
that is in control of its territory, illegal exploitation will continue and serve as the 
motivation and the fuel for continued conflicts in the region, to the detriment of the 
Congolese people, who have suffered too much for too long. 
49. The establishment of a transitional Government and institutions iii the 





However, and for the reasons highlighted above, the process is. not yet irreversible. 
Major obstacles will continue to be faced as the country moves from a state of 
conflict and division, to that of reunification, peace, security and economic 
recovery." There i-hould be no illusion that the Congolese people will be able to carry 
out that colos11al task on their own. Without " the active engagement of the 
international community, the chances of success will be minimal. The international 
community has already demonstrated its political resolve and commitment with the 
adoption of resolution 1493 (2003) of 28 July 2003, which strengthened the mandate 
of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC), as well as with the rapid deployment of the Interim Emergency 
Multinational Force to Bunia last June. However, the time has now come for the 
international community to demonstrate the same commitment by providing in a 
coonii11atett maffffer w-gently needed -teelmieal-afld fman-cial aS'S'i-stanee-itt support t>f 
the transitional process. The Panel has consistently highlighted the need in its earlier 
reports for a strengthened national capacity to assume control and regulate the 
exploitation of the natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Now 
is the time to pursue that ob~~ctive. 
50. Ensuring that a Central Government is in control of its natural resources for 
the benefit of the .population will be a complex process with different phases. One of 
the most significant challenges is enabling the timely extension of the transitional 
authority throughout the national territory, in particular in such problematic areas as 
Ituri and the Kivus. The transitional Government, with the assistance of the 
international community, should consider that a high priority. Where possible, 
bringing the existing administrative structures in former rebel-held areas back under 
the management of the central authorities of the Government of National Unity 
could be a starting point. The extensio& of government authority should also be 
accompanied by a reform of the rule of law sector and the re-establishment of a 
criminal justice capacity in all its components: police, judiciary and corrections. 
MONUC and the international assistance will be vital in that regard, inter alia, by 
providing technical assistance in the reform of the legislative instruments, including 
the penal system and the penal procedure codes, with a view to tailoring those 
instruments to the needs of courts that function effectively and in harmony with the 
international legal instruments to which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
party. Material support will also be required for the training of a national integrated 
police force and the rehabilitation of criminal justice facilities. 
51. The most important factor in ensuring the reunification of the national territory 
will he the effective integration of the new armed forces. While the transitioMl 
partners ·have rea~hed agreement on the command structure of those forces, its 
actual integration has yet to take place. In addition to the will of the parties, which, 
as demonstrated .earlier, continues to be lacking, the success of that exercise will 
also require a national strategy for the armed forces that determines the size and 
structure of the forces as well as the national military headquarters to take effective 
control over all armed militias in order to create the new integrated forces. Again, 
the support of the international community will be vital for the training of the new 
forces as well as in the effective and timely demobilization and reintegration of the 
excess personnel. 
52. Parallel to the extension of government authority, there are a number of 
institutional reforms that have to be initiated immediately in order to allow the 
democratically e lected Central Government - once in place - to ensure the legal 
exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They 
include the following recommendations: 
• Effective control of the national borders is a prerequisite if the flow of 
i11egally extracted natural resources and arms is· to be ste!llmed. While the 
unified national army and police will have a major role in that regard, an 
effective customs administration can bring many benefits, including higher tax 
revenues and a reduction in smuggling. A comprehensive diasnostic review 
should therefore be undertaken of the customs service (Office ·des douancs et 
accises) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, preferably with the 
assistance of recognized international consultants. Following that review, a 
comprehensive strategy, covering the medium-term, to upgrade the agency 
should be developed and implemented. Such a strategy would address training, 
equipment and, in particular, sound management issues 
• The Democratic Republic of the Congo has traditionally been plagued with, at 
best, an inefficient accounting and auditing system. Strengthening and 
enlarging the government auditing function, the Cour des comptes, is required 
so that it has the capacity to _undertake regular auditing of all government 
departments and agencies throughout the country. Auditing of natural resource 
revenues should also be undertaken by the Cour des comptes with the 
publication of annual and other more frequent reports. In_ that regard, 
accounting systems must be developed for the provinces, especially for 
conflict areas in the Kivus and Ituri, so that transparency of both revenues and 
expenditure can be established. Such transparency is necessary to ensure that 
all provinces receive their fair share of the revenues from national reso urces, 
· as well as from mineral developments in their areas. Moreover, such disclosure 
should make local administrations more accountable for the management of 
public funds. Measures should also be taken to ensure that amounts due to the 
regional government administrations, including the Entites administratives 
decentralisees, from the Central Government in Kinshasa are paid on time. 
Spending that is not in the budget approved by Parliament should immediately 
come to a halt 
• Serious consideration should be given to the break-up of the lcrge State-owned 
mineral resource enterprises, such as Gecamines and MIBA (Societe miniere 
de Bakwanga). Those grossly inefficient entities have traditionally been the 
vehicles by. which the wealth generated from Congolese resources has been 
channelled ·away from the rightful owner, the Congolese people. In that 
connection, the Panel assesses th .. t overhauling and restoring sound 
managementto many of those enterprises will not be cost-effective in view of 
the enormity of the task and the obstacles that they face. With the assistance of 
the international community, the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo should therefore consider selling off enterprises either as they 
currently are or in parts that are likely to be of interest to potential investors. 
Widening the benefits from natural resource exploitati-On 
53. Disclosure of revenues earned from the natural resource sector is an important 
step towards transparency in that highly lucrative sector. The "publish what you 
pay" initiative should be implemented in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 





• Natural resource companies, both domestic and foreign, to disclose all the 
payments that they make to the Government (e.g. concession fees, taxes, fees 
and royalties) 
. . . 
• The Government to disclose what it has received from those companies and 
also how the receipts have been used, including amounts paid into the 
proposed natural resource fund (see below). It will be necessary to develop 
reporting/disclosure guidelines that are both as comprehensive as possible but 
at the same time streamlined. Within the Democratic. Republic of the Congo, 
disclosure should not only be at the Central Government level, but also at the 
provincial level so that amounts accruing to each province/district, in 
accordance with mining and codes can be tracked. Responsible companies 
should benefit from a more level playing field in their activities in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
• The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to ~onsider making the 
implementation of the "publish what you pay" initiative a condition for further 
funding to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
. . ' . 
• International stock exchanges to consider including in their listing 
requirements the mandatory disclosure of payments by companies involved in 
extractive industries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
• The capacity of civil society should be enhanced through funding, tr&ning and 
partnerships to monitor the collection and expenditure of government revenues 
from the extractive sector. International donors and NGOs can probably play 
an important role in building such capacity among Congolese NGOs and 
associations. 
54. One step in ensuring a more equitable distribution of the wealth generated 
from the exploitation of natural resources could be to establish a natural resources 
fund into which a portion of natural resource proceeds are paid. The fund would use 
its revenues in social and economic infrastructure projects, including job creation 
programmes and diversification initiatives to help regions reduce their dependency 
on natural resources. The fund should be managed by an autono;nous government 
agency, with international technical assistance and monitoring that would be 
independe_nt. of the established ministries responsible for raising and spending 
government moneys. 
55. Similarly, where a natural resource company operates in an area where local 
infrastructure is -underdeveloped, and where the capacity to build schools and 
hospitals and other public facilities does not exist, consideration could be given to 
allowing the company to build such facilities in return for receiving tax credits. That 
could enable the local community to enjoy more quickly the benefits generated by 
the company's presence. To avoid abuse, it would be necessary to enscre that such 
facilities had been sanctioned as necessary and what level of tax credit was 
appropriate. 
56. Large international mining and oil companies have been shown to contribute 
more to the countries in which faey operate than their smaller ccmpetitors. In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the artisanal mining carried out by rebel groups 
and militias has been particularly bad in the way local communities have been 
mistreated, land has been stolen for exploitation and environmental damage has 
been caused. Moreover, many workers have been forced to work in slave-like 
conditions. Large mining companies have been shown to be generally much better 
employers than small or medium-scale mining firms. There may be. very sizeable 
multiple effects in the jobs they can create both directly and in subcontracted firms 
that supply goods and services. 
57. Backward linkages from foreign multinationals to domestic firms are 
important channels through which direct and indirect employment can be created. 
Foreign mining and oil companies operating in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo should ,be encou;aged to subcontract the provision of as many support 
services as possible to Congolese companies. 
58. The measures outlined above will require substantial and coordinated 
assistance from the international community. In that connection, donors may wish to 
cOB:S·ider esta:bli-shlng· a ·atffl:tH' ctlt)rdination meeltaftttm .. that coolti ·ideitt-i.fy with· the 
Government of National Unity and MONUC the priority needs and allocate the 
required resources. The coordination mechanism could subsequently monitor the 
expenditure of those allocations to ensure its most effective use. · 
Immediate steps 
Arms monitoring 
59. The Panel realizes that the foregoing measures cannot be fully implemented in 
the immediate future and will require the sustained efforts over a long period of time 
of both the Congolese and international stakeholders. Immediate interim measures 
should therefore be considered to stem the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
until such time when a strong Government could assume that role. As elaborated 
earlier in the present report, the flow of arms, exploitation and the continuation of 
the conflict are inextricably linked. Each of those three elements thrives on the other 
two. Without the wealth generated by the illegal exploitation of natural resources, 
arms cannot be bought, hence the conflict, which almost always involves grave 
human rights abuses and large-scale population displacement, cannot be 
perpetuated. Without arms, the ability to continue the conflict, thereby creating the 
conditions for illegal exploitation of resources, cannot be sustained. 
60. Breaking that vicious cycle will be key to ending both the conflict and the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources. Emphasis should therefore be placed on 
stemming and, if possible, halting the flow of illegal arms to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. That is the weakest element in the cycle, and the area where 
th~ internatio-nal community ~an play an effective role. The Panel feels thc.t the 
in~ernational community is cognizant of the threat posed by the_.illegal flow of arms, 
as demonstrated by the arms embargo imposed on Ituri and the Kivus by the 
Security Council in its resolution 1493 (2003). In that connection, the Council may 
wish to consider establishing a monitoring mechanism, as envisaged in paragraph 23 
of its resolution. 
61. Such a mechanism could complement the role entrusted to MONUC in the 
monitoring of compliance of the arms embargo by tracking the !"ull scope of the 
arms flow supply chain, from manufacturer or supplier to the final beneficiary, 
including the financing of the process through the illegal exploitation of resources 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The high risk of exposure that such a 
monitoring mechanism could create would contribute to deterring arms trafficking 





flows and continued conflict by directing actions at all parties in the chain from 
manufacturing, brokering, financing and transporting to end-users and training. 
62. Such a mechanism would provide a greater degree of mobility, flexibility and 
adaptability in monitoring the arms embargo compared wi'th today, since having 
human resources on the ground would complement any air surveillance and 
interdiction capability. MONUC should have the capacity to make seizures on the 
ground. Undoubtedly, the success of the proposed monitori!lg mechanism will 
depend on close collaboration with MONUC . 
. Peace dividend 
.63. If the hearts and minds of the people living in conflict areas in the Democratic 
Rep-11hlie of the- C-e-ngo- are to ht:" won over, they wi-H need re-be-quickly ce-nvinced 
that peace is better than conflict. It is vital. to break the dependency link between 
armed groups carrying out natural resource exploitation and the local communities 
if their activities are to be brought to an end. Specific quick impact projects need to 
be undertaken to convince people of the advantages of peace. Hospitals, clinics and 
schools need to be reopened and local policing re-established·. Massive job creation 
schemes involving the repair of roads, sanitation systems and public buildings 
should be devised to get adults back into the workforce. Farmers need to be 
encouraged to return to their fields and start farming again to produce food again. 
That requires a major reduction in the level of banditry. 
64. Given that the population is spread out over large rural areas, projects are 
required that go down to the village level in conflict areas. They need to be designed 
to restore basic social services and security rapidly. Specially trained teams of civil 
servants with local knowledge should be tasked to undertake those projects 
supported by security personnel, as circumstances dictate. 
Regional cooperation and confidence-building measures 
65. None of the above recommendations can be sustained in the long term unless a 
regional solution can be found. The legitimate concerns of all regional actors must 
be addressed in a comprehensive manner to allow a culture of good neighbourly 
relations to evolve. The Principles on Good Neighbourly Relations adopted by the 
parties during the meeting convened in New York by the Secretary-General on 
25 September is a step in that direction. In the immediate future, confidence-
building measures are needed to take forward those principles,. One such measure 
should tackle the issue of the foreign-armed groups in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, including the ex-FAR/lnterahamwe. 
Also to be addressed are the status of the Banyamulenge and other ethnic groups, 
such as the Banyarwandans in North and South Kivu. In dealing with those issues, 
the Government of National Unity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will 
require the cooperation of neighbouring countries and the support of the 
international community. 
66. Regional economic cooperation bodies, especially the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa, in which the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its 
immediate eastern neighbours, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, are members, should 
work to bolster legal trade and investment that benefits all the countries. They 
should set up working groups to examine in detail how to enhance trade and 
economic cooperation that will bring win-win results to trading among the four 
countries, in particular between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its 
neighbours. 
VII. ·. hnpact of the Panel's work and lessons learned 
Impact 
67. The work of the Panel was useful because it set a number of precedents. It 
developed a model that explains the links between illegal exploitation and the 
. funding of armed groups, which have fomented conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, including the arms they purchase. With the information provided by 
the Panel, the international community was made much more aware o f the scale of 
the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
68. The international community now has a deeper understanding of the illicit 
exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of· the Congo, 
including. the role of companies and business peqple involved. Moreover, there is an 
appreciation of the need to assistcountries in managing their natural resources for 
the long-term development and welfare of their populations. 
69. The Panel has made a major contribution to the progress of the peace process. 
That was, for example, evident in its role in encouraging the various actors to 
participate in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and prompting the withdrawal of foreign 
forces, in particular from Ituri and the Kivus. 
70. The Panel has breathed life into the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and drawn attention to their applicability in developing countries and, 
especially, in conflict areas. A number of cases have been referred by the Panel to 
OECD National Contact Points in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
71. The Panel's work has spurred Governments, NGOs and other organizations or 
associations to pursue their own investigations into the plundering of resources. 
That has taken place within the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as 
internationally. In Uganda, following his implication in exploitation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo by a government commission, the head of the 
defence forces, General Kazini, was relieved of his post. In Belgium, a number of 
diamond dealers have been indicted in connection, inter alia, with their activities in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that regard, it is important for the 
international community to support and strengthen the monitoring capacity of civil 
soi;iety, in the form of NGOs and other groups, so that they can play a greater and 
more effective role. 
72. The enactment of the Forestry Code and the Mining Code benefited from 
recommendations included in the Panel's reports. Its reports also spurred reform of 
the diamond sect-Or, including the fact that the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
has become a member of the Kimberley Process. 
73. Consideration is being given in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the 
establishment of a ·government body or commission to review and possibly revise all 
natural resource concessions and contracts signed since 1997.. That was 






74. There have been several instances of the Panel's sources having to leave the 
region after being uncovered. Given the sensitive and vital nature of information 
they can provide, for future panels, some form of:a witness protection programme 
should be established at the outset with the support of the Office of Legal Affairs of 
the Secretariat. 
7.5. Panels _have -served as very valuable contributors to the ,Security Council's 
work on peace and security issues. There is, nevertheless, a need to analyse and 
institutionalize ~nd make available, as appropriate, the experie~ces and lessons 
learned from the investigations and findings of successive panels mandated by the 
Council on. Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Liberia, 
Stef'l'a-be&ne- aad S6flla-lia. 
76. To be effective, monitoring activities concerning arms and revenue flows in 
conflict situations should be institutionalized and cover longer periods. That would 
require high levels of expertise, flexibility iµ_ conducting fieldwork and adequate 
support of the relevant United Nations bodies and Secretariat. 
(Signed) Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem 
Chairman 
(Signed) Andrew Danino 
(Signed) Alf Gorsjo 
(Signed) Mel Holt 
(Signed) Bruno Schiemsky 
(Signed) Ismaila Seek 
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Excerpt from the United Nations Panel of Experts Report on the Democratic Republic of Congo 2005 
United Nations 
• 
Security Council Distr.: General 
26 July 2005 
o_rigi~al: English 
Letter dated 26 July 2005 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee estab1lshed pursuant to resolution 1--s33""(Z0{)4) 
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the 
President of the Security Council 
On . behalf. of the Security Councii Comm.ittee · established pursuant . to 
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in 
accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 1596 (2005), I have the honour to 
submit herewith the report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. 
I would appreciate it if this letter, together with its enclosure, were to be 
brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a 
document of the Council. 
05-41118 (E) 220705 
*0541118 * 
(Signed) Abdallah Baali 
Chairman 
Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the 
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commonality of purpose, in opposition to the Transitional Government, FARDC and 
MONUC. The Group has been unable to investigate the allegations independently, 
because of time constraints, but notes that such alliances are not new to Ituri district. 
In the past, the Group has documented negotiated settlements between FAPC, UPC 
and FNI over the sharing oftenitory and revenuesources .. 
37. On the .basis of its collection of data, the Group notes new circumstances 
giying rise to joint arrangements. More highly mobile than in the,,,past because of 
hicr:eased deployments of FARDC and MONUC, th~ dissident g,oups are utilizing 
overlapping corridors for access to needed supplies. In view of the extension of 
State structures at key border crossings, however weak and incomplete, former 
supply entry .points are less effectµal, resulting in a shift to more remote areas. 
Another result is the rise to prominence of experienced smugglers, such as the FNI 
commander Peter "Karim" Ugada, among the dissident forces. 
38. The Group notes the progftlss being made to further weaken supply lines for 
some of the dissident militia. For example, PUSIC control over Tchomia and 
Kasenyi ports has been undermined, particularly with the. arrest of Chief Kahwa, the 
leader of PUSIC. The movement of goods across Lake Albert at those junctures is to 
a limited degree better monitored, thanks to the slow introduction. of central 
Government, Customs services, FARDC marine patrols, and the presence of 
MONUC. 
39. Similarly, {JPC-L, FNI and ex-FAPC dissident forces are no longer in direct 
control of major border crossings, including Aru and Mahagi. The Group documented 
heavy fighting between FARDC and UPC-L and ex-FAPC remnants in the region 
around Berunda, which serves as a major gateway between Mongbwalu and Mahagi 
and Aru territories. Progress is also being made in Mongbwalu, where some 120 
peacekeepers have been deployed and have started inspecting incoming aircraft. 
Connections with neighbouring States 
40. According to reliable reports, leaders of dissident factions in conjunction with 
other Congolese dissidents have held operational meetings in Uganda and Rwanda 
for the purpose of resisting the transition and peace process in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. The Group asked the Governments of Uganda and Rwanda 
to investigate those allegations, including the activities of the individuals and other 
specifics .. Both Governments assured the Group that no such meetings had been held 
on their territories. 
41. . The Group has asked the Government of Uganda-in writing and orally over a 
period oLthree mandates to provide it with detailed 'information pertaining to 
meetings between Ugandan Government officials, Ituri armed group leaders and 
other dissidents, which Uganda claims were for the purpose of the peace process in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group is still waiting for this 
information from Uganda. 
42. Uganda has informed the Group that a number of former FAPC combatants, 
including Colonel Ali Mbuzi and Major Ramazani Barume Rams, are seeking 
political asylum. Their applications a.re being considered by an Eligibility 
Committee, which operates under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office. The 
Group requested information on those asylum-seekers from the Government of 
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[TRANSLATION - TRADUCTION] 
CONVENTION1 ESTABLISHING THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF 
THE GREAT LAKES COUNTRIES (CEPOL) 
The President of the Republic of Burundi, the President of the Rwandese 
Republic, the President of the Republic of Zaire, 
In accordance with the spirit of the agreements signed at Kinshasa on 29 August 
1966, the Goma Declaration signed on 20 March 1967, 2 the resolutions signed at 
Bujumbura on 12 June 1969 and 12 June 1974, and the solemn declaration signed at 
Bukavu on ~May 197S, 
Considering the historical, geographical and cultural links between their States, 
their similar development problems, their common interests and their common aspi-
rations for peace, security and progress, 
In accordance with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations, and in loyalty to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, l 
Resolved to consolidate and increase co-operation and trade, and to join forces 
in economic, cultural and social development endeavours, 
Guided by their common desire to increase understanding between their peoples 
and co-operation between their States in order to consolidate their fraternity and 
integrated solidarity as part of a greater unity transcending national characteristics, 
Convinced that the establishment of regional economic groups constitutes an 
objective approach and a realistic basis for African unity, 
Desiring to promote mutual understanding and solidarity between the member 
States so as to foster in perpetuity a climate propitious to economic co-operation and 
the maintenance of friendly and peaceful relations between them, 
Decide to establish the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries 
(CEPGL) and agree as follows: 
PART I. 0BJ'ECTIVES 
Article J. ·· By this Convention the High Contracting Parties establish among 
them an Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), hereinafter 
referred to as the Community. 
1 Came into force on 17 April 1978, the date by which the Instruments of ratification ofthesignatoryStateshad been 
deposited with the Oovernment of Rwanda, in accordance with article :35. The deposit of the instruments of ratification 
was effected as follows: 
Dale of df'P0$1t 
of 1/U' ilUtrUIMIIIS 
S1a1~ of ratijit:ation 
Burundi . . . • . . . . • • • • . • . . • • • • . • • . . . • . . • • • . • • • • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . . • . • . • 7 January 1977 
Rwanda ............................... , •.• - ••.•.....••. - .................... ~ . , . 13 January 19"17 
Zaire • , •• , .•••.• •.••••••..•••••..•.••••••••.•••..••.•.••...•••••••• , • . . . . 17 Apr.II 1978 
2 Sec p. 31 of this volume. 
3 United Nations, Treaty Serles. vol. 479, p. 39. 
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Article 2. The aims of the Community shall be: 
1. To ensure, first and-foremost, the security of the States and their people in such a 
way that nothing disturbs peace and order along their respective frontiers; 
2. To devise, plan and encourage the organimtion and development of activities of 
common interest; 
3. To promote and intensify trade and the movement of persons and goods; 
4. To co-operate closely in the social, economic, commercial, scientific, cultural, 
political, military,-financial. technical and tourist fi.el!is, and more particularly in 
legal, customs, public health, energy, transport and telecommunications mat-
ters. 
Article 3. In order to attain these objectives, the member States solemnly 
d le • • • • • the bl . :i-..i • • lar un ei tre to wuate appropnate actro,con · purems mvo.lY""' m pai ucu~, 
through the establishment of common agencies and services, and by the signing of 
understandings, agreements or conventions. 
Article 4. Any member State which is or becomes a member of other organi-
zations promoting economic co-operation shall inform the Community and commu-
nicate to it those provisions. of the constituent instruments which may relate to the 
Community's aims. · 
PART D. INSTITUTIONS 
Article 5. In order to achieve their aim, the High Contracting Parties have 
agreed to establish the following organs: 
The Conference of Heads of State; 
The Council of Ministers and the State Commissioner; 
- The Permanent Executive Secretariat; 
The Arbitration Commission. 
Section I. THE CoNFERENCB OF HEADS OF STATE 
Article 6. The Conference of Heads of State shall be the Community's 
supreme authority. It shall have decision-making power in all spheres, and in parti-
cular: · 
1. ··It shall promote unity and solidarity between the States; 
2. It shall co.ordinate and develop their co-operation · under the most favourable 
conditions possible, in order to ensure the happiness and prosperity of their 
peoples; 
3. It shall determine general policy in all matters relating to co-operation; 
4. I~ shall supervise the work · of the Council of I\,1inisters and the State Commis-
sioner; 
5. It shall determine the location of the Community's headquarters; 
6. It shall draw up its own rules of procedure and approve those of the other 
organs; 
7. It shall decide whether to establish specialized organs and common services; 
8. It shall decide on the Community's annual budget, on the recommendation of 
the Council of Ministers and the State Commissioner; 
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9. It shall appoint the Executive Secretary and the Assistant Executive Secretaries; 
10. It may, furthermore, on the recommendation of the Council, alter the structure, 
functions and activities of any organ; 
11. It may delegate its decision-making power in designated matters to the Council 
of Ministers and the State Commissioner. 
Article 7. The Conference shall hold a regular session once a year and special 
sessions as required. It shall be convened by the current President of the Community, 
who shall determine the date of and venue for the session . 
. Article 8. The Conference shall be presid«{ over each year by a Head of State,· 
chosen in rotation in the alphabetical order of the names of the States. 
Article 9. Decisions by the Conference shall be taken unanimously. Each 
State shall be entitled to speak and to vote. 
· Article JO. The decisions adopted by the Conference shall be binding on all 
member States, which undertake to implement them. 
Section II. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE STATE CoMMJss10NER 
Article I 1. The Council of Ministers and the State Commissioner of the Com-
munity shall comprise members of the Governments and Executive Council of the 
member States or plenipotentiaries designated by the States. 
Article 12. The Council shall be presided over each year by a Minister or State 
Commissioner, in rotation. The Minister or State Commissioner may not be from 
the country which is currently presiding over the Conference of Heads of State. 
Article 13. The Council shall hold a regular session twice a year; one of the 
sessions must precede the regular session of the Conference of Heads of State. It 
shall be convened by the current President, who shall determine the date of and 
venue for the session. 
Article 14. At the request of a member State, the Council may meet in special 
session; subject to the consent of all the members. Special sessions shall be convened 
by the current President. The agenda of a special session shall, in principle, comprise 
only those matters for which it was convened. 
Article 15. The Council shall be responsible for promoting any activities aimed 
at achieving the objectives defined in articles 1 and 2 above. 
Article 16. The Council shall formulate and propose general development and 
co-operation policy measures for the States members of CEPGL. It shall be responsi-
ble to the Conference of Heads of State. 
Article 17. The Council shall be responsible for preparing for the Conference 
of Heads of State. It shall consider any matter referred to it by.the Conference and 
shall implement the policy of co-operation determined by the Conference of Heads 
of State. 
Vol. 1092, l-J6748 
1978 United Natlous - TrestJ Series • Nations UIIJes - Recudl des Trait& ·SJ 
Article 18. Council decisions under article 6, paragraph 11, shall be taken 
unanimously, and shall be binding on all member S~tes, which undertake to imple-
ment them. Each member State shall be entitled to speak and to vote. 
Section III. THE PERMANENT EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT 
Article 19. The Permanent Executive Secretariat of the Community shall be 
the responsibility of the Executive Secretary. 
The functions of the Executive Secretary shall be: 
To formulate projects of .common interest and to submit them to member States 
with specific proposals relating, in particular, to the establishment of industries, 
taking account of common criteria, mutual advantage and the volume of trade 
to be generated-by-such industries; 
To prepare for meetings; 
To monitor the implementation of current projects, to formulate proposals for 
possible changes or readjustments, to report on· difficulties encountered and to 
propose solutions thereto; 
To make proposals relating to sources of .finance; 
To prepare working papers for the competent authorities of the member States, 
to prepare drafts of agreements, understandings and conventions among the 
member States in all areas of co-operation and, if necessary, to update such 
instruments; 
To carry out any studies necessary to promote co-operation among member 
States, such as consideration of ways and means of implementing decisions taken 
by the competent authorities, as well as consideration of any matter referred to 
him by such authorities; 
To prepare annual reports for the authorities of the member States, and an 
annual report on his work; 
To maintain the records relating to co-operation among the States. 
Article 20. The Executive Secretary shall be assisted by two Assistant Execu-
tive Secretaries and by administrative and technical staff. 
The Assistant Executive Secretaries shall be responsib~e, respectively, for: 
Political, legal, social, cultural and scientific affairs·; ·: 
Economic, technical, financial and administrative affairs. 
Article 21. The Executive Secretary and the Assistant Executive Secretaries 
shall be appointed' for a four-year term, which may be renewed by the Conference of 
Heads of State on the recommendation of the Council. 
Article 22. The statute of the Permanent Executive Secretariat and its staff 
.shall be determined by decision of the Conference of Heads of State on the recom-
mendation of the Council. 
Article 23. In the performance of thejr duties, the Executive Secretary, the 
Assistant Executive Secretaries and the administrative and technical staff shall not 
seek or receive instructions from any State, nor from any national or international 
entity. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as 
international officials. 
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(c) :aorrow; 
(cl) Institute legal proceedings; 
(e) Accept donations, legacies and gifts. 
The current President of the Conference of ·Heads of State shall be the Commu-
nity's legal.representative. He shall be competent t~ perform or delegate the above-
mentioned juridical acts. 
Article 34. The Conference shall determine the immunities and privileges to 
be granted to the Commumty, its representatives and the staff of the Executive Secre-
tariat in the territories of the member States. · 
PART V. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Article 35. This Convention shall enter into force upon 1ts ratification by the 
signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the headquarters' country 
designated as the depositary State, which shall notify all the signatory States and the 
Permanent Executive Secretariat of the said act. 
Article 36. This Convention may be acceded to by other States in the Great 
Lakes region. 
Article 37. This Co1,1vention shall be registered with the United Nations and 
the Organization of African Unity. 
Article 38. This Convention may be amended or revised by the Conference of 
Heads of State upon written request by a member State. 
Article 39. Any member State may give notice of denunciation of this Con-
vention to the current Presidentt who shall immediately notify the other member 
States. 
·The Convention shall.cease to apply to that State three years after the date of 
notification. 
Article 40. Competence with regard to the dissolution of the Community shall 
lie exclusively with the Conference of Heads of State_ which shall determine the pro-
cedure for apportioning assets and liabilities. · 
DoNE at Gisenyi on 20 September 1976. 










President of the Republic of Zaire: 
[Signed] 
MoBUTo SEsE SEKO KuKu NGBENDU WA ZA BANGA 
Army General 
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Appendix xvi 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity 
OAUCHARTER 
We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, 
Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny, 
Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential 
objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples, 
Conscious of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our 
continent for the total advancement of our peoples in all spheres of human 
endeavour, 
Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples 
and cooperation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for 
brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national 
differences, 
Convinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the 
cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and 
maintained, 
Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the 
sovereignty and t~rritorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-
colonialism in all its forms, 
Dedicated to the general progress of Africa, 
Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, to the Principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a 
solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among States, 
Desirous that all African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-
being of their peoples can be assured, 
Resolved to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening 
common institutions, 




1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an 
Organization to be known as the ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. 
2. The Or:ganization shall include the Continental African States, Madagascar 
and other lslands surrounding Africa. 
PURPOSES 
ArlicleII 
1. The Organization shall have the following purposes: 
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; 
(b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve.a 
better life for the peoples of Africa; 
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and 
independence; 
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and 
(e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
2. To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their 
general policies, especially in the following fields: 
(a) Political and diplomatic cooperation; 
(b) Economic cooperation, including transport and communications; 
(c) Educational and cultural cooperation; 
(d) Health, saniU1tion and nutritional cooperation; 
(e) Scientific and technical cooperation; and 
(f) Cooperation for defence and security. 
PRINCIPLES 
· Article III 
The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II solemnly affirm 
and declare their adherence to the following principles: 
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1. The sovereign equality of all Member States. 
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States. 
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence. 
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration. 
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as 
of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other 
States. 
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which 
are still dependent. 
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs. 
MEMBERSHIP 
Article IV 
Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a Member of 
the Organization. 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBER STATES 
Article V 
All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties. 
Article VI 
The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles 




The Organization shall accomplish its purposes through the following principal 
institutions: 
1. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
2. The Council of Ministers. 
3. The General Secretariat. 
4. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. 
THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT 
Article VIII 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme organ of the 
Organization. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss matters of 
common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general 
policy of the Organization. It may in addition review the structure, functions and 
acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies which may be created in 
accordance with the present Charter. 
ArticleIX 
The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State and Government or their 
duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once a year. At the request 
of any Member State and on approval by a two-thirds majority of the Member 
States, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session. 
ArticleX 
1. Each Member State shall have one vote. 
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a two-thirds majority of the Members 
of the Organization. 
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3. Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority. Whether or not a 
question is one of procedure shall be determined by a simple majority of all 
Member States of the Organization. 
4. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Organization shall form a quorum 
at any meeting of the Assembly. 
Article XI 
The Assembly shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure. 
THE COUNCII.. OF MINISTERS 
Article XII 
1. The Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers or other 
Ministers as are designated by the Governments of Member States. 
2. The Council of Ministers shall meet at least twice a year. When requested by 
any Member State and approved by two-thirds of all Member States, it shall 
meet in extraordinary session. 
ArticleXIH 
1. The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government. It shall be entrusted with the responsibility of 
preparing conferences of the Assembly. 
2. It shall take cognisance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly. It shall 
be entrusted with the implementation of the decision of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government. It shall coordinate inter-African 
cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly conformity 
with Article II (2) of the present Charter. 
Article XIV 
1. Each Member State shall have one vote. 
2. AU resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the members of 
the Council of Ministers. 
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3. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Council of Ministers shall form a 
quorum for any meeting of the Council 
Article XV 
The Council shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure. 
GENERAL SECRETARIAT 
ArtieleXVI 
There shall be a S·ecretary-General of the Organization, who shall be appointed by 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Secretary-General shall 
direct the affairs of the Secretariat. 
Article XVII 
There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the Organization, who 
shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
Article XVIII 
The functions and conditions of service of the Secretary-General, of the Assistant 
Secretaries-General and other employees of the Secretariat shall be governed by the 
provisions of this Charter and the regulations approved by the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government 
1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall 
not seek or receive instructions from any govemme!).t or from any other 
authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action 
which might reflect on their position as internationalofficials responsible 
only to the Organization. 
2. Each member 01 the Organization undertakes to respect the exclusive 
character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and 
not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
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COMMISSION OF MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION 
Article XIX 
, Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means 
and, to this end decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration, the composition of which and conditions of service shall be defined by a 
separate Protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and 




The Assembly shall establish such Specialized Commissions as it may deem 
necessary, including the following: 
1. Economic and Social Commission. 
2. Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission. 
3. Defence Commission. 
ArticleXXI 
Each Specialized Commission referred to in Article XX shall be composed of the 
Ministers concerned or other Ministers or Plenipotentiaries designated by the 
Governments of the Member States. 
Article XXII 
, The functions of the Specialized Commissions shall be c·arried out in accordance 
with .fhe pr-0risions of the present Charter and of the regulations appro,ed by the 




INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER 
Article XXVII 
Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of this Charter shall be 
decided by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
of the Organization. 
ADIIESION A.~D ACCESSION 
Article XXVIII 
1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the 
Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter. 
2. The Secretary-General shall, on receipt of such notification, communicate a 
copy of it to all the Member States. Admission shall be decided by a simple 
majority of the Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be 
transmitted to the Secretary-General, who shall, upon receipt of the required 
number of votes, communicate the decision to the State concerned. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Article XXIX 
The working languages of the Organization and all its institutions shall be, if 
possible African languages, English and Fren~h, Arabic and Portuguese . 
... 
ArticleXXX 
The Secretary-General may accept, on behalf of the Organization, gifts, be~uests 
and other donations made to the Organization, provided that this is approved by the 
Council of Ministers. 
Article XXXI 
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The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and immunities to be 
accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the respective territories of the 
Member States. 
CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP 
Article XXXI 
Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a written 
notification to the Secretary-General. At the end of one year from the date of such 
notification; if not withdrawn, the Charter shall eea-se-to apply witlr-respectto the 
renouncing State, which shall thereby cease to belong to the Organization. 
AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER 
Article XXXII 
This Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes a written 
request to the Secretary-General to that effect; provided, however, that the 
proposed amendment is not submitted to the Assembly for consideration until all 
the Member States have been duly notified of it and a period of one year has 
elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at least two-
thirds of all the Member States. 
IN FAITH WHEREOF, We, the Heads of African States and Governments have 
signed this Charter. 
Done in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
2Sh day of May, 1963 
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